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Abstract
Operating Outside of Empire: Trading Citizenship in the Atlantic World, 1783-1815,
looks at markets and ships as spaces for negotiation between merchants and the state. The
dissertation follows the experiences of former British colonists in America who won
independence and then immediately tried to find a way to get back into the British empire. For
American merchants, such as Nicholas Low, William Constable, and Thomas Handasyd Perkins,
the inconsistently-governed Caribbean provided an entry point to the greater British Atlantic and
the markets of the empire. These merchants won access by exploiting the opportunities offered
by environmental catastrophes, slave rebellions and trade wars.
The dissertation approaches the trade in identity through five chapters that trace the
connections formed between transatlantic merchants and their relationship to an increasingly
intrusive and powerful state apparatus. By taking citizenship and belonging in a new direction,
the dissertation looks at the ways in which commerce reshaped nationality and challenged what it
meant to be a citizen in the Atlantic World. Before the idea of the nation was fully formed,
merchants, statesmen, and philosophers offered an alternative conception of belonging and
nationality that was much more fluid and malleable. By focusing on information as a valuable
commodity, the dissertation shows how letters filled with rumors and gossip sustained an
economy without the official support of a government monopoly and even in opposition to the
Royal Navy. It was through their discussions of demand and opportunity that merchants
participated in debates about the nature of commerce, the loyalty of the citizen, and the role of
the state in regulating national identity and international trade.
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Introduction
On November 1, 1797, an American vessel known as The Indian Chief arrived in the port
of Cowes. Mr. Hewlet, The Indian Chief’s supercargo, had stopped in Cowes for the latest
commercial news when his ship was promptly seized by British authorities under suspicion of
having violated the law by trading with His Majesty’s enemies. The ship had just completed a
global voyage. Having left London in 1795, Hewlet directed The Indian Chief to the Portuguese
island of Madeira, undoubtedly to fill its hold with that island’s namesake wine, before
continuing on to the English East India Company’s outpost at Madras. From Madras, Hewlet
stopped in Dutch Batavia and then proceeded to return to England for further instructions on the
best market to sell his newly obtained wares. By flagrantly sailing across three empires in the
midst of the bloody French Revolutionary Wars, this one vessel seemed to challenge not only
Britain’s exclusive hold on India, but the entire mercantilist system which underpinned all
European overseas empires. However, when The Indian Chief found itself before the British
High Court of Admiralty on February 27, 1801, the captors defended their prize not by
emphasizing The Indian Chief’s proclivity for smashing through imperial markets, but instead by
harping on the alleged British identity of the ship and its owner. At first, this appeared to be a
peculiar tactic as The Indian Chief’s owner, Joshua Johnson, was the former American consul to
London. Johnson, who was born in America, had resided in London as a merchant since 1771.
Johnson had only left England in 1797 (two years after The Indian Chief left port) and the
captors believed that his twenty-six year residence in the country made Johnson a British
merchant, despite his official status as an American agent.
According to the captors, Johnson was a British subject whose business with The Indian
Chief violated his obligations as a subject of the crown. The court eventually sided with Johnson,
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whose representatives in court argued that Johnson was in the process of moving permanently
from England during The Indian Chief’s voyage. Judge Sir William Scott agreed, arguing in his
ruling for the restitution of the vessel that Johnson was to be “considered as an American,” from
the very moment when he “set foot on board the vessel to return to America.”1 According to the
court, Johnson was in fact a British merchant by residence, but the act of leaving the country had
transformed his identity.
Cases like that of The Indian Chief reveal the multiplicity of interpretations of nationality
and belonging that were still possible at the end of the eighteenth century. Despite the
nationalizing impulses of the Age of Revolution, trade was an activity through which merchants
and states constantly reshaped the definition of national identity.2 Merchants used the
marketplace to trade in identity and select the most appropriate nationality to safeguard their
profits. Those self-fashioned voyages often came into contact with the state when merchant
vessels were caught by privateers and hauled before the admiralty courts. In the courtroom,
merchant transnationality came into conflict with privateers and the state, each of which had a
unique and evolving understanding of national identity.
Operating Outside of Empire: Trading Citizenship in the Atlantic World, 1783-1815,
examines markets and ships as spaces for negotiation between merchants and the state. This
study follows the experiences of former British colonists in America who had just won
independence and then immediately tried to find a way to get back into the British empire. For
American merchants, the inconsistently-governed Caribbean provided an entry point to the

1

The Indian Chief, 27 Feb. 1801, see, Christopher Robinson, Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the High
Court of Admiralty, 1798-[1808], vol. 3 (London: A. Strahan, 1802), 12–21.
2
My approach to the Age of Revolution embraces the broad chronological and geographical framework adopted by
Subrahmanyam and Armitage, see, Sanjay Subrahmanyam and David Armitage, eds., The Age of Revolutions in
Global Context, c. 1760-1840 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
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greater British Atlantic and the markets of the empire. They won access by exploiting the
opportunities offered by environmental catastrophes, slave rebellions and trade wars. For the first
ten years of independence, Americans maneuvered around restrictive trade regulations through
subterfuge, intermediary ports, and outright smuggling.
The period bracketed between the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars brought
new challenges and opportunities for American merchants, who faced increasing scrutiny as
neutral carriers in hostile waters. American nationality, while undefined, became a liability as
British and French authorities suspected the American flag of covering enemy property. When
American sea captains left home waters they were forced to negotiate with foreign merchants,
naval officers, and admiralty court judges to justify their national identity and the legitimacy of
their neutral commerce. By the turn of the century, state reforms had closed regulatory loopholes
and rationalized the administration of the empire, effectively constricting foreign contact with
the British colonies. Armed with these weapons of economic warfare, British privateers seized
vessels based on the mere suspicion that American ships intended to venture towards blockaded
enemy ports. Ultimately, the Royal Navy’s supremacy in the Atlantic provided the British a
chance to increase drastically the scale of Britain’s economic dominance through the licensing of
all commercial activity. In other words, precisely at the moment that historians traditionally
claim that “economic liberalism” gained traction over mercantilist systems, the British
introduced a new system wherein the state could control free enterprise by forcing Atlantic
merchants to pay to play. After twenty-five years of independence, American commerce once
again operated under the umbrella of the British Empire. Peace may have brought America’s
political separation from Europe, but economic interdependence persisted well into the middle of
the nineteenth century.
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This study brings into focus the Caribbean as the center of European negotiations over
trade, citizenship, and empire. While focusing on the Atlantic as a field of inquiry, it views the
ocean as a conduit, which allowed merchant practices to flow into a wider world that
increasingly experienced the effects of consumer globalization since the sixteenth century. My
research traces the connections formed between transatlantic merchants and their relationship to
an intrusive and powerful state apparatus. Information was a valuable commodity, and the letters
filled with rumor and gossip sustained an economy without the official support of a government
monopoly. It was through their discussions of demand and opportunity that merchants
participated in debates about the nature of legitimate commerce, the loyalty of the citizen, and
the role of the state in regulating national identity and international trade.
The story of Americans operating outside of empire engages with a wide range of
historical scholarship on identity, globalization, and the Atlantic World. As a distinct field, the
Atlantic offers an important window into understanding the connections between individuals
belonging to different empires, operating on the frontier, or even in imperial metropoles. The
Atlantic World was a sphere of interaction, at the intersection of four continents, where
commodities, people, and ideas flowed across borders despite closed imperial controls.3 Instead
of a stateless utopia, the Atlantic World subsumed overlapping systems of governance and
market control. Atlantic studies, then, reveal the experiences of individuals living in an early
modern world of cross-border circulation and immense state growth.
Work in Atlantic history has focused on the transatlantic exchange of goods, people and
ideas. In taking this approach, scholars of the Atlantic World were inspired by Fernand Braudel’s
groundbreaking studies on global trade and the regional unity of the Mediterranean. Braudel’s
3

On the Atlantic as a “sphere of interaction”, see, Nathaniel Millett, “Borderlands in the Atlantic World,” Atlantic
Studies 10, no. 2 (2013): 268–95.
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focus on a ‘shared sea’ and the circulation of goods and money uncovered hidden connections
which united disparate peoples together under a common culture. Braudel’s work on climate and
circulation has inspired scholars to consider whether the Atlantic was another shared sea.4 In
pursuing this idea, Atlantic historians have adopted Braudel’s view of a ‘complex of seas’ in
order to accommodate the geographic and cultural diversity of the communities which made up
the Atlantic World.5 The ‘complex of seas’ approach has encouraged the study of several
nationalized Atlantics (British, French, Spanish, and Dutch) which overlapped and interacted
with one another. By looking at Atlantic worlds, the story of empire is no longer limited by
imperial borders or even simple models of center and periphery.6
According to Bernard Bailyn, Atlantic history is more than a composite of national
histories, historians should instead focus on the ‘informal actuality’ that lies beneath the
mercantilist policies of governments.7 Since David Armitage championed a methodology known
as ‘Cis-Atlantic History’, scholars have opened our eyes to the importance of particular spaces
and their relationship to the wider Atlantic World in order to overcome the obscuring effect of
artificial national barriers erected by nationalist historians of the nineteenth century.8 Histories of

4

Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, 2 vols. (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1995); Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century, 3 vols. (Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1982); For a discussion of Braudel’s impact on Atlantic history, see, Alison
Games, “Atlantic History: Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities,” The American Historical Review 111, no. 3
(June 2006): 741–57.
5 On the “complex of seas” approach and its impact on the Atlantic World, see, Philip Morgan and Jack Greene,
“Introduction: The Present State of Atlantic History,” in Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal, ed. Philip Morgan
and Jack Greene (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 337–56.
6 Ian Kenneth Steele, The English Atlantic, 1675-1740: An Exploration of Communication and Community (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Kenneth J. Banks, Chasing Empire across the Sea: Communications and the
State in the French Atlantic, 1713-1763 (Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002); Wim Klooster, Illicit
Riches: Dutch Trade in the Caribbean, 1648-1795 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1998).
7 Bernard Bailyn, Atlantic History: Concept and Contours (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 51–60.
8
David Armitage, “Three Concepts of Atlantic History,” in The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800, ed. M.J.
Braddick and David Armitage (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 23; For a criticism of the Atlantic history
approach as too limited in scope and artificial in approach, see, Peter A. Coclanis, “Atlantic World or

xiv

port cities in particular have offered an important avenue for studying cross-border interactions
and circuits of exchange. By focusing on an individual city’s orientation toward the sea, this
scholarship has revealed important connections prevalent in early modern commerce despite the
strict mercantilist barriers setup by competing European empires.9 Several chapters below
contribute to this interest in specific ports as a meeting place for illicit exchanges by examining
both the peripheries of empires through the neutral islands of St. Eustatius and St.
Bartholomew’s as well as more central hubs such as Jamaica and London.
As the most dynamic and cosmopolitan space for transnational cooperation, historians
have identified the Greater Caribbean as a key geographical framework for understanding how
empire worked on the ground. Works by Ernesto Bassi, John McNeill and Matthew Mulcahy
have emphasized the fluidity of space and the unique connections which overrode traditional
national barriers. According to Bassi, mobile subjects, such as sailors and explorers, “did not live
lives bounded by the political geographies of the time nor were their lived experiences
circumscribed by geographical frameworks defined after their own time.”10 Studies of the

Atlantic/World?,” The William and Mary Quarterly 63, no. 4 (2006): 725–42; Peter A. Coclanis, “Beyond Atlantic
History,” in Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal, ed. Philip Morgan and Jack Greene (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2009), 337–56; Peter A. Coclanis, “Introduction,” in The Atlantic Economy during the Seventeenth
and Eighteenth Centuries: Organization, Operation, Practice, and Personnel, ed. Peter A. Coclanis (Columbia:
University of South Carolina Press, 2005); Also see the global approach to empire taken by Games, Games,
“Atlantic History: Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities.”
9 Linda Marguerite Rupert, Creolization and Contraband: Curaçao in the Early Modern Atlantic World (Athens:
The University of Georgia Press, 2012); Kit Candlin, The Last Caribbean Frontier, 1795-1815 (New York:
Palgrave, 2012); Fabrício Prado, Edge of Empire: Atlantic Networks and Revolution in Bourbon Río de La Plata
(Oakland: University of California Press, 2015); There is also increased interest in comparative studies of empires,
see, J. H. Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2006).
10 Ernesto Bassi, An Aqueous Territory: Sailor Geographies and New Granada’s Transimperial Greater Caribbean
World (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 9; Matthew Mulcahy, Hurricanes and Society in the British Greater
Caribbean, 1624–1783 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008); Matthew Mulcahy, Hubs of Empire: The
Southeastern Lowcountry and British Caribbean (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014); John Robert
McNeill, Mosquito Empires: Ecology and War in the Greater Caribbean, 1620-1914 (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2010); Schwartz describes this approach as applying Braudel to the “circum-Caribbean region”,
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Greater Caribbean move from the national to the transimperial, and emphasize the often
forgotten links connecting disparate islands to the rest of the Atlantic World. The ecological
focus of the scholarship on the Greater Caribbean is particularly relevant here as it applies
directly to the opportunities created for extraimperial trades in the years after the American War
of Independence.
The call to move beyond national barriers, due to the rapid increase in international trade
and communication, has led historians to extend the history of globalization back into the early
modern period.11 Immanuel Wallerstein has argued for a world-system model to understand the
transition to capitalism and the rise of the European world-economy in the modern world. The
birth of Wallerstein’s capitalist world-system was dependent on the collapse of empires and the
end of the early modern era. Wallerstein focused on the dynamic exchange between center and
periphery, which has been particularly appealing for historians of the Atlantic World interested
in the direction of trade as well as political power within imperial structures. The strict
Wallersteinian reliance on nation-states for the formation of a global economy, however, limits
the scope and effectiveness of the model as it relates to transnational exchange and intercultural
experience in the Atlantic World. Further, world-system theory needs to accommodate the
important commercial role of individual ports, over entire nations, in contributing to the process
of globalization. In the words of Mark Peterson, in discussing the port of Boston, “individual
British North American cities often had more features in common with their competitors and

see, Stuart B. Schwartz, Sea of Storms: A History of Hurricanes in the Greater Caribbean from Columbus to
Katrina (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015).
11 Emma Rothschild, “Globalization and the Return of History,” Foreign Policy, no. 115 (Summer 1999): 107.

xvi

counterparts in the greater Atlantic world than they shared with their fellow cities in the ‘thirteen
colonies’.”12
Studies of consumption have focused on the similarities between early modern
economies and have shown how commodities connected individuals throughout the world,
effectively transforming their daily lives.13 Emma Rothschild and Paul Cheney have separately
emphasized the advantages of intellectual history to illustrate not only the prosopographical
dimension to globalization but also the increased interest in the real effects of globalization on
European states in the eighteenth century. According to Cheney, French writers throughout the
eighteenth century grappled with the effects of international credit on morality, and worried over
the increasing influence and wealth of the French colonies, which obscured the distinction
between center and periphery.14
As a bridge between histories of continents and a global history, historians of the ocean
have viewed the sea as a space of social life and exchange rather than a dead space between
12

Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, vol. 1–3 (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2011); Mark Peterson, “The War in the Cities,” in The Oxford Handbook of the American Revolution, ed. Edward G.
Gray and Jane Kamensky (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); Manuel Covo, “Baltimore and the French
Atlantic: Empires, Commerce, and Identity in a Revolutionary Age, 1783–1798,” in The Caribbean and the Atlantic
World Economy: Circuits of Trade, Money and Knowledge, 1650-1914, ed. Adrian Leonard and David Pretel (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Still others challenge the class-consciousness, homogeneity, and modernity of the
modern world system, see, Joop De Jong, “The Dutch Golden Age and Globalization: History and Heritage,
Legacies and Contestations,” Macalester International 27, no. 1 (2011): 46–67; Kenneth R. Hall, ed., Secondary
Cities and Urban Networking in the Indian Ocean Realm, c. 1400-1800 (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008).
13 See John Brewer and Roy Porter’s monumental collection of essays on consumption, John Brewer and Roy
Porter, eds., Consumption and the World of Goods (New York: Routledge, 1993). In particular, see the essays by
Amanda Vickery, Peter Burke, and John Wills though all of the essays emphasize the ‘world of goods’ that
consumers participated in. For the similarities and eventual ‘divergence’ in economies between East and West see,
Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009. Also see Maxine Berg on
foreign commodities as a spur and inspiration for Western industrialization.
14 For Rothschild on intellectual history, see, Rothschild, “Globalization and the Return of History”; also see Emma
Rothschild, The Inner Life of Empires: An Eighteenth-Century History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2011), 201 for a discussion of the impact of commodities on the daily life of merchants and their families. For
Cheney, see, Paul Burton Cheney, Revolutionary Commerce: Globalization and the French Monarchy (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2010), 17 According to Cheney, some French writers worried that the commercial links
between France and her colonies would make Europeans into savages, while the Physiocrats suggested that the
distinction between France and her colonies should be broken down in the name of modernizing French trade, see,
160 and 164.
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different metropoles and peripheries. Scholars have suggested that oceans were spaces beyond
the limits of any individual empire; politically neutral, the ocean had a social life of its own
which was unrestrained by mercantilist trade barriers. The ocean, then, could be a web of
reciprocal influence rather than the traditional hub and spoke model of empire common to
historical narratives.15 By using Atlantic history as a history of the Atlantic Ocean these scholars
have challenged traditional geographic assumptions, questioning continental and national biases
and producing a polycentric Atlantic World founded on principles of mutual dependence and
exchange located in hundreds of overlapping networks that crisscrossed empires.16 Further, as is
emphasized below, oceans were spaces where identities were shaped by both personal agency
and external forces. A merchant might safeguard his cargo under a neutral flag, but the vessel
could still be seized by vigilant privateers attacking ships under suspicion of possessing an alter
ego, or by a naval squadron that believed the neutral ship intended to wander into hostile waters.
While the focus of this dissertation lies primarily in the waters of the Atlantic and
Caribbean, merchants who disregarded national and imperial borders were not limited by a single
ocean. Many of the merchants under examination here had business interests in the
Mediterranean, Indian and Pacific Oceans. In this regard, this work situates itself into a broader
scholarship on world history which has developed in recent years. Outside of the Atlantic World,
the Indian Ocean has proven to be one of the most vibrant spaces for the study of border-crossers

15

In an attempt to understand trade outside of strict imperial controls, Alison Games has looked at English overseas
trade before the British Empire, when the English relied on negotiation and adaptability in order to prosper, see,
Alison Games, The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560-1660 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2008).
16 Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, “The Mediterranean and the New Thalassology,” The American
Historical Review 111, no. 3 (June 2006): 722–40; Paul D’Arcy, The People of the Sea: Environment, Identity and
History in Oceania (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006); A. Polónia, A. S. Ribeiro, and D. Lange,
“Connected Oceans: New Pathways in Maritime History,” The International Journal of Maritime History 29, no. 1
(2017): 90–95; M. N. Pearson, ed., Trade, Circulation, and Flow in the Indian Ocean World (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2015); David Abulafia, The Great Sea (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
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and transnational exchange.17 Sebouh Aslanian’s study of Armenian trade networks from the
Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean and beyond has shown how global merchant communities
mobilized imperial structures for their own commercial ends. Aslanian’s Julfans served as
important ‘go-betweens’ or cross-cultural brokers whose network depended on the successful
circulation of personnel, information and credit.18
From the Seven Years’ War to the nineteenth century, the governments of Great Britain,
France, and later the United States made increasing demands on its citizens. The service of a
citizen in a war, their loyalty to a cause, or their abhorrence of another became the markers of
modern citizenship. Many historians have noted the transformation of citizenship in this period
as states began to shape citizens around certain ideals, and to demand more from their citizens
than passive obedience. This was seen most forcefully in the mobilization of armies and
volunteer movements in the Revolutionary Wars. Histories of national identity and citizenship at
the close of the early modern period tend to either focus on themes of consensus or exclusion.
Linda Colley’s Britons discusses the active participation of Britons in the formation of a
British identity; a relatively inclusive process for Colley leading her to compare Britishness to an
umbrella or “a shelter under which various groupings and identities could plausibly and even
advantageously congregate.”19 David Bell has similarly underlined the successful and
widespread acceptance of the nation as the sole source of legitimate authority in France by the

17

M. N. Pearson, The Indian Ocean (New York: Routledge, 2003); Pearson, Trade, Circulation, and Flow in the
Indian Ocean World; Subrahmanyam has discussed at length the dilemmas faced by border-crossers in a world of
unstable identities, see, Sanjay Subrahmanyam, Three Ways to Be Alien: Travails and Encounters in the Early
Modern World (Waltham, Mass.: Brandeis University Press, 2011).
18 Sebouh Aslanian, “‘The Salt in a Merchant’s Letter’: The Culture of Julfan Correspondence in the Indian Ocean
and the Mediterranean,” Journal of World History 19, no. 2 (June 2008): 127–88; Sebouh Aslanian, From the Indian
Ocean to the Mediterranean: The Global Trade Networks of Armenian Merchants from New Julfa (New York:
University of California Press, 2014).
19 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (London: Pimlico, 2003), xi.
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1780s. Though Bell identifies consensus in the popularity of the nation as an ideal, his work also
focuses on how the concept of the nation was ‘destabilized’ through debate during the French
Revolution.20 Discord rather than consensus has proven far more popular in historical
scholarship as historians have identified this Age of Revolution as a formative period not only
for French identity but for the wider Atlantic World as well.21 Scholars have notably recognized
the state’s reaction to growing British radicalism as important in the ideological formation of
Britishness; backed by loyalist mobs, reformists of every stripe were accosted in the name of
loyalty to the state. Lisa Steffen argues that the definition of treason in Britain was redefined and
the concept of allegiance was narrowed during the French Revolution in order to exclude
reformist movements who wished to alter the legislature. Treason in earlier periods had been
defined by disloyalty to the monarch, but in the Age of Revolution the king was made into a
symbol of the state — one to which all loyal Britons now owed their allegiance.22 The passive
subject of the early modern period gave way then to the conscripted citizen actively participating
in the nation state. As Kenneth Johnston notes in his study of the persecution of radical British
authors, “neutrality was not possible.”23 Rather than seeing Britishness as axiomatic of state
expansion, Kathleen Wilson argues that national identities were “understood, performed and
consumed in a variety of ways by different groups,” all making claims on the resources of the
20
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nation-state.24 According to Douglas Bradburn this was also an important period for the creation
of the modern citizen in America as proponents of expatriation claimed that free men had the
right to leave an oppressive regime if necessary. Bradburn argues that the debate over the right to
expatriation led to America’s first naturalization laws. Similarly, Nathan Perl-Rosenthal has
shown how sailors and the American federal government worked together to create a system for
documenting and defending American citizenship claims. Similarly, Peter Sahlins has uncovered
how citizenship in early modern France evolved gradually from a legal distinction of taxation to
a political category based on exclusive rights.25 In short, citizenship was a tool for governments
and individuals to use to their advantage.
This narrative of modern citizenship has revealed the nuances of legal discrimination and
the development of natural right ideologies, but it appears wholly incompatible with how states
managed merchants and commercial nationality at the end of the eighteenth century. At one
level, scholars following the mercantilist schema of early modern states are right to focus on
exclusion. After all, long before the British Parliament issued sweeping alien acts, or the French
Republic broke down the distinction between foreigners and enemies, the governments of these
countries had established strict definitions of nationality in the construction of their respective
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empires.26 Great Britain’s navigation system restricted trade with the empire to British ships
owned by British subjects and manned by a British crew. This policy was first enshrined into law
by the Navigation Act of 1651, and reaffirmed and modified by later governments to act as the
bulwark of the empire. While the prevalence of smuggling and cosmopolitan commerce in North
America always undermined this policy on the periphery, historians’ interpretation of
mercantilism has often reified the main premise of the system: the British empire was solely for
the British.27
The last ten years has seen a rich scholarship develop over the ability of border-crossers,
tricksters, transnational subjects and go-betweens to negotiate past religious, political, and
commercial restrictions. Primarily, scholars have focused on the Mediterranean in the early
modern period as a shared world, particularly suited for cross-cultural cooperation. Following
this trend, studies of the Atlantic world have used ‘entangled history’ as a framework for
challenging the study of empire as a closed geographic unit.28 Recent works on migrations into
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the British Empire have challenged a narrow interpretation of the Navigation Acts and Britain's
closed commercial system. By integrating foreign merchants into the empire, works by Margrit
Beerbühl and Mark Häberlein have questioned who qualified as British and who participated in
the project of empire.29 If Britishness was not limited to native Britons, and could be exploited
by foreigners for their own ends, the state was also complicit in reshaping nationality on a whim
to restrict access to markets, seize a neutral vessel, or impress sailors into service in the Royal
Navy. Scholars have also ‘re-thought’ and ‘re-imagined’ the mercantilist policies of European
empires, by looking at deliberative processes over unitary discourses and by emphasizing the
mutually dependent relationship between merchants and political institutions in the early modern
period.30
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This dissertation takes citizenship and belonging in a new direction by looking at the
ways in which commerce reshaped nationality and challenged what it meant to be a citizen in the
Atlantic World. Before the idea of the nation was fully formed, merchants, statesmen, and
philosophers offered an alternative conception of belonging and nationality that was much more
fluid and malleable. As the following chapters illustrate, the years after political independence
can be defined by the transactions and schemes of American merchants who contested the
boundaries of the British empire.
The 1780s is often defined by historians as one of marked inactivity in the history of
Anglo-American commerce. The opening chapter instead argues that the 1780s was a period of
intense public debate and commercial creativity for the British empire. The conduct of British
subjects who had both won independence and traded with the enemy during the war provoked a
series of troubling questions about the loyalty of Great Britain’s West Indian colonies and the
place of Americans within the empire after independence. The chapter shows that American
merchants continued to rely on the empire for business connections, products, and even
commercial identity. By focusing on experimentation rather than market mishaps, the chapter
shows how merchants and state officials attempted to understand the limits of legitimate
commerce and the role of the Navigation Act in defining commercial identity. The following
chapter then focuses on the persistence of Anglo-American commerce in the West Indies.
Despite increasingly stringent Orders in Council, American produce continued to flood into the
West Indies to meet the extraordinary demand caused by a series of natural and political
disasters. Even when ‘the American trade’ hit a temporary downturn after 1789, American
merchants continued to correspond and depend on the British state to create new opportunities
for trade in the Caribbean. The information exchanged and gathered by merchants and states
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offers valuable insight into how those who participated in the economy of information
understood risk, opportunity, and diplomacy, as they attempted to self-fashion their way into the
next move of the market.
Chapter 3 moves into the French Revolutionary Wars, which brought new opportunities
for neutral American trade both within and without the British Empire. In order to enjoy the
benefits of neutrality, Americans had to first prove their Americanness to foreign states. The
chapter points to the general disinterest of the commercial classes in the impressment debate,
which has overshadowed merchant concerns about sailor desertion to the Royal Navy. In short,
the voyage from port to court required numerous negotiations with foreign merchants, naval
officers, and admiralty court judges as Americans grappled with the limits of national identity
and legitimate commerce.
Chapter 4 charts the turn from concerns over relative Americanness to questions of
neutrality. The rationalization of British mercantilist policies during the Napoleonic Wars
effectively narrowed the field of legitimate commerce in wartime. The period from 1798 to 1809
saw the dynamic evolution of ‘the neutral’ in law and public consciousness from a morally
ambiguous supplier of consumer goods to a malicious war profiteer whose trade with
belligerents undermined the war effort. The chapter argues that the debate over concepts of
neutrality should be situated within the wider discussion of national allegiance and commercial
identity which had consumed the British Empire since the American Revolution. The
mercantilist rhetoric that pervaded reforms in colonial governance and admiralty courts
attempted to force a choice on American merchants: to rejoin the British Empire or stand with
Napoleon as an enemy.
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Finally, Chapter 5 examines how the licensing system transformed international
commerce. For almost a decade Great Britain and its dominions became the entrepôt for the
world at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. All trade and even correspondence required the
empire’s approval. The licensing system had the potential to greatly expand the British empire.
In this sense, licensing was a mercantilist milestone in the final years of the Navigation Act.
More importantly, the system offered an alternative view of mercantilism. Rather than a
restrictive system catering to the few who monopolized foreign trade, licensing greatly expanded
membership in the empire by granting access to any merchant willing to pay a fee.
Through these five chapters the dissertation explores the irreconcilable relationship
between modern citizenship and early modern commercial practices in the Atlantic World. While
international trade in earlier periods depended on freedom of movement and ineffectual state
regulation, the French Revolution fostered the growth of state institutions, which increasingly
restricted access to citizenship. After independence, American merchants accessed European
empires by constantly reshaping their own identity to meet the needs of the market. British
merchants in particular, tempted Americans with offers of access to technically forbidden
markets and the promise of enormous profits by taking advantage of the general uncertainty
surrounding American commercial identity. While this period is often mistakenly portrayed as
one of American neutrals operating in a vacuum, the chapters below emphasize American
dependence on the British Empire to create demand and furnish a steady supply of news, rumor,
and gossip. Americans relied on the institutions of the empire to reformulate their identity in
order to re-enter the British Empire. Despite official commercial restrictions, and eventual war in
1812, these networks of information persisted. By studying the correspondence of merchants and
state officials, admiralty court rulings, popular pamphlets, parliamentary debates, and the wealth
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of commercial information found in contemporary newspapers, this dissertation underscores how
commerce reshaped individuals’ roles as loyal citizens in the Age of Revolution.
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Chapter 1: Placing Americans in the British Empire, 1783-1789
On February 3, 1781, Richard Downing Jennings faced a crisis of identity. This crisis did
not originate from any internal angst, but was rather imposed on him by external forces, in this
case, the Royal Navy. Three days before, the first part of the Royal Navy’s Leeward Island
squadron surrounded the neutral island of St. Eustatius, taking the inhabitants entirely by surprise
and cutting off any chance of escape. Now, the remainder of the fleet had sailed into the harbor
and taken the island with scarcely a shot fired. In their conquest of the island, the two British
commanders, Admiral George Brydges Rodney and General John Vaughan, managed to capture
over 150 vessels, along with numerous warehouses overflowing with sugar and tobacco, in a
single day.1 Jennings, a British subject and native of Bermuda, had resided in St. Eustatius for
fifteen years while seeking his fortune in the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War.2 When war
broke out again in 1775, the neutral inhabitants of St. Eustatius offered their active assistance to
the nearby British islands. Jennings proudly recalled that the British merchants in particular were
always willing to aid their fellow countrymen. And Jennings himself had offered to assist in the
war effort by supplying Admiral Byron in 1779 with military stores.3 Despite all of their efforts
on behalf of their country and king, Jennings and the other British merchants on the island
received no special reward or compensation on February 3, 1781. Instead, under the pretext of
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their residency on the island, the Royal Navy singlehandedly disregarded their British identity
and seized their property.
Like the Dutch, French, and American merchant communities on St. Eustatius, the British
merchants received notice that their property and papers would be confiscated in violation of
their rights as British subjects. Despite their trade being officially sanctioned by multiple Acts of
Parliament, Admiral Rodney declared that it was his intention to punish the English merchants in
particular, “who forgetting the Duty they owe their King and Country, were base enough, from
lucrative motives, to support the enemies of their country, will, for their treason, justly merit
their own ruin.”4 Though Jennings willingly admitted that he “did not attempt to restrain
[himself]” from the advantages a neutral port offered, he nevertheless insisted that his business
remained neutral and actually contributed to the “general wealth and revenue of his mother
country, while he was enriching himself.”5 Indeed, Jennings’s business proved to be immensely
profitable and by the start of the war he was one of the leading merchants on St. Eustatius.6 Like
many on St. Eustatius, Jennings maintained business partnerships with British, French, Dutch,
and Spanish merchants during the war. For the Royal Navy, the activities of Jennings and the
other British merchants were viewed as treasonable and tantamount to a renunciation of their
Britishness. According to Rodney, British neutral traders had become Dutch Burghers and were
liable to confiscation and Rodney’s own brand of rough justice. Yet the merchants
conceptualized Rodney’s actions in a wholly new light. Jennings stated that he believed the
British admiral was “infected with the commercial mania of the place,” and in turn had become a

4

George Brydges Lord Rodney, Letters From Sir George Brydges Now Lord Rodney to His Majesty's Ministers,
Relative to the Capture of St. Eustatius, and Its Dependencies, (London: Printed by A. Grant, 1789), 17.
5 Jennings, The Case of Richard Downing Jennings, an English Subject Who Resided at Saint Eustatius, 1790, 7.
6 Jarvis, In the Eye of All Trade: Bermuda, Bermudians, and the Maritime Atlantic World, 1680-1783, 406–7.

2

merchant himself, plundering the property of his countrymen for sale to the highest bidder.7
Rodney and Jennings’s opposing views on loyalty and appropriate commerce caused a crisis of
identity for British merchants on St. Eustatius. This crisis would come to define the debates over
the future of the British Empire in the following decade.
These competing views of belonging and utility to the state were symbolic of a greater
discursive division within Great Britain as a whole. In Parliament, calls by the supporters of the
government to sink St. Eustatius into the ocean were met with warnings about the potential
dangers of pushing the war too far and creating more enemies for Great Britain at a precarious
moment. This discussion continued into the decade after the American Revolution, as Britons
questioned the meaning of loyalty, belonging, and empire.8
Despite the commotion at St. Eustatius, the 1780s are often defined by historians as one
of marked inactivity in the history of Anglo-American commerce. This chapter will instead
highlight the intense public debate and commercial creativity of the period. By focusing on
innovation and experimentation rather than market mishaps we can further understand how
merchants, state officials, and pamphleteers attempted to grapple with the true meaning of the
Navigation Act and its pivotal place in defining commercial identity in the British Empire. In
order to examine the nature of mercantile activity in the 1780s and the debates surrounding it,
this chapter will engage with several pressing historiographical questions. How did the state
attempt to regulate Anglo-American commerce in the aftermath of the war? What were the
conceptions and limits of British identity in the initial years after independence? What types of
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relevant information were commodified in Anglo-American correspondence and how did this
information shape merchant perceptions of major political events?
To answer these questions, the chapter approaches the changing shape of AngloAmerican commerce between 1783-1789 through three interrelated perspectives: the internal
consequences of commercial war against the neutral Dutch; the debate over American trade with
the British Empire; and the nature of American commerce with the British Isles and Europe in
the 1780s. The first section examines popular reaction to Rodney's St. Eustatius escapade in
order to get at a better understanding of the competing discourses mobilized by merchants,
politicians, and the Royal Navy in the debate over legitimate commerce and loyalty to the state.
The debates that St. Eustatius provoked were given further impetus in the years after the war as
Britons questioned the role of Americans in the British Empire. The next section then
reexamines the debate started by Lord Sheffield's Observations on the Commerce of the
American States (1783) over the makeup of the British Empire and the reification of old
mercantilist trade barriers. Continuing the argument from the previous section, emphasis is
placed on how Sheffield and his supporters sought to further redefine British mercantile identity
and loyalty around the Navigation Act. Rather than merely retelling Sheffield's work as a
restatement of zero-sum mercantilist theory, this section focuses on the different interpretations
of empire and the Navigation Act that came out of the cessation of hostilities in 1783. After
examining these competing debates, the chapter then addresses the experiences of newly minted
‘American’ merchants as they were shut out of old colonial markets and forced to rethink their
commercial strategies. While technically able to trade independently, many American merchants
were much more interested in commercial dependence on the British Empire. By looking at the
experiences of those on the periphery, we can further understand the complexities inherent in
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British identity during the breakup of the First British Empire. The third section looks at
American merchants as a bridge between two communities in the Atlantic world. Rather than
focusing on the relative success of various mercantile ventures, this section instead emphasizes
the old and new connections these merchants utilized and the information they traded within a
seemingly new Atlantic world. By placing an emphasis on commercial information, we can
acquire a better understanding of how these merchants viewed their own commercial world in
the aftermath of independence.

St. Eustatius and the limits of British commercial identity
In studying the capture of St. Eustatius, historians have variously focused on the military
repercussions of the siege and occupation, the greed and rage of Admiral Rodney in his wanton
seizure of merchant property, and even the war’s effect on the stability of the Dutch Republic.9
Yet Rodney’s views on the identity of the English merchants at St. Eustatius have garnered
relatively little attention. Most scholars note that Rodney was particularly harsh towards his
fellow countrymen, but little reason is given as to why Rodney focused so incessantly on the
identity of these merchants, who, in his words, were only “calling themselves English
merchants.”10 This section will examine the myriad of ways in which the press, ministers of
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state, MPs, military commanders, and merchants conceived of British identity in their
discussions of Rodney’s actions on St. Eustatius.
In order to approach the debate over commercial identity in the taking of St. Eustatius it
is first necessary to examine the British motivations behind the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War. The
British ministry was especially interested in outlining their reasons for going to war through the
publication of a manifesto in December 1780. According to the manifesto, Britain’s declaration
of war was not meant to target the Dutch Republic as a whole but only its commercial element in
the city of Amsterdam.11 In the subsequent debate over the war in the House of Lords, the
Secretary of State for the Northern Department, Lord Stormont, referred to the Dutch as “secret
enemies” who plotted to undermine Great Britain by forming treaties with Britain’s enemies, and
clandestinely supporting the rebels from St. Eustatius.12 For the ministry, then, this was
undoubtedly a commercial war carried on from the general belief that without Dutch aid the
American rebels would have already been defeated.13
The opposition in both houses challenged the government’s interpretation of recent
events by pointing to numerous British violations of the treaties with the Dutch and warning of
reprisals by the League of Armed Neutrality if Britain made war with their former ally.14 The
Whig leader William Petty, Earl of Shelburne, led the charge in opposition to the ministry,
arguing that the current government simply did not understand that the Dutch were merchants. In
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Holland, according to Shelburne, acts deemed ‘heinous’ were excused in the name of promoting
and extending commerce. In this line of reasoning, Shelburne was backed by Lord Camden in
the House of Commons who declared that the Dutch were “a wise and politic people; commerce,
and the advantages derivable from it, were the uniform objects of their political pursuits.”15 If the
Dutch had strayed and supported the French and Americans against the British, it was due to the
conduct of the ministry in attempting to restrain Dutch commerce.
The identification of the Dutch as a ‘commercial people’ in order justify their actions or
condemn them is a startling window into contemporary British conceptions of commerce and
identity. For the North ministry, the Dutch had violated the laws of nations by greedily supplying
Britain’s enemies in their pursuit of French gold. The Dutch sale of naval stores to the French led
MP Anthony Eyre to call for a crippling blow against the Dutch island of St. Eustatius, which he
referred to as "that abominable nest of pirates.”16 The opposition though warned of the disastrous
repercussions of a Dutch war. Thomas Townshend claimed that if the British succeeded in
destroying the Dutch trade they would in turn destroy Britain’s own commercial prosperity.
Townshend asked the Commons, if the war continued, “what maritime state remained capable of
carrying our manufactures of various kinds, to all quarters of the globe, as the Dutch had done
for above a century?”17 Townshend’s claim was borne out as British manufacturers and
merchants, along with American traders, exploited the Dutch carrying trade in order to continue
the consumption of British goods during the war.18
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In their debate over the decision to go to war with the Dutch Republic, MPs revealed that
the conduct of a commercial war would depend on their interpretation of what it meant to be a
‘commercial people’. The ambiguity of what it meant to be a ‘commercial people’ in 1780 is
somewhat surprising given that historians have readily identified the eighteenth century as the
pivotal moment when the British began to define their own nationality around Britain’s global
commerce. To use David Armitage’s well-known argument, British national and imperial
identity was based around the principles of “Protestant, commercial, maritime and free.”19 Yet
the debate in Parliament also belies a tension between commerce and morality. If the British
were a commercial people, clearly their morality was distinct from the ‘Gallo-American’ faction
running the States General. Unlike the Dutch, the British were not motivated solely by “lucre and
usurious gain.”20 For their moral compass in navigating the rough waters of commercial identity,
Britons relied on the Navigation Act as their guide. The debate over the meaning of ‘commercial
people’ would later have a direct bearing on the debates over the inclusion of Americans in the
British Empire and the sanctity of the Navigation Act.
Parliament met on May 14 to again consider the issue of ‘commercial people’ and St.
Eustatius. Edmund Burke opened the debate over the seizure of private property on the island
with a warning for Britain if it continued to carry out a “scheme of inhuman plunder.”21 Burke
recounted in vivid detail the violent seizure of property on the island. Like a plague, Rodney had
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indiscriminately attacked both countrymen and enemy traders, seizing everything from the
artisan’s utensils to the wealth of the most opulent merchants. Though Burke spent much of his
time on the different victims of Rodney’s onslaught, in particular the Jews of St. Eustatius who
were expelled from the island, the real force of his speech was reserved for Rodney’s treatment
of the English merchants. Burke recounted how Rodney had brazenly ignored the protests of the
Saint Kitts Assembly and the several Parliamentary Acts legitimizing and even encouraging
trade with the island.22 Burke claimed that Rodney had blatantly and disrespectfully ignored
these Acts of Parliament, telling the petitioners that, “he and the general did not come there to
hear acts of parliament explained, but to obey his Majesty's orders.”23 The resulting debate in
Parliament was tempered only by a general confusion over whether the British commanders had
acted independently or if they had been instructed to ignore Parliament by the ministry. Lord
George Germain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, explained that Rodney and Vaughan had
not been informed of any Acts of Parliament but were merely told to secure all the property on
St. Eustatius. Germain justified this approach by claiming that St. Eustatius was “perfectly a new
case,” independent of existing practices of war.24 Germain’s justification of Rodney’s conduct
then took a unique turn as he explained to the Commons how Burke’s defense of private property
was ill founded. Though the inhabitants of St. Eustatius were now part of the British Empire,
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Germain explained that there were actually two types of naturalized subjects: those who took
oaths of allegiance, and were entitled to all the privileges of a natural born subject, and then there
were those who joined the empire “at the point of the bayonet.”25 As a conquered people, these
‘bayonet subjects’ were vulnerable to mistreatment, seizure of property, and expulsion from
British territory.
The opposition took to a stringent defense of ‘commercial people’ and challenged the
categorization of the merchants on St. Eustatius as ‘bayonet subjects’ and ‘merchants who call
themselves British’. At the end of Burke’s debate, George Byng entered into a harangue against
the ministry who, he argued, exerted its influence to give “a mortal stab to the trade of the
commercial world.”26 Byng praised merchants for their completely legal and praise-worthy
commerce. The capture of St. Eustatius was, for Byng, a severe loss to the city of London.27 The
Parliamentary debates continued through 1781 and as the war wound down Burke’s investigation
of Rodney continued but to no avail. Rodney’s momentous victory at the Battle of the Saintes in
1782 garnered him lasting fame and prevented any further consideration of the St. Eustatius issue
in Parliament.28 Indeed, when Burke moved on to the impeachment of Warren Hastings in 1787,
Hastings’s defenders pointed to Burke’s earlier persecution of Rodney as evidence of his
misguided vendetta.29
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Parliament’s unwillingness to act forced the British merchants of St. Eustatius to turn to
the courts and the general public for redress.30 The first formal complaint came from the West
India lobby, which published a petition to the king in April 1781 calling for the release of the
property seized by the British commanders on St. Eustatius. The petition warned of reprisals by
the French if Rodney’s actions were seen as a precedent, and reminded the king and the public
that the tobacco trade on the island was in keeping with the tenets of the Navigation Act and
sanctioned by Parliament. Rather than the harbor of ‘secret enemies’, the petition claimed that
the island of St. Eustatius had frequently assisted the British Leeward Islands during the war,
supplying provisions to the islands of Antigua and Saint Kitts in order to prevent a famine. That
many British subjects had property in the islands was well known but the petition claimed that
these subjects, whom the petition called ‘most faithful and loyal subjects’, had remained on St.
Eustatius in order to trade with Great Britain and her colonies.31 The overall effect of this
petition on Parliament seems to have been minimal.32 Outside of Parliament though the first
publication in defense of the island’s inhabitants sparked a wider debate over Britain’s conduct
in the West Indies.33
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Despite the popularity of their position in some quarters, the merchants’ cause faced
considerable pushback from those aware of the notorious legacy of Dutch neutral trade in the late
eighteenth century. In the Seven Years’ War, the Dutch had made a name for themselves
shuttling North American provisions and lumber to French islands, effectively trading with the
enemy. St. Eustatius also served as an important hub for news traveling through the Caribbean,
linking together the European Caribbean empires with the North American colonies in
wartime.34 Further, the Dutch profited again from this commerce through the insurance trade by
covering French property at exorbitant prices. In 1757, James Marriott claimed in The Case of
the Dutch Ships Considered that neutrals gave up their rights when they traded with Britain’s
enemies. Marriott argued that the Dutch ships operating in the French islands under special
licenses were “adopted French ships.”35 Marriott’s pamphlet was aimed at revealing Dutch
violations of neutrality in the Seven Years’ War, but the pamphlet found a second life when the
Dutch continued their neutral trade during the American Revolution. The Case of the Dutch
Ships Considered was reprinted in 1778 after France entered the war. The reprint was not only a
reaction to the widespread illicit trade conducted during the war, but also as a response to
increasing interest in curtailing the illegal and often violent activities of smugglers in the
colonies and in the British Isles.36
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The conquest of St. Eustatius was greeted by some as the end result of decades of
treachery on the part of the Dutch.37 In April 1781, the London Courant and Westminster
Chronicle featured several letters from Admiral Rodney detailing his conquest of the Dutch
islands. In one letter, Rodney celebrated the conquest of Demerara and Essequibo, two colonies
that had the potential to “produce more revenue to the crown, than all the British West India
islands united.”38 The same paper also featured a letter from Rodney regarding the capture of St.
Eustatius and the complicity of the British merchants in neighboring islands. In this letter,
Rodney warned that the only threat to his securing the island was the nearby community of
British merchants who disregarded their duty and traded in provisions and naval stores with the
enemy.
As a result of the conquest, the few papers seized on the island were published
anonymously as Authentic Rebel Papers (1781).39 Authentic Rebel Papers provided documentary
evidence of the poor state of the American government, rising tension within the FrancoAmerican alliance, and the treasonable activities of British merchants on St. Eustatius who were
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in constant contact with the rebels. Authentic Rebel Papers also revealed the extensive trade in
tobacco between London and America during the war. Notably, the author of the pamphlet
decided to redact the names of the merchants trading with the enemy, merely threatening to
reveal the names if anyone challenged the authenticity of the papers. While this may have served
to protect merchants in the particular, the author clearly viewed the merchants as traitors, “who
have been seduced by the flattering prospect of immense gain into a criminal and scandalous
support of the Rebellion.”40 In a letter from ‘CM’ in Virginia to ‘TS’ in December 1780, the
Americans are shown taking advantage of the British convoy system to transport tobacco to St.
Eustatius. Though the tobacco trade was technically legal, due to the Tobacco Act of 1780, the
Act only protected loyal British trade through neutral islands.41 Another letter from Virginia
detailed the intricate web of secrecy required in such a voyage, not only to subvert the Royal
Navy but also to best their fellow American merchants by reaching St. Eustatius first. Too many
participants in the trade would raise the premium on insurance and therefore affect the
profitability of the voyage, the anonymous author concluded “let this matter be as secret as
possible, i.e. in America, but public as the 'Statia streets in the West Indies.”42 Authentic Rebel
Papers called for ‘public vengeance’ against those who acquired their fortune by such means,
which illustrates the tension between the English merchants who profited from the war and those
who viewed their ventures as ‘secret treasons’. The perception, for some, that Rodney had saved
the empire from its most disloyal subjects was assisted by his own victory at the Battle of the
Saintes, the multiple votes of thanks offered in both Houses as a result of his victories, the toasts
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offered throughout the empire in his honor, and by Rodney’s own spirited public defense of his
actions in the West Indies.43
In hearing the appeals of the inhabitants of St. Eustatius, the Admiralty Court handled
sixty-four different claims. Even though Rodney stated that the value of the prizes taken at St.
Eustatius were “beyond all comprehension,” the merchants’ claims still managed to exceed the
estimated value of the prizes taken in 1781.44 Due to the loss of almost all of the documentary
evidence of smuggling and trade with the enemy, the court process was a prolonged ordeal for
both Rodney and the claimants. By 1786 only 13 claims had been dealt with: nine of which
resulted in restitution, 25 were still waiting for an appeal, and the remaining 26 had yet to be
heard. It was in this climate of legal distress and general confusion that the Lords Commissioners
of Appeals heard case no. 47, the claim of John and Philip Hawkins in 1786. John Hawkins was
an English merchant in London whose brother Philip resided in St. Eustatius and oversaw the
firm’s business on the island; though a relatively modest venture their claim amounted to
£16,559.45 According to John Hawkins’s affidavit, the Hawkins brothers had entered into an
agreement with the Amsterdam banker Jean de Neufville to trade with the island in British
manufactures and tobacco. De Neufville was a well-known banker engaged in trading with
America during the war. De Neufville’s activities on behalf of the American trade, which
43
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included the signing of a secret treaty with Henry Laurens, were discussed extensively in
Parliament in the lead up to the war.46 Between their partnership with the literal symbol of
British animosity and their trade in tobacco with the neutral Dutch, the Hawkinses represent the
quintessential ‘secret enemies’ of the British Empire. While their claim was rejected, and the
result of the appeal is unknown the published appendix to their affidavit is valuable for providing
the testimony of Admiral Rodney, General Vaughan, and their agents on the island. In Rodney’s
affidavit of November 8, 1781, the admiral made his clearest statement yet about his views on
the neutral British merchants of St. Eustatius, condemning those “who had made themselves
Dutch Burghers, and thereby as this deponent is informed had forfeited their rights as British
subjects.”47 Rodney recounted to the court his discovery of twenty-five warehouses containing
the property of “divers persons, calling themselves English merchants.”48 Rodney’s personal
secretary, Reverend William Pagett, corroborated Rodney’s testimony before the Admiralty
Court. Though Pagett conveniently claimed that he could not remember any details regarding
either the merchants’ papers or Rodney’s correspondence, he did tell the court that Dutch
Burghers, “chiefly Dutch and English subjects,” owned the goods seized on the island.49 Pagett
believed that if the prizes had been restored to their original owners the goods would have been
transported to the enemy in the French islands or North America. Rodney and Pagett were
clearly of the same mind when it came to the British inhabitants, but other depositions show less
interest in the identity and activities of their fellow countrymen on the island. While General
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Vaughan’s testimony mentioned the English merchants, his account focused on the confiscated
property rather than the identity of the claimants, simply describing, “merchandizes, which were
claimed and asserted by divers English merchants to be their property, were left undisposed of by
the said agents.”50 Comparing the affidavits of the deponents makes clear that the lawyers were
working from a script of some thirty-two questions. Among others, each witness was questioned
about their origin, the events they witnessed during the capture of the island, whether they saw
anyone destroy any papers related to the island’s trade, and if the witness knew the identity of the
owners of the stores. While some testimonies claimed that all of the residents had become Dutch
Burghers in order to legally trade on the island, only Rodney and his secretary transformed this
legal status into a moral category.51
Despite Rodney’s victory in the Hawkins decision, in other cases Rodney was far less
successful. Elias Lindo, a London merchant, twice defended his claim against Rodney,
successfully proving through his own articles of agreement and bills of lading that the goods on
St. Eustatius were owned by his firm Noble & Lindo.52 Lindo’s partnership with David Noble of
Amsterdam served as a pretext for continued appeals by Rodney on the grounds that “the said
goods are not proved by legal evidence to have been the property of the claimant, and to have

50

Lords Commissioners of Appeals in Prize Causes. St. Eustatius and Its Dependencies. Appendix to the
Appellant’s Case, 2. The deposition of Henry Savagae, Commander of HMS Russel, shows a similar disregard for
identity, merely stating that the owners of the goods found in the warehouses were “British and neutral subjects.”
See, ibid. 5. Kenneth Breen, who examined Vaughan’s personal correspondence with Germain, claims that Vaughan
held a similar prejudice against the British on the island. Clearly in his testimony though, Vaughan did not see
English identity as the most important factor in justifying his actions. See, Breen, “Sir George Rodney and St.
Eustatius in The American War: A Commercial and Naval Distraction, 1775-81,” 197.
51 The testimony of Richard Foxall, a merchant from Dublin residing in Saint Lucia, bears this out as he even makes
a further distinction between the Dutch burghers and English merchants, or neutral subjects, see, Lords
Commissioners of Appeals in Prize Causes. St. Eustatius and Its Dependencies. Appendix to the Appellant’s Case, 7.
52
Before the Lords Commissioners of Appeals in Prize Causes. St. Eustatius and Its Dependencies, No. 8, Claim of
Elias Lindo (London, 1786), 6.

17

been employed in a lawful British trade.”53 The London World reported on June 4, 1788 that the
Lords of Appeal confirmed their former sentence in favor of Lindo, “with full costs,” and in
addition accepted the appeal of Joseph Waldo, a Bristol merchant.54 Kenneth Breen argues that
the Continental merchants tended to prevail in court over the residents of St. Eustatius. The cases
of Waldo and Lindo allow us to widen Breen’s argument to include merchants trading from
Great Britain as well. These merchants were also able to overcome the labels of ‘secret enemy’
and those who ‘call themselves British merchants’.55 As will be discussed in the next section,
many in Britain were beginning to consider the colonies as separate from the national body in the
aftermath of the American Revolution. This new approach to empire appears directly related to
the concern over space and residency in Admiralty court decisions.
The changing ideology about the loyalty of the inhabitants of the West Indies helps to
explain the treatment of Richard Jennings at the beginning of this chapter. Jennings published his
short memoir in 1790, and after almost a decade he had found little redress in the Admiralty
Courts. Impoverished and his reputation ruined, he turned to the public as his final court of
justice. Jennings argued angrily that his claim had been denied because the Admiralty Courts
favored local merchants, and thus a line had been drawn and “THAT OF RESIDENCE HAS
BEEN MADE THE BOUNDARY OF JUSTICE.”56 Jennings stated that he had endangered his
business to assist in the war effort while English merchants based in London safely profited
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through their temporary agents in the West Indies. As a British West Indian, Jennings was
condemned as merely one ‘who calls himself English’.

“The Alien States of America”
With the conclusion of the war in 1783 the question of America’s place in relation to the British
Empire remained unresolved. John Baker Holroyd, Lord Sheffield’s Observations on the
Commerce of the American States with Europe and the West Indies led the charge in this debate.
Sheffield sought to place the American states outside of the British Empire, arguing for the
exclusion of Americans from British commercial identity. Sheffield’s fierce defense of the
Navigation Act ostensibly serves as the preeminent definition of British mercantilism and the
guiding light for the government’s policy towards America.57 Yet the variety of responses to
Sheffield’s pamphlet from British and American officials, West Indian planters, and merchants,
reveals that the Navigation Act was always being reinterpreted and Sheffield’s opponents could
just as easily use it for their own ends. This section examines the complexity of Anglo-American
relations in the immediate years after the war. By focusing on debate rather than unitary
discourses of mercantilist rhetoric, this section highlights the limitations of studying commercial
policy from solely the perspective of statesmen and Orders in Council.
Historians have traditionally examined Sheffield’s treatise from an economic perspective.
This is only natural considering the wealth of economic data Sheffield mobilized in order to
prove his claim that the British Empire needed its maritime nursery more than it needed
America. The weight of Sheffield’s argument and its consequent success in shaping official
57
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policy has led many scholars to shy away from dissent to view this conversation over
commercial and national identity as one with a preordained and settled victor.58 Sheffield’s
Observations was written in response to a proposed commercial act by the Shelburne ministry to
continue the colonial trade with the new United States. Shelburne's ministry, motivated by the
spirit of reciprocity and the potential of solidifying an Anglo-American alliance, sought to secure
the American trade with a provisional bill on March 7, 1783. The bill granted Americans access
to the British West Indies and treatment as British subjects within British ports. The liberal
treatment of the Americans stemmed from Shelburne’s emphasis on reciprocity and particular
privileges in order to preserve the British-American Empire.59 Despite its temporary status, the
bill provoked a firestorm from Sheffield and his supporters, who decried it in the parliamentary
debate on March 18. Sheffield argued that Shelburne’s proposal would lead to the destruction of
the carrying trade.60 Though Shelburne’s ministry soon crumbled, the dangerous ideas behind the
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bill prompted Sheffield to write his spirited defense of the Navigation Act in 1783. The debate
that Shelburne’s bill provoked came to define the commercial disputes of the next three decades.
Beyond its wealth of economic data, Sheffield’s Observations was most of all a treatise
on identity and belonging. The provisional bill, described by its opponents as an ‘experiment’,
declared that in British ports the ships of the United States would remain American but the cargo
would be treated as if it were the property of British subjects imported in a British vessel.61 For
Sheffield, the Americans were first and foremost aliens, and any experimentation with their
identity would undermine the Navigation Act, which Sheffield called “the guardian of the
prosperity of Britain.”62 Sheffield pitched commercial competition as an endless battle for
preeminence; if the Americans were allowed an exception to the Navigation Act they would
increase their shipbuilding efforts and overtake the British carrying trade.63 Sheffield further
warned that the American flag would become a universal flag, used by the French and Dutch to
sneak into the British Empire and then sell British goods at lower rates in Europe.64 Sheffield
concluded that the Americans had fought for their independence and Parliament must recognize
their new identity in order to protect the remainder of the British Empire: “it is absolutely
necessary to mark the line of distinction between our subjects and these aliens.”65 Sheffield
viewed these experiments as a dangerous breach of the Navigation Act, crafted out of a desire to
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protect the American trade with the West Indies. In a third edition to his popular work, writing
after the failure of the bill, Sheffield noted with relief the calamities Britain had narrowly
avoided:
“Had it passed into a law, it would have affected our most essential interests in
every branch of commerce, and in every part of the world; it would have deprived
of their efficacy our navigation laws, and undermined the whole naval power of
Britain; it would have endangered the repose of Ireland, and excited the just
indignation of Russia and other countries: the West India planters would have
been the only subjects of Britain who could have derived any benefit, however
partial and transient, from their open intercourse directly with the American
states, and indirectly through them with the rest of the world.”66
As is seen here, Sheffield recognized the need to supply the West Indies from some external
source. But in order to maintain the sanctity of the Navigation Act, it was necessary for these
supplies to come from within the British Empire. As an alternative to the Americans, Sheffield
suggested that Canada and Nova Scotia could both supply the West Indies and serve as a
potential nursery for seamen. Sheffield argued that within five or six years up to 400 vessels
might be employed in trafficking Canadian goods to the West Indies and Europe.67 British North
America then would save the empire, protect the Navigation Act, and supply the West Indies
without recourse to ‘these aliens’ the Americans.
If the Americans were to be excluded from the West Indies and treated in Great Britain
like any other nation, what was their commercial role in Sheffield’s worldview? The former
colonies were now merely another customer, and Sheffield encouraged his fellow Britons to
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view ‘the dismemberment of the empire’ for the advantages it offered.68 Rather than losing an
essential member, Great Britain had gained a valuable new customer, wholly dependent on
British manufactures. The Americans actively sought a trade with Great Britain, and Sheffield
noted that they begged for credit in order to feed consumer demand. The real danger was not that
America may shun British markets if kept out of the West Indies, but rather that British creditors
and manufactures may overstock and over-lend the impoverished American consumer.69 Further,
American inexperience in foreign languages and overseas negotiations meant that the British
would serve as necessary middlemen in any American business transaction with Europe.70
Partially as a result of Sheffield’s pamphlet, the new Fox-North ministry shifted the regulation of
trade to the king and council and issued a new Order in Council on July 2, 1783, to regulate the
commerce with America.71
The initial Order in Council repealed the prohibitory acts on American trade, permitted
the Americans to trade with the British West Indies in British bottoms, and allowed the
exportation of colonial produce from the British colonies to the United States. Notably, these
goods would be subject to the same duties as “if exported to any British colony or plantation in
America.”72 Subsequent Orders in Council would continue to modify and restrict American
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commercial access to the West Indies until 1788 when an Act of Parliament made the previous
orders permanent. The Act of Parliament and Orders in Council reaffirmed restrictions on
American trade in the West Indies but also continued to treat American ships and goods to the
“payment of the same duties as the like sort of goods or merchandize are or may be subject and
liable to if imported in British-built ships.”73 In the British West Indies, Americans were
gradually treated as foreigners and aliens but in the British Isles they remained fellow subjects
entitled to the privileges they had renounced in 1776. The legal fiction of American foreigners,
created by subsequent ministries, continued rather than ended the debate over America’s true
place within the British Empire.
While Sheffield’s work provoked considerable interest on both sides of the Atlantic, it
was the prominent Jamaican politician and future historian of the West Indies, Brian Edwards,
who penned the most important response.74 Edwards’s Thoughts on the late Proceedings of
Government (1784) argued for a return to the consanguinity of the past, viewing the Americans
as “our best friends and customers in peace, and in war our firmest allies.”75 By restricting
American trade to British ships, Edwards believed the Orders in Council would eventually
destroy the American trade altogether. Edwards also noted that many in the British West Indies
the United States of America and the West-India Islands (London, 1783); An Act to Authorize the Congress of the
United States to Adopt Certain Regulations Respecting the British Trade (Richmond, 1784).
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had observed the immediate increase in the cost of American supplies after the proclamation was
published.76 Further, Edwards claimed that these restrictions might provoke the Americans into
acting from their passions rather than their interest and shunning the British market entirely.
Contrary to Sheffield, Edwards viewed the American trade as more extensive and more
important to British commerce than traditionally imagined. Arguing that custom house books
could not convey the extent of such a trade, which Edwards described as “spreading through a
variety of distant channels, their profits all returned to, and ultimately concentred [sic] in, Great
Britain, like rivers to the ocean.”77 Edwards concluded his Thoughts on the Late Proceedings of
Government by connecting the commercial success of the sugar islands with the national wealth;
a view that stood in stark contrast to Sheffield’s emphasis on the importance of the Navigation
Act as the source of all prosperity.
Sheffield was not alone in supporting a strict interpretation of the Navigation Act.78
Denying the ties of consanguinity after the war, John Stevenson challenged Edwards’s claim that
the colonists would favor passion over self-interest. Stevenson did agree with Edwards over the
prevalence of smuggling in the islands, claiming that despite the Orders in Council, the
Americans would obtain sugar ‘clandestinely’. Nevertheless, the existence of smuggling was not
a sufficient reason to alter the law, or “for our granting the Alien States of America a free trade
with our sugar islands.”79 Along with Stevenson, the most stalwart defender of Sheffield’s
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principles at the time was George Chalmers. Chalmers chastised the West Indians for
complaining that the proclamation of July 2, 1783, did not do enough for their economic welfare:
“The question however does not turnoff the pivot of supplying the West India Lords with their
usual luxuries, or the West India slaves with their accustomed needs.”80 It was not enough that
the West Indians had three different markets vying to supply their every need, Chalmers mocked,
because “neither the proclamation nor the law commanded traders to supply the West India
wants.”81 Finally, Chalmers reiterated Sheffield’s argument that Great Britain had successfully
supplied the West Indies during the war, stating simply that, without American competition, the
British were able to provision the islands at great profit to the nation.82 Chalmers believed that
the true solution was for the West Indies to pursue self-sufficiency, stating that Britain was more
interested in the West Indies cultivating their own food than any colonial produce.83
Several other authors rallied to the West Indian cause in response to Sheffield and his
supporters. These authors undermined Sheffield through a reinterpretation of the purpose of
Britain’s commerce, the conduct of American merchants, and the true meaning of the Navigation
Act. Edward Long, a close friend of Edwards, pointed to the irrationality of British policy toward
the Americans, complaining that Britain was ostensibly seeking to prevent the development of a
competitive American mercantile marine. Yet, according to Long, British policy seemed to
encourage the building of large transatlantic brigs to trade with the British Isles over the small
warning that if the Americans were allowed to trade with the West Indies, Britain’s honor would be ‘tarnished’, see,
Morning Post and Daily Advertiser, 13 Oct. 1784.
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coasting vessels used by the Americans in the West Indies. Further, Long pointed to the
contradictory policy of treating Americans as fellow subjects in Britain while barring them from
the West Indies as foreigners: “Thus the American, when he goes to Saint Kitts with his cargo of
lumber, finds himself renounced as an alien; but when he lands with the same cargo at Liverpool,
he is caressed and welcomed, as a naturalized Briton.”84 Others chose to focus on Sheffield’s
warnings about American trustworthiness and credit. ‘An American’ claimed that the
commercial difficulties brought on by the market glut and widespread credit failures of the 1780s
were not due to American negligence but rather the inhibitions of Europeans trading in America
and “assuming the mask of calling themselves Americans.”85 As a counter to the cool logic of
Sheffield’s trade data, some turned to emotional arguments, seeing the prohibition on American
commerce as revenge for the war.86 Finally, James Allen’s sweeping attack claimed that Canada
was a frozen wasteland, producing no crops for export. Allen further argued that only the United
States could supply the necessary provisions for the West Indies and that the sacrifice of
commerce for the promotion of navigation would destroy the empire. “The carrying trade,”
Allen asserted, “is of great importance, but it is of greater still to have trade to carry.”87 Allen
believed that the trade was so necessary for the survival of the West Indies that if prohibited the
84
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colonists would simply smuggle American supplies through neighboring islands or take
advantage of lax customs enforcement.88
Contemporary newspapers mark the widespread knowledge and engagement with
Sheffield’s work. Articles provided supposed proof that the new minister, William Pitt, was in
favor of a free trade between America and the West Indies, and accounts of Canadian scarcity
mocked Sheffield’s blind faith in Nova Scotia as an alternative source of grain and lumber.89 A
letter to the London Public Advertiser, signed ‘Albion’, warned of a ‘set of writers’ that
attempted to exacerbate the loss of America by claiming that Britain had benefited from the
separation. The article further claimed that any person who dared to complain of these ‘national
calamities’ was either ridiculed as a fool or charged as an ‘internal enemy of the state’.90 In this
spirit, Thomas Paine penned a piece under the pseudonym ‘Common Sense’, claiming that the
British wished to govern American trade since America lacked a system of commerce.91 Paine’s
conspiracy of clandestine British governance of America fed into rumors that an American had
assisted Sheffield in his ‘noxious doctrines’. The British, according to Paine, were conniving
with the Barbary pirates to destroy American commerce in the Mediterranean in order to protect
“the favorite system of Lord Sheffield.”92
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Responses to this debate continued to pour through the press at a rapid rate well into the
following decade. In 1791 Assistant U.S. Treasury Secretary Tench Coxe used custom house
records to prove that Sheffield’s blind faith in Canada was baseless. Coxe attempted to show
conclusively that “the British West India islands are proved to have been indebted to the United
States, in 1790 for more lumber, more grain, and more bread and flour than they imported from
these states before the revolution.”93 While this was hardly the final word on the place of
America within the British Empire, the Atlantic World had shifted considerably by 1791 from
what Sheffield had described in 1783. In the midst of another revolution American merchants
would regain their position as an essential part of the British Empire.
The antipathy prevalent in popular literature during the 1780s is undeniable, but as the
following section shows, this dispute over government policy did not necessarily lend itself to a
hatred of the British in general. Merchant correspondence reveals a climate of mutual
cooperation, which ensured the continuation of commercial relationships despite the competing
claims of government ministers. Whether out of consanguinity or the safety of old commercial
ties, Sheffield was right to argue that Americans would continue to purchase British commodities
despite the restrictive Orders in Council.

Americans attempt to reverse the Revolution
Despite ministerial aggression, Anglo-American commerce returned to its pre-war pace after the
war. The uncertainties created by the debate over British identity and the limits of the empire
offered opportunities for American merchants seeking to rekindle Anglo-American trade. This
Brothers and Their Business and Political Associates, 1771-1795. (Hartford: Connecticut Historical Society, 1930).
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section examines the vicissitudes of that relationship by focusing on the economies of
information maintained by networks of transatlantic merchants.94 Merchants participated in the
transatlantic exchange of information and ideas by reacting to gossip and seeking new ventures
based on rumors of market demand found in their professional correspondence and contemporary
newspapers.95 By viewing the Atlantic as a sea of exchange, rather than a space of competing
trade barriers, we can gain a fuller understanding of the complexities of commerce and national
identity at the end of the eighteenth century.96 Three merchant firms are examined in order to
highlight the characteristics of these economies of information: the New York firm Lynch &
Stoughton whose correspondence documented America’s dependence on British manufactures;
New York merchant Nicholas Low’s struggle with British identity as he attempted to assist his
loyalist family and cover his own property with British Mediterranean Passes; and Boston
merchant and Revolutionary patriot Caleb Davis’s commercial relationships with British contacts
despite the war and proceeding market glut. These three case studies serve to not only reiterate
America’s dependence on British commodities in the 1780s but also the continued importance of
Britishness in Anglo-American commerce and British contacts for facilitating foreign trade.
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The merchant firm of Lynch & Stoughton was formed on March 10, 1783, in Bruges
between Dominick Lynch, originally from Galway, and Don Thomas Stoughton, a merchant
with connections to Spain and France. That same year, Stoughton relocated to New York to
establish a trading house and later married Lynch’s sister Catherine. The partnership agreement
saw Lynch providing the majority of the funds from the fortune he had accumulated in Bruges
while Stoughton served as acting partner in New York, dealing with the day-to-day business.97
The firm’s observations on the American market offer considerable detail on the demands for
British goods, the general uncertainty from the lack of reliable information, and the missed
opportunities resulting from such widespread confusion.
On March 3, 1784, Thomas Stoughton wrote to an Irish contact celebrating the demands
for British goods, which had even exceeded the abundant supply provided by the evacuation of
the British from New York. Stoughton wrote confidently that he could obtain advantageous sales
for Irish linens. Stoughton was so optimistic about the market that he advised Dominick Lynch,
who was still in Europe, of the possibility of engaging a ship from Galway or Sligo to maintain a
regular trade between Ireland and New York.98 Yet, just over a month later, Stoughton wrote to
his partner of potential impending losses for importers of goods from Europe. He now predicted
that the amount imported would take at least two years to sell. By May, Stoughton had revised
his estimate again after witnessing the arrival of eight more cargoes from London and Liverpool.
Now Stoughton believed that it would take three years to sell all of the British merchandise.
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Combined with the market glut, New York’s agriculture had suffered considerably from the war
and Stoughton claimed that time was needed before the merchants could begin to sell produce in
order to pay off their growing debt.99 By the end of the year Stoughton wrote to his partner with
a gloomy view of their commercial activity thus far:
“Excuses & ambition in trade are ever productive of evil consequences, that of
America has been over done. GB & Ireland I am fearful will have reason to
remember the year 1784. We have neither produce or money to discharge our
debts, happy is the man of honest principles who has nothing to do with dry goods
or exposes himself or friends to the collection of debts in this country.”100
With the arrival of peace, a flood of British goods saturated the American market. British
merchants, eager to maintain their commercial ties with the now independent colonies, lent
liberally to American customers. As a result, several merchant houses in Britain and America
went bankrupt due to these lending practices.101 The state of the market was so severe that the
London Chronicle reported the story of an ‘eminent merchant’, who had sent a large shipment of
goods to America and failing to receive payment, and too proud to accept assistance, “put a
period to his existence by shooting himself through the head. He has left a disconsolate widow
and nine children.”102 British newspapers warned young merchants and tradesmen to ignore
reports of “American wealth, American faith, [and] American prosperity.”103 Rather than a
merchant’s paradise, the new states had committed a ‘universal violation of commercial
confidence’ by failing to pay their debts to British creditors. One London newspaper described
America’s ‘commercial infidelity’ as a final act of vengeance against Great Britain.
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The irresponsible demand for British goods was not limited to young adventurers or
disreputable Americans. Jonathan Amory, of the prominent Boston merchant family, clearly
participated in these ventures, taking out five advertisements in the Independent Chronicle over
the course of a month in order to sell “a large assortment of English goods, too many to be
enumerated.”104 Stoughton noted that it was not only American demand that fueled the
destructive trade but also Europeans who “have been intoxicated with golden dreams of America
& rapid prospects of fortunes.”105 James Beekman echoed Stoughton in a letter to a Manchester
firm; Beekman blamed the British for draining the specie from New York during the war,
preventing Americans from repaying their debts. The pervasive spread of British commodities
alarmed Thomas Pleasants Jr. who warned Thomas Jefferson that if something was not done to
regulate the trade, “there will not be in Virginia a Merchant unconnected with G. Britain.”106 In
1784, at the height of the glut, British exports to America were valued at £3,679,467. Over the
course of the following two years, the value of these exports dropped by almost two million
pounds before recovering in 1787.107 The market bust ruined several firms on both sides of the
Atlantic.
For British commerce, despite these losses, the continued dependence of America on
British commodities was recognized as a victory. The Hereford Journal boasted that all of
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Europe’s freight to America could not equal Great Britain’s share of the trade.108 Phineas Bond,
British Consul to America, noted that so long as British creditors used restraint in their liberal
lending they could insure a monopoly of the American market for British credit and
manufactures.109 This general preference for British manufactures and credit appeared to closely
follow Sheffield’s prediction that only the British merchant had the power to supply the “wants
of America.”110 The market glut of British goods can be explained through the lens of
consumption studies, which have shown that the demand for new commodities could often
outstrip available income and even rationality. Further, American merchants had spent the better
part of the eighteenth century becoming fully immersed in a Georgian culture of gentility based
around their consumption of imperial commodities.111 Clearly, political independence did not
necessarily break the strong ties of commercial and cultural dependence on the British Empire.
In such a climate, how was any merchant expected to carry on transatlantic business?
Lynch & Stoughton’s strategy for maintaining commercial relationships despite general
economic stagnation was to provide their correspondents with a steady supply of negative news
about American markets. Rather than paint an optimistic picture of American prosperity,
Stoughton followed a strategy of dissuasion and despair in order to maintain the trust of his
contacts. Stoughton warned of navigation ‘reduced to nothing’, and the ‘impossibility’ of
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obtaining vessels for shipments. When writing to Strange, Dowell & Co. of Cadiz, Stoughton
noted the recent scarcity of grain at Lisbon, and went into great detail on the sudden price
increase for wheat, Indian corn & flour. Rather than encouragement or schemes to race to the
market in order to meet this sudden demand, Stoughton’s response was concerted
disenchantment. He explained that the firm had not sent a single shipment to a house in Lisbon
because they were fearful of the results of such exorbitant prices.112 The following year,
Stoughton noted confidently to his partner the success of this strategy; the price of grain in
Lisbon had finally dropped and by avoiding temptation they had survived while eager
speculators “must burn their fingers.”113
The successful maintenance of this correspondence without the actual exchange of
commodities helps to explain the importance of the economy of information in periods of
economic downturn. Lynch & Stoughton ensured their trustworthiness by warning their
European customers off. Confessing to his partner, “we really are at a loss how to employ
ourselves,” Stoughton did nothing in Europe.114 Instead, he focused on building his firm’s
trustworthiness by avoiding risky ventures. Stoughton provided his contacts with a steady supply
of information on the state of agriculture in New York, and in turn requested information on
opportunities in Europe from his friends in London, Galway, and Cadiz. In August 1785, the
firm finally announced to its European contacts an abundant crop of wheat and solicited their
business, telling James Sutton & Co. that any opportunities in London would enable American
merchants to begin to pay off their debts.115 By December, Stoughton complained to Sutton that
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he had not received any encouragement to ship grain to European markets.116 Still awaiting some
sign from a business contact in Europe by May 1786, the firm temporarily gave up on the idea of
shipping grain for a European market.
The transactions of Lynch & Stoughton from 1783-1787 make for a dull read. The firm
took few risks, and their one major European scheme was a failure. Yet the value of the firm
rests in its role as a purveyor of information about the American market. By recognizing and
alerting their correspondents to potential market dangers their letters offer us insight into how
merchants attempted to manage risk.117 Some risks though could not be so easily avoided. At the
end of 1785, Stoughton wrote to Charles O’Brien in London about insuring a ship for a potential
voyage to Cadiz. Stoughton noted that it would be preferable to use a British vessel in order to
guard against the ‘exaggerated danger at Lloyds’ of American ships falling victim to Barbary
pirates. Unfortunately, the same conditions that flooded the American market with British
manufactures ensured that few British bottoms were available in 1785 and Stoughton was forced
to use an American vessel burdened by costly insurance premiums and the threat of ‘piratical
navigators’.118
The inability of the American government to protect its mercantile marine from Barbary
pirates was the most troublesome foreign policy test for the new nation. The American
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commissioners in London appointed Thomas Barclay to negotiate with the Barbary powers in
1785. Despite successfully concluding a treaty with Morocco in 1787, American ships in the
Mediterranean still faced considerable difficulties from Algerian pirates. Added to this was the
widespread belief that the European powers, and particularly the British, were acting in concert
with the pirates to keep the Americans out of the Mediterranean.119 In July 1785, the NewHampshire Gazette reported on the scale of the Barbary fleet, commenting that the Barbary
pirates typically only used galleys, but now they appeared to be equipped with ‘stout ships’
probably provided by the European states.120 Without any naval protection of their own,
American merchants relied on the distraction caused by European powers waging war with the
Barbary States. In 1786 the onset of peace between Spain and Algiers alarmed the New York
Packet, which declared that if a permanent treaty was signed, “we shall be almost their only
object.”121 It was in this context of international dominoes, and intrinsically linked markets, that
New York merchant Nicholas Low read the news and eagerly awaited word from his foreign
contacts about any potential peace between a European state and the Barbary pirates.122
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In the summer of 1785, Low received a letter from his Lisbon contact, the firm Daniel
Bowden & Son, announcing the signing of a treaty between the Spanish and the Algerians.123 By
October, one account claimed that the commerce of the United States in the Mediterranean had
almost been ‘annihilated’.124 The consequences of the Spanish truce for American commerce
were clearly drastic, and for Nicholas Low they had severe repercussions for his business in the
Mediterranean and especially the Madeira trade.125
Low’s first introduction to the Madeira trade came as a byproduct of his loyalist
connections. The Madeira firm Mendonsa & Brush solicited Low’s business based on a previous
correspondence with his older brother, Isaac Low.126 Mendonsa & Brush, and other Madeira
firms that corresponded with Low, assured him that despite the number of American ships
already in port, Low could expect regular returns for his business.127 The prominent landowner
Dona Guiomar also made a connection with Low, forming an initial agreement to ship 20 pipes
of madeira on consignment with the returns to be invested in wheat, flour, or Indian corn.128
Low's opportunities were not limited to just the island of Madeira however. In the
Mediterranean, Low received price lists from Lisbon, Leghorn, Cadiz and Marseilles. All of
these solicitations were accompanied with tales of great demand for American provisions; some
failed to acknowledge the Barbary threat while others mentioned the pirates in tandem with

123

Daniel Bowden & Son to Nicholas Low, 7 July 1785, Nicholas Low Papers, LC.
Manchester Mercury, 11 Oct. 1785.
125 Though Madeira was technically in the Atlantic, reports showed that the pirates would pursue vessels ‘between
200 and 300 leagues farther to the Westward than at any former period’, see, Manchester Mercury, 11 Oct. 1785.
126 Below, I will address the part loyalists played in Low’s business as important middle-men.
127 Mendonsa & Brush to Nicholas Low, 24 Aug. 1783, Box 3, Nicholas Low Papers, LC. The extent of Low’s
involvement in the Madeira trade can also be charted through the advertisements he placed in local papers. On 9
Dec. 1784, Low advertised ‘Bowden’s best sweet Lisbon wine’, New York Packet, 9 Dec. 1784. Additional ads were
placed in the New York Packet on 12 Jan. 1786 and in the Daily Advertiser, 17 May 1786, and 28 Dec. 1789.
128 Dona Guiomar to Nicholas Low, 18 Sept. 1784, Box 5, Nicholas Low Papers, LC.
124

38

growing market demand.129 It was up to Low to decide if the potential reward warranted such
risk.
After the American Revolution, Madeira consumption in the United States dropped as
Americans turned to Continental wines.130 The Madeira trade, however, remained profitable as
Americans served as middlemen and carriers to other markets. Through Dona Guiomar, Low
shipped pipes of wine on consignment to the East Indies; taking advantage of the rapid growth in
the number of civil servants and military officers in India.131 The numbers reveal the growing
profitability of the Asian market for Madeira; one vessel transporting Madeira to Bengal carried
seven hundred pipes of wine in 1784. This market would only continue to grow and by 1815,
one-quarter of Madeira’s exports went to Asia.132 Dona Guiomar’s initial agreement with Low
was a consignment of one hundred and eighteen pipes of East India market wine. Trusting in
Low’s ‘prudent management’, Dona Guiomar wrote that Low should attempt to make a
remittance as quickly as possible, but if demand for the East India market slipped he should hold
onto the wine as it would increase in value with time. In return for his services, Dona Guiomar
provided valuable information about Madeira’s market. In January 1788, she informed Low of
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the late severe weather, and recommended a shipment of 3000 bushels of Indian corn, 3000
bushels of wheat and 300 barrels of flour.133 Low’s participation in a global trade which
connected the Atlantic, Mediterranean and Indian Ocean highlights his continued dependence on
the British Empire for both commercial contacts and available markets.
The immense profitability of the Mediterranean trade meant that even the threat of
capture by Barbary pirates was not a sufficient deterrent for enterprising merchants. In order to
safeguard his business, Low’s shipments needed to become British. Low took advantage of the
widespread availability of Mediterranean passes and alternative bottoms to insure his ships at a
lower freight and continue his trade in the Mediterranean.134 Though not an absolute guarantee of
safety, American ships sailing under British colors and carrying a Mediterranean pass were able
to pass by Barbary corsairs without examination as they sailed under the Royal Navy’s
protection.135 This trade in identity through false papers was a common practice of early modern
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commerce as merchants were able to take advantage of loose definitions of citizenship and
nationality to gain access to forbidden markets.136
For the British, the trade in passes, papers, and even British bottoms was part of a larger
concern over the general violations of the Navigation Act in the 1780s. In Parliament, Charles
Jenkinson, future President of the Board of Trade, described how ships sold their Mediterranean
passes while at sea once they no longer needed protection. In reaction to the pass trade Jenkinson
proposed a series of reforms to stamp out false registries and guarantee that “no ship should be
deemed British built, that was not actually built in Great Britain or the British dominions.”137 As
this debate continued in Parliament, some MPs mocked the collusion of local government
officials and whole cities with the smuggling trade, deriding Londoners’ support for ‘Alderman
Smuggler’.138 Newspapers recounted harrowing stories of cosmopolitan vessels of Scottish and
Irish smugglers, navigating under American colors, and violently assaulting revenue cutters off
the coast of Britain.139 Under William Pitt’s ministry, the government increasingly recognized
the annual loss to the revenue from these violations of the Navigation Act.140 Attempts were
made to stamp out smuggling by a reduction in duties, investment in new cutters, and a popular
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campaign against the sins of smuggling.141 In order to understand the extent of the trade, more
information was needed, and the ministry here relied heavily on its consuls in America for
concrete knowledge of American complicity.
After British consul-general John Temple learned of a counterfeiting operation in
Mediterranean passes at Philadelphia he unconvincingly warned the U.S. Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, John Jay, that the Barbary Corsairs were experts in detecting counterfeit passes and he
could only lament “the misery that such of your mariners will probably meet with should they
with such counterfeit passes fall into the hands of the Barbary Corsairs…”142 Recognizing the
scale of the trade, British Consul Phineas Bond requested permission from the Secretary of State,
the Marquess of Carmarthen, to appoint agents for the different American ports in order to check
Mediterranean passes. Bond clearly recognized the danger the pirates posed in motivating
Americans to obtain passes, “the mischief is become more alarming, as the fraud is become more
general: as far as I can learn most American vessels, sailing in the track of the Algerine cruizers,
carry forged passes.”143
So extensive was this trade in British identity that American newspapers featured
advertisements selling ships with alternative papers. Low took out several advertisements
through the 1780s, announcing in the New York Daily Advertiser in April 1788, “For Charter.
The ship Philadelphia, George Tower, Master, lying at Murray’s wharf, British build, now under
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Dutch colors, with a Mediterranean pass. Enquire of Nicholas Low.”144 The multiple identities of
a single ship with a British bottom, Dutch flag, and American ownership was meant to throw off
any would-be aggressor. The identity of ships though could even confuse the merchants
exploiting them. Because the particular identity of a ship and its papers determined its eventual
market, it was important to pin down a ship’s origins. After a long discussion with Robert
Gilmore over the identity of the ship Philadelphia, mentioned above, it was concluded that if the
Philadelphia was a Dutch bottom and possessed a Mediterranean pass it would be well suited for
shipping wheat to Lisbon or Cadiz. But if the Philadelphia ‘proved American’ the ship would go
to Holland instead.145 Eventually it was decided to send the Philadelphia to Holland, but
believing the ship possessed a valid Mediterranean pass, Low and Gilmore decided to charter her
regularly between the Iberian Peninsula and New York.146
While the trade in Mediterranean passes clearly depended on a weak government and
haphazard enforcement, it also reveals another layer of American dependence on the British
Empire.147 The temporary acquisition of Britishness by American merchants offered them the
opportunity to reduce costs and insure their vessels at cheaper rates. The general confidence in
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the effectiveness of the Mediterranean passes to confer British identity and protection helps to
explain why Low’s partners remained unconcerned when the Philadelphia was delayed overseas.
Wooddrop & Joseph Sims explained to Low their optimism over the fate of the Philadelphia
with the following: “The papers the Ship has on board doubt not will prove sufficient for her to
pass unmolested from any of the Barbary Corsairs.”148 The continued consumption of Britishness
through the purchase of Mediterranean Passes and British commodities reemphasizes the
importance of the British Empire in the study of American transatlantic commerce.149 Americans
depended on the British state and the Royal Navy to inadvertently protect their trade in the
Mediterranean while British merchants continued to serve as the most important source for
manufactured goods and liberal credit for American firms.
The initial trade with the British Empire after the war was characterized by its
multiplicity of schemes and diversity of origins. Some, like Nicholas Low, originated their trade
through familial ties. These connections often offered vital information about markets and
strategies for potential profit. This was the case with Alexander Wallace, Low’s brother-in-law,
who retreated to Britain after the war with his loyalist family.150 At the onset of the French
Revolution, Wallace lamented Low’s failure to ship tobacco to Ireland, mildly scolding his
brother-in-law over a missed opportunity: “had she arrived here with a cargo of tobacco this
month, you would have made a great voyage.”151 Such chastisement was characteristic of an age
where the line between the personal and the commercial so often blurred. Low’s older brother
Isaac, another loyalist, served as a middleman for Low, by first providing a necessary
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introduction to the Madeira trade and then later Isaac set up a shipment of flour to Havre through
the London firm, Turnbull, Forbes & Co.152 Loyalists like Isaac Low and Alexander Wallace
were able to act as a conduit of information between two communities, leveraging their previous
experience as transatlantic merchants to act as a necessary go-between for Anglo-American
commerce.153 Just as Low exploited his loyalist and familial connections in order to carry on his
firm’s business, others were forced to form completely new relationships with overseas firms.
Often these merchants were set adrift in search of business and faced the full brunt of the risk
and uncertainty of transatlantic commerce.
The strategies utilized by Caleb Davis to reestablish his business in the transatlantic trade
required the assistance of state officials and the active solicitation of new commercial
relationships. Within the new United States, Caleb Davis’s revolutionary credentials offered him
the chance to influence state policy and access vital market information. A prominent merchant
in Boston before the war, Davis served in the Sons of Liberty, and on the Boston Committee of
Inspection, Correspondence, and Safety. After the war, Davis was a representative on the
Committee of Tradesmen, served in the Massachusetts House of Representatives, and acted as an
elector in the first presidential election.154 Ever vigilant about the commercial prosperity and
safety of Boston, Davis was a signer of a merchant’s petition in 1787 to the State Assembly,
calling for an increase in the power of Congress to regulate commerce and guard against the
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'insidious conduct ' of Great Britain. The petition accused Great Britain of imposing enormous
duties on American commodities while British ships and goods enjoyed free passage to America.
Recognizing the market conditions brought on by the post-war trade with Britain, the petition
warned of a looming British 'monopoly of our trade' if immediate action was not taken.155
As a public servant, Davis was able to leverage his position in order to benefit his private
business. Besides his own public service, Davis exploited his friendship with Rufus King, a
member of the Confederation Congress, to acquire the latest information before any of his
competitors.156 It was through King that Davis learned of Congress’s attempts to form a treaty
with the Barbary powers. King also informed Davis of a potential conspiracy between France
and Britain to injure the commerce of America.157 King encouraged Davis to distribute this
information to his merchant friends but to avoid at all costs publishing what he had learned, as it
could lead to King’s censure before Congress.158 Davis’s relationship to state officials gave him
important access to insider information not readily available to the general public. As a
merchant, Davis’s reliance on state institutions and good order to carry on his business serves as
a check on any type of cosmopolitan idealism that transatlantic trade is often associated with.159
But just as Davis’s trade depended on state officials for transatlantic commerce, he also
continued to rely on relationships with British merchants to carry on his trade. Davis’s search for
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British connections is representative of a wider commercial dependence by American merchants
on the British Empire’s commercial stability and prosperity.
In his quest to establish his business with overseas firms, Caleb Davis sent Captain Peter
Cunningham to Liverpool in pursuit of a freight. Cunningham was told to seek out any house
that would offer the best terms, but to give preference to the Liverpool firm, John Johnson & Co.
Cunningham was given specific instructions to deliver an open letter to the house of his
choosing. After terms were agreed upon, Cunningham was to sell his cargo and in exchange fill
up the vessel with a return freight. Then the letter begins to falter, revealing the uncertainty of
the voyage. Clearly uncomfortable leaving so much up to Cunningham, Davis suggested that if
the freight was inadequate he should fill up the rest of the vessel with ‘well assorted ware or salt’
or instead proceed to Bristol for a freight. Most importantly, Davis stressed, it was necessary to
acquire the ‘best information’ on Liverpool or Bristol as Davis planned to carry on an extensive
trade with Great Britain. The ‘seeking voyage’ of Cunningham to ‘Liverpool or Bristol’ with
such a loose set of instructions was not atypical of the period. The following year, Davis sent
Captain Joshua Henshaw in search of a freight telling him to avoid London and its high port
duties but that business may be found in ‘Liverpool or Bristol’ or even ‘Ireland, Holland or any
other part of Germany’.160 Without a prior connection to a new port, merchants depended on
‘seeking voyages’ to procure shipments and gather information about markets.161 With Captain
Cunningham, Davis stressed his ultimate goal of forming a connection with a house in
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‘Liverpool or Bristol’ and acquiring the best information about the articles that would answer at
market.162
Through Cunningham, Davis was able to establish connections with both Liverpool and
Bristol. The arrangement with John Johnson & Co. though was strained from the beginning.163
Freights were sent on credit from Liverpool because of the poor value of Davis’s goods, which
resulted in a growing debt that Davis was unable to pay. In defense of their conduct towards
Davis, John Johnson & Co. used Cunningham as a ploy, stating that he was sent with “such full
powers from you that we made him privy to all our transactions…as if he had been one of
yourselves.”164 In Bristol, Davis found a more reliable partner through Joseph Waldo. Waldo was
one of the many merchants pursuing claims against Admiral Rodney for his treatment of their
property on St. Eustatius. Before the Lords Commissioners of Appeals, Waldo successfully
defended his claim and won an appeal for the restoration of his goods in June 1786.165 In the
midst of Waldo’s court battle with Rodney, he began his partnership with Caleb Davis, primarily
trading in tobacco, rice, and naval stores.
On February 11, 1785, Waldo wrote to Davis notifying him of an ‘insuperable difficulty’
in supplying a return freight to Boston. Waldo had learned that the Barbary pirates had captured
several American vessels, which advanced the premium on all American ships sailing without a
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Mediterranean pass. Forced to use a British bottom, Waldo complained that it was “a very
mortifying circumstance, that your ships are not equally privileged with British, which hope will
soon be remedied, by some agreement with those piratical states, or by a commercial treaty with
this, or other salutary measures, the Congress may think proper to adopt.”166 Waldo explained
that he would delay the shipment while waiting for the American commissioners to reach a
settlement with the Barbary States. Davis’s troubles with Waldo continued in May, when Waldo
informed him that he was unable to fulfill any new orders as his credit was stretched “to its
utmost baring,” due to the failure of remittances from America.167 Though Waldo was forced to
suspend his formal business, he continued to supply commercial information to his
correspondents, informing Davis of a potential demand for naval stores in London after a great
fire engulfed the city’s existing supply. Waldo continued to pass on discouraging accounts of his
market through 1785, complaining in October, “in short the American trade is attended with the
greatest discouragmts & embarrassmts which nothing but a commercial treaty will relieve.”168 In
the midst of disputes over remittances between Caleb Davis, John Johnson & Co. of Liverpool
and Joseph Waldo of Bristol, these merchants traded in information while patiently waiting for
the next market opportunity.169
Despite the setbacks Davis faced in Liverpool and Bristol, he continued to pursue
relationships with British firms and even support pre-existing ties. Beginning in 1786, Davis
began to gradually pay off outstanding debts and in the process gathered information about
markets and British policies. In an exchange with a merchant from Glasgow, Davis learned of
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two ships built in America by a Scottish firm that existed in a kind of legal limbo; the merchants
had unsuccessfully applied to Parliament to recognize these ‘American’ ships as British but their
application was rejected, “so that they are neither British nor American bottoms and must be sold
to a foreign state.”170 After a brief hiatus, Davis’s relationship with Joseph Waldo was reestablished with a shipment of lumber in 1787.171 In 1791 Davis received a further solicitation
from Waldo, Francis & Waldo, advising him of the payment of a dividend on the debt of Joseph
Waldo and informing him of the ‘considerable’ demand for American lumber in Bristol.172
Similarly, Davis received an offer from Edmund Lockyer of Plymouth, England who wrote,
“there is not at present perhaps a port in England where the produce of America sells better than
at this.”173 The sudden demand that Lockyer indicated in Plymouth was only one part of a wider
desire for American goods beginning in 1788.174 Shortages in Great Britain, the Iberian
Peninsula, France, Canada and the West Indies created immense demand for American suppliers.
Britain’s Corn Laws prevented export once the prices had advanced to a certain level and the
nation now required imported grain to offset its own poor harvest.175 The opportunities of the
1790s created by environmental disaster, revolution, and war would continue to require the
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active participation of British merchants and officials in providing credit, protection, and access
to markets.

Conclusion
In the decade after independence, American and British merchants joined ministers of state,
Members of Parliament, and popular pamphleteers in a creative effort to define British identity,
empire, and the limits of licit commerce. Bernard Bailyn has argued that “Britain’s Atlantic
world was far larger and more complex than its formal Atlantic empire.”176 An examination of
merchant correspondence, Parliamentary debates, Admiralty Court reports and popular
pamphlets reveals how the intellectual and commercial webs of empire stretched beyond the
limits of mercantilist trade barriers. These events also emphasize that the end of the First British
Empire was never a clean break with the past. After the war, the British Atlantic served as a
space of continual commercial co-dependence and identity making. As a liminal space, the
Atlantic enabled a series of transformations: British merchants became those who ‘call
themselves British’ or ‘bayonet subjects’; the products of the ‘Alien States of America’ were
turned into British goods; and defenseless American ships were re-labeled British vessels under
the ostensible protection of the Royal Navy. In the lead up to the French Revolutionary Wars, the
Atlantic would be transformed once again as natural disasters and revolutions shook the West
Indies, opening up new opportunities for Anglo-American commerce. The next chapter examines
the unexpected collaboration between British colonial governments and American and British
merchants. The opportunities brought on by environmental disaster and slave rebellion led to
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numerous violations of the Navigation Act and prompted further conversations about belonging
in the British Empire.
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Chapter 2: Tragic Opportunities for Anglo-American Commerce, 1784-1792
In May 1788, the American Mercury reprinted an excerpt from Edward Ward’s infamous
1698 description of Jamaica. Ward’s A Trip to Jamaica undoubtedly appeared relevant to the
editors of the American Mercury, looking back on a decade of hurricanes, war, and disease. In A
Trip to Jamaica, Ward satirically assessed what he viewed as the chief characteristics of Great
Britain’s crown jewel in the Caribbean:
“Jamaica is the dunghill of the universe: the refuse of the whole creation: the
clippings of the elements; a shapeless pile of rubbish, confusedly jumbled into an
emblem of chaos, neglected by Omnipotence, when he formed the world in its
admirable order; the nursery of Heaven’s judgments…the receptacle of
vagabonds, and the sanctuary of bankrupts, as sickly as an hospital, as dangerous
as the plague, as hot as [hell], and as wicked as Satan; subject to tornadoes,
hurricanes & earthquakes.”1
The excerpt, printed without attribution to its authorship or original publication, continued for
two more columns. All aspects of life on the ‘dunghill’ were mocked, from the general cost of
living to the scarcity of supplies. The underlying argument was clear, Jamaica was a place where
in the aftermath of a hurricane the richest man could hardly afford a cask of butter. The excerpt
would be republished periodically over the next thirty years in a series of American newspapers,
seeming to punctuate periods of costly military adventures, wild swings of the market, and slave
insurrections.
The frequent publication of this scathing description of Jamaica reflects two underlying
truths: the constancy of natural disaster which loomed over the daily lives of colonists in the
region; and the tendency of contemporary newspapers to treat half-truths, rumors, and biased
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accounts as the latest intelligence. In such a place, provisions were generally short and demand
dependable. In fulfilling this demand, American traders played a vital role in the British West
Indies. So much so, that John Adams forcefully proclaimed the West Indies as part of the
“American system of commerce,” a claim which would provoke many troubling questions about
the loyalty of the British West Indies over the next thirty years.2 As the previous chapter has
shown, contemporaries hotly debated America’s role in the West Indies. Going beyond the
debates over Lord Sheffield’s Observations, this chapter will examine how the British state
grappled with Anglo-American trade in the Caribbean in the decade after the American
Revolution.
From 1784 to 1792 American trade with the British West Indies went through a series of
phases: an initial post-war rush to meet the demand caused by repeated hurricanes; a temporary
slump as new Orders in Council limited the role of American goods in the British islands; and
finally, a pre-war upswing of the market in reaction to new disasters, both environmental and
political. Yet, despite the volatility of the market, opportunity was still there for those merchants
who could adapt to new Orders in Council and take advantage of the natural disasters that
marked the 1780s. This chapter looks at the processes by which the state regulated the empire
during the natural and man-made disasters that plagued the British Caribbean in these years. For
the state, focus here is primarily placed on the activities of the Board of Trade, which managed
an immense administrative apparatus that monitored conditions throughout the empire. The
Board’s main responsibility was the enforcement of the provisions of the Navigation Act, which
guaranteed the commercial and military strength of the empire. A task which was made more
2
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difficult by the independence of the thirteen North American colonies in 1783. While statesmen,
pamphleteers and merchants debated the Navigation Act and America’s role in the empire, the
Board was forced to deal with a series of disasters which struck the West Indies in the years
between the American and French Revolutions.
In response to a crisis, the Board collected information, interviewed planters and colonial
officials, and attempted to come to a solution which would uphold the Navigation Act and
provide relief for the affected colonies. For merchants looking to navigate around new mercantile
restrictions, ready information on the West Indies was necessary. Even as the British state took
greater control of the provisioning trade and attempted to force the Americans out, economies of
information persisted. Merchants, governors, diplomats, and the Board of Trade all participated
in the exchange of the latest news, rumor, and gossip through the spread of correspondence,
newspapers, and state decrees. For merchants, this information served as a didactic tool that
continuously instructed and corrected those who participated in its exchange. In navigating a
region characterized by amorphous borders and transnational cooperation, the latest news helped
merchants to configure their identities to meet the needs of the market. States also participated in
the information economy, both as repositories of information to guide policy and as a bulwark
against the demands of enthusiastic merchants and frantic colonial governors.
The first section of this chapter examines the opportunities and challenges created by the
repeated hurricanes that struck the West Indies in the 1780s. Disasters brought competing and
contradictory reports of scale and direction which merchants, colonial officials, and the Board of
Trade were forced to discern. To understand the impact that storms had on the imperial
economy, this section will focus primarily on the island of Jamaica as a case-study. Jamaica’s
port of Kingston represented the most important port in the British West Indies. A dynamic
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entrepôt, Kingston connected the British and Spanish empires under the Free Port Act. Jamaica’s
size allowed for greater diversification and less reliance on foreign supplies for provisioning its
slaves. While these factors helped shield Jamaica from the devastation experienced by many of
the empire’s smaller islands, the 1780s served as a reminder that Jamaica was hardly immune to
regional disasters. While merchants and colonial officials attempted to exploit the aftermath of
these storms, the state was forced to chart a course between enforcing mercantilist regulations
and uncovering the truth behind colonist claims of widespread destruction and supply shortages.
Section two moves into the early years of the French Revolution and its impact on the
economic life of the Caribbean. At the turn of the decade, when the hurricanes had tapered off
and supply lines were fortified, the immediate need for American provisions diminished and
Americans were forced to consider new commercial strategies.3 The crisis of the Haitian
Revolution offered the promise of immense profit for enterprising merchants. Opportunity,
however, came with serious risks. The ensuing price fluctuations, caused by the loss of the most
important sugar island in the West Indies, destabilized the market. Amidst the general
uncertainty of revolution, contradictory reports of market glut and widespread demand forced
merchants to choose which version of the truth to invest in. Merchants who attempted to profit
from the crisis on Saint-Domingue gambled dangerously with disaster. By studying how
merchants and the state not only attempted to ‘manage risk’ but also exploited disasters, we can
better understand the ways in which individuals and institutions interpreted market information
and adapted to shifting political climates.
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This chapter draws on the official records and merchant correspondence on both sides of
the Atlantic which fueled the economy of information. The proclamations and correspondence of
British colonial governors in the West Indies reveals how these governors justified the opening
of the ports to the public and to the home government. Every opening of the ports to foreign
trade was a violation of the Navigation Act, which required a written defense by the governors.
These papers serve as a useful tool for understanding the inner-workings of colonial
governments. As a general source for the latest commercial information, newspapers provided
accounts of devastating events that offered opportunities for adventurous merchants, as well as a
platform for state officials.
In 1783, American commerce in the West Indies was loosely controlled through vague
state decrees and unspoken tradition. Under the Shelburne Ministry, the Americans were largely
treated as if the war had never happened. At the onset of peace, Americans flocked to the West
Indies to exchange lumber and grain for colonial produce. The Board of Trade attempted to limit
commerce between the West Indies and the United States to British bottoms, but merchants
quickly exploited loopholes in the law. British colonists, for example, remained convinced that
the order did not apply to single decked vessels going to free ports.4 In subsequent years, the
Board of Trade continued to clarify its position by increasing controls over the American trade
through a series of Orders in Council, which dictated the types of commodities Americans could
bring to the West Indies and further restricted the shipping of American goods to British owned
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ships.5 In response to the actions of the Board of Trade, Massachusetts and New Hampshire
issued retaliatory Navigation Acts targeted at British shipping in order to strong-arm the British
government into reforming their policy. While there was much enthusiasm for these measures in
the American press, and the Board of Trade even began an inquiry into the possible effects of the
American Navigation Acts, the Orders in Council nevertheless persisted until 1788 when an Act
of Parliament made the provisions permanent.6
The restrictions placed on American shipping by the Board should not be viewed as part
of a firm and coherent system of rules enforced by the home government.7 At local and imperial
levels, the British government constantly made alterations to existing policy to fit the needs of
the moment. Even when regulations became more stringent, the language used by the
government revealed an unspoken uncertainty about how to handle the American trade. This
incoherence was partly due to the unpredictability of the weather, but also a product of general
economic demand for the empire’s goods. Navigation Acts were relaxed and customs officials
looked the other way to meet the growing demands for colonial produce in these years.8
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Generally historians of this era tend to focus on many of the events discussed above.
Economic historians note the dwindling number of American ships destined for British ports in
the Caribbean. Scholars such as L.J. Ragatz, Selwyn Carrington, and Seymour Drescher only
mention this trade to debate the dependence and unsustainability of the West Indian slave
economy. For historians of the British Empire, the period after the American Revolution serves
as a marker for the first stirrings of Caribbean independence, which were only suspended by the
subsequent twenty years of war with France. Finally, historians of early America, such as
Charles Ritcheson and Andrew O’Shaughnessy, have focused on the political ramifications of
these insults to national honor from capricious Orders in Council and the rising specter of
impressment.9
None of these schools are necessarily wrong, but by focusing on macroeconomic
performance or by marrying American merchant activity to national policy they fall short of
recognizing the depth and complexity of commerce in this period.10 Rather than a story of
incessant conflict, this chapter focuses on continuity and cooperation at the local level. Under the
auspices of unofficial colonial approval, Americans continued to exchange goods and ideas with
the empire despite the official policies of the British and American governments. American
merchants were not merely agents of either state’s policies, and focus should be placed on the
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ability of merchants to adapt to new situations and even take on new identities. In these years,
there was in fact no contradiction for an Atlantic merchant to act as both a loyal citizen of the
new American republic and a participant in the British Empire.
Recent scholarship has reoriented our understanding of the Caribbean as a transimperial
region, rather than a site of clearly delineated national borders. Historical surveys of the Greater
Caribbean’s ecology illustrate how natural disasters broke down mercantilist regulations and knit
disparate communities together. Stuart Schwartz has applied Fernand Braudel’s argument for the
role of climate in shaping culture and politics to the circum-Caribbean region. Schwartz has
further identified a cross-regional solidarity; a common thread of ‘fatalism’ balanced with the
pursuit of profit running through Caribbean communities of various nationalities.11 Matthew
Mulcahy’s groundbreaking work on hurricanes in the Caribbean has argued that historians have,
for too long, ignored the impact of natural disaster on shaping market conditions, cultural
attitudes, and notions of loyalty and state responsibility.12 Mulcahy’s study of disaster and
disaster relief relocates the Caribbean from the periphery to the center of the empire. For
Mulcahy, the British Caribbean was a central ‘hub’ from which goods, people, and ideas spread
throughout the Atlantic World. Similarly, Berland and Endfield have expanded on the work of
Schwartz and Mulcahy by looking at the impact of drought on the Lesser Antilles. Echoing
earlier scholars, Berland and Endfield have concluded that the American Revolution was a
“watershed in free-trade,” that established an emergency policy for the empire of opening the
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ports to foreign traffic. In other words, the pressures of the Caribbean climate overwhelmed the
closed commercial systems of European empires.13 This chapter will further extend the
geographical and political limits of the Greater Caribbean by looking north to the merchant firms
of the new American republic. It also pushes the literature on disaster in a new direction by
emphasizing the potential profitability of disaster for those operating outside the British empire.
A severe information shortage, especially in moments of crisis, forced merchants and
state officials to rely on unsubstantiated intelligence in crafting their market strategies. Rumors,
like other types of knowledge, circulated through the empire. Rather than viewing the
transmission of knowledge as a zero-sum power struggle between center and periphery, it is
necessary to see rumors as ideas which evolved to meet particular societal demands.14 The
concept of rumor here draws on the work of Tamotsu Shibutani who argued that rumors were
‘improvised news’ rather than simply pathological lies. For Shibutani rumor was a result of the
‘failure of formal news’; a product of a situation where the public demand for news exceeds the
available supply of information from official channels.15 Shibutani’s supply and demand problem
helps to make sense of the numerous conflicting reports featured in contemporary newspapers in
periods of crisis. Michiel van Groesen argues that early modern newspapers in the Low
Countries engaged in a ‘culture of anticipation’ in which editors speculated on the latest
commercial news to maintain their readership while waiting for information to trickle in from
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foreign lands.16 Inspired by Shibutani’s ‘improvised news,’ scholars have also looked at how
rumor acted as a driving force in shaping early colonial history in America. Gregory Evans
Dowd notes that rumors of hidden treasures and native violence shaped and reflected perceptions
on the colonial frontier.17 According to Dowd, if rumors did not drive history, they at the very
least determined how individuals reacted to historical events. This chapter contributes to the
growing interest in Shibutani’s ‘improvised news’ by examining how merchants and the state
reacted to rumors of disaster and attempted to exploit unsubstantiated intelligence for their own
ends.
For the broader picture of the impact of the American Revolution on the region, this
chapter emphasizes continuity over conflict and actively questions narratives of revolutionary
rupture that supposedly ended the first British Empire. Despite American independence, and
increasingly stringent Orders in Council, American goods continued to flow into the West Indies.
Even when the ‘American trade’ hit a temporary downturn after 1789, Anglo-American
merchants continued to correspond and depend on the British state to create new opportunities
for trade in the wider Caribbean. During moments of crisis the distinction between American
citizens and British subjects seemingly broke down, allowing Americans to push back into the
empire. Finally, the information exchanged and gathered by merchants and states offers valuable
insight into how those who participated in the economy of information understood risk,
opportunity, and politics, as they attempted to anticipate the next move of the market.
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Environmental Disaster and Breaking into West Indian Markets
On October 22, 1785, the American newspaper The Providence Gazette, reported on a violent
hurricane that had devastated Jamaica and threatened the island with famine.18 At about the same
time, the English Hereford Journal confidently claimed that Jamaica had ‘felt nothing’ from the
recent storm. In the midst of these competing accounts, the London Times joined the debate by
predicting devastation on such a level that it made the opening of the British West Indies to
foreign traffic inevitable:
"The late hurricane in the West Indies will occasion such a demand for provisions
and lumber, that the Governors of the different islands will be obliged to open the
ports for the importation of those articles from America. This is one instance of
the inconveniency that may arise from our ports in the West Indies being totally
shut by Act of Parliament against American vessels, and of which the planters
have loudly complained; it being possible, that from a public calamity, their
necessities may be so great, as to bring on a famine...”19
According to these newspapers, the very same hurricane had at once produced a famine, created
an opportunity, and completely passed by the island of Jamaica. These three articles illustrate the
immense hurdles faced by merchants who attempted to profit from a calamity when reliable
information was less than accurate and speculation ran rampant. Conflicting reports similarly
made governing the empire through the Navigation Act a nearly impossible task.
The threat of inconsistent information was an unending battle for merchants trading in
provisions. During moments of crisis, to combat the general dearth of reliable knowledge,
merchants turned to their correspondents to gauge demand in the ports and acquaint themselves
with alternative strategies to bypass trade barriers. The Board of Trade faced a similar problem
of unverified intelligence. While naturally suspicious of reports of widespread destruction, the
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Board found that the process of verifying the facts about a disaster was even more difficult.
Locals had a vested interest in opening the ports to foreign traffic, and colonial officials often
experienced divided loyalties while in the path of a hurricane.
In response to a natural disaster colonial governors had a variety of choices available to
them, ranging in degrees from: the opening of the ports for certain enumerated articles (carried in
British ships); the temporary suspension of trade barriers; and the liberalization of trade in cases
of extreme emergency. The willingness of officials at various levels of the British government to
relax the Navigation Act in the face of such disasters has often been overlooked in this period in
favor of bellicose Orders in Council and heated Parliamentary rhetoric. This section examines
the reaction to natural disaster and impending famine by looking at major environmental
catastrophes from 1784 to 1789. To understand the complexities of this trade, multiple
commercial and official sources need to be consulted including: contemporary newspapers, the
records of colonial governments and the Board of Trade, and the papers of several New York
merchant firms. The letters received and sent by American merchants represent the difficulties
and potential opportunities merchants faced in navigating an ever-changing field of legal
restrictions and furious demand. Often merchants located in the same port received their
intelligence at the same time, but the news they received could differ markedly. The
contradictory experiences of the merchants examined below, further complicates any attempt at
generalizing on the nature of commercial activity in this period.
By studying the multiple reactions to an environmental crisis, we can attempt to grasp
how merchants and state officials conceived of risk, and acted on the vague reports and
unsubstantiated claims found in newspapers and daily letters. The information available to an
enterprising speculator was often the most valuable commodity to be traded. While official
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proclamations announced to the world the opening of a port, and newspaper accounts provided
striking details of recent hurricanes, information was also exchanged in secret and steeped in
rumor and wild predictions. In order to be the first at market, such flimsy evidence of impending
demand was often more important than official accounts. Disasters loosened restrictions on
foreign nationalities providing a time and space for identity manipulation and the movement of
illicit goods past mercantilist barriers.
Rather than being limited by the goals of a nation state, merchants operated in a
commercial world full of choices. When New York merchants learned that the Spanish would
bar American trade with Havana, they turned to New Orleans, and when that failed merchants
considered shipping in Spanish bottoms.20 In planning a speculative venture, ports of call could
vary, as might the identity of an individual ship and its cargo. When the 1784 hurricane struck St.
Augustine, “a captain's nationality or port of origin was irrelevant when it came to providing
food to a desperate population.”21 Unexpected events also had the potential to redefine the
importance or dangers of certain identities. Even the most spurious rumors of war could double
insurance costs on certain flags and offer exciting opportunities for those with access to neutral
bottoms. Time was also a determining factor in self-fashioning a business endeavor. An ‘early
freight in British bottoms’ made Nicholas Low's shipment of flour to Dominica profitable while
the failure to accumulate the proper papers in a timely manner could sink a venture before it ever
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got off the ground.22 Such strategies depended entirely on mutual trust between merchants. It was
vital for a merchant to recognize potential options in order to properly navigate a market full of
risk.23
For New York merchants Nicholas Low and Thomas Stoughton the initial Orders in
Council were viewed as irritating hurdles for the provisioning trade. The London Chronicle
noted that by October 1783, the new Orders were already in force in Jamaica and American
vessels were commanded to leave empty-handed. Stoughton lamented to a contact in Alicante
that, “[Between us] the restrictions of the British to their West India Islands is a heavy blow, our
intercourse with them was great, the quantities of Jamaica Rum consumed in America
immense.”24 At the same time that Stoughton complained to his Spanish contact about the impact
of new regulations, Nicholas Low received letters from the West Indies soliciting business. From
Jamaica, Abraham Cuyler informed Low that flour was already selling for double its rate at CapFrançais, and if a cargo was to arrive by the middle of March it would sell to a ‘good profit’.25
By June, a contraband trade was already well-established in order to circumvent the Orders in
Council, and the Royal Navy was forced to maintain two men of war at Port Royal to combat the
smuggling of salt from Turks Island to the United States.26
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In response to these restrictions, Stoughton solicited business from a number of West
Indian merchants. His letters inquired about the state of various West Indian markets while also
informing the potential associate about Stoughton’s credentials, the firm’s interest in shipping
goods, and their access to ‘English colors’ if necessary. Finally, Stoughton was sure to mention
the firm’s London contact and intermediary, James Sutton & Co., in order to facilitate any
business with Jamaica and other colonial markets.27 Stoughton’s emphasis on his London
contacts was meant to instill confidence in prospective investors that the firm had access to credit
and available markets whenever necessary. By leaning on his British connections and access to
British identity, Stoughton’s tactics reflected the willingness of many American merchants to
rejoin the British empire, however briefly, in order to make a profitable sale.
In the British West Indian colonies, the Orders in Council were met with increasing
hostility. It was announced in The Ipswich Journal in January 1784 that the inhabitants of
Jamaica refused to pay the British forces stationed on the island until the American trade was
resumed. Despite official prohibition, by June there was already a considerable contraband trade
between America and Jamaica.28 Recognizing the important role of American merchants in the
West Indies, The West India Committee, led by Lord Penryhn, petitioned the Board to permit an
official trade between the American states and the sugar colonies.29 Such measures though had
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little effect on official policy. Instead, it was environmental disaster, which determined the real,
albeit unofficial, change in policy.
For the island of Jamaica, the hurricane of 1784 arrived in the middle of a disastrous
decade for the colony. Five hurricanes had struck the island in seven years. For the region as a
whole, the 1780s are regarded as the most meteorologically active and destructive on record. The
first, and the largest, was the Great Hurricane of 1780 which killed approximately 30,000 in the
region and left only sixteen houses standing in Kingston.30 The storm which struck Kingston and
Port Royal on the night of July 30, 1784, was said to have stripped the trees bare, struck down
buildings and reefed ships.31 The American poet Philip Freneau was inspired by his harrowing
trip to Jamaica during the storm and penned an eyewitness account, titled, “Verses, made at Sea,
in a Heavy Gale,”
“While death and darkness both surround,
And tempests rage with lawless power,
Of friendship’s voice I hear no sound,
No comfort in this dreadful hour –
What friendship can in tempests be,
What comfort on this raging sea?”32
The hurricane of the summer of 1784 ended a long period of tense scheming and market
manipulation for American merchants. Before the hurricane, business contacts in Nicholas
Low’s network were informing him of poor demand in the West Indies for grain and little chance
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of tangible profit.33 Matters changed at the end of July when reports flowed into London of a
hurricane which struck several islands in the British West Indies. The news forced the Board of
Trade to open the ports of Bermuda to the importation of lumber and provisions in British
bottoms.34
Knowledge of the extent of the devastation reached American merchants by September
1784, where it was quickly apparent that the level of demand would outstrip the immediate
supply and force merchants to choose their preferred markets carefully. On September 3, 1784,
the New-Jersey Gazette featured a sensational account of the hurricane. The report, based on ‘a
letter from Kingston’, described a scene of absolute devastation as almost all of the vessels in the
port were destroyed. On land, the sugar-works were hit particularly hard and the writer lamented
that “no pen can describe the havock, and what is worse, there is not provision in this town
sufficient for two weeks.”35 The article also noted that the inhabitants had petitioned the
Lieutenant Governor requesting the admission of American provisions for six months. Though
the article claimed that Lieutenant Governor Alured Clarke had initially refused the petition, by
the end of the month, newspapers were announcing that plans were going forward to open the
port for four months for provisions and lumber.36 Despite the contradictory information offered
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to merchants, the article concluded that the above rumors had already resulted in a mad rush to
ship out flour to Jamaica as quickly as possible.37
The effects of the hurricane were severe; as late as December 1784 building materials for
Jamaica continued to fetch a high price and the demand for flour remained steady. Amidst the
chaos, it appeared as if the colonies had completely broken with the commercial regulations
imposed by Whitehall. Ships were advertised for charter in local newspapers with British
registers and bound for the West Indies. At the same time, West Indian merchants informed their
American contacts of repeated renewals of proclamations allowing American vessels into
Jamaica well into the following year.38 A supposed letter from Kingston, printed in the United
States Chronicle, declared that the hurricane had accomplished in a single hour, “more for these
ports and for the continent of America than all the negociations which have taken place on the
American commerce, since the conclusion of the definitive treaty. For our Governor, affected by
the exigence that was likely to ensue has opened our ports to all the world for four months to
come.”39 Most of all, the crisis that beset the British West Indies in 1784 seemed to declare to the
world the inadequacy of Lord Sheffield’s plan for British North America to supply the sugar
colonies. The Freeman’s Journal even speculated that any lumber shipped from Canada to the
West Indies was originally acquired in the United States.40
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Though ships continued to embark for the British West Indies into 1785, access began to
close as early as January of that year. Peregrine Bourdieu of Dominica noted to Nicholas Low at
the end of January that it was impossible to introduce North American lumber, the chief
American commodity, into the island. Nevertheless, Bourdieu hinted that Americans continued
to travel to the port, often without displaying any colors.41 A subsequent investigation by Charles
Jenkinson, later Lord Hawkesbury, into the trade between the American states and Jamaica,
concluded that the distress of the colony was largely exaggerated, and “that in fact there never
was the smallest necessity for opening the ports on account of the hurricane.”42 Jenkinson’s
investigation largely blamed the Lieutenant Governor of Jamaica for overreacting. The report
argued that the decision to open the port “does not stand justified either by necessity or good
policy,” because it led to the influx of American ships. These ships glutted the market, caused
massive price fluctuations, and left Jamaica with fewer resources than during the previous war.
Planters, it was said, only reacted to the ‘interest of the moment’ and failed to recognize that a
‘temporary rise in the market’ did not warrant a violation of the Navigation Act. It was
concluded that greater adherence to the Navigation Act was necessary and foreign supplies
the limitations of British North America to supply the West Indies, see, Ritcheson, Aftermath of Revolution: British
Policy toward the United States, 1783-1795, 193; Jensen, The New Nation: A History of the United States during the
Confederation, 1781-1789, 165.
41 Peregrine Bourdieu to Nicholas Low, 30 Jan. 1785, Box 7, Nicholas Low Papers, LC. Despite these restrictions,
the Governor of the Bahama Islands had issued a proclamation as late as November permitting the importation of
Indian corn into the island, see New-Hampshire Gazette, 4 Jan. 1785, reprinted in the New York Journal, 20 Jan.
1785 and Essex Journal, 19 Jan. 1785.
42 Narrative of Circumstances respecting the Trade between North America and the Island of Jamaica in the year
1784, reel 2, Liverpool Papers, UMSC. For more on Jenkinson’s role in the debates over the American trade, see,
Crowley, “Neo-Mercantilism and the Wealth of Nations: British Commercial Policy after the American
Revolution”; Johnson has shown that the Spanish faced a similar issue of questioning whether to trust reports of
disaster in Florida, see, Johnson, “Climate, Community, and Commerce among Florida, Cuba, and the Atlantic
World, 1784-1800,” 472; For a contemporary discussion of exaggerated disaster claims, see, Joseph Horan, “The
Colonial Famine Plot: Slavery, Free Trade, and Empire in the French Atlantic, 1763-1791,” International Review Of
Social History 55, no. 18 (2010): 103–21; Johnson’s work challenges the view that disaster claims were merely a
strategy meant to force the opening of ports, see, Sherry Johnson, “El Niño, Environmental Crisis, and the
Emergence of Alternative Markets in the Hispanic Caribbean, 1760s-70s,” The William and Mary Quarterly 62, no.
3 (July 2005): 365–410.
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should come from North America only in British bottoms.43 In sum, for the British government,
the disaster at Jamaica was made by man, not the weather. In the Board’s view, if the planters
and local officials had used ‘better information’ they never would have made such claims of
distress and famine. The results of Jenkinson’s investigation would take on a new importance in
1786 when Jenkinson was made Lord Hawkesbury and President of the Board of Trade.
Jenkinson’s conclusions would then come to define official British policy towards the West
Indies going forward.
The British government was not completely passive in maintaining the wellbeing of its
Caribbean possessions. As Johnston has shown, over the course of the eighteenth century the
Board of Trade proactively monitored the public health of the colonies, even at the expense of
potential economic benefits.44 After the Great Hurricane of 1780, Parliament granted relief for
the islands of Barbados and Jamaica amounting to £120,000, but relief was typically limited to
private subscription campaigns and local charity.45 More locally, planters and colonial officials
produced a distinct built environment in response to disaster by reducing the height of buildings
and investing in alternative construction materials. While historians have noted the state’s
growing interest in providing disaster relief by the turn of the century, most still acknowledge the
limitations placed on contemporaries to ‘manage’ the everyday risks associated with life in the
West Indies within the constraints of the British mercantile system. This was largely due to the
demands placed on planters and merchants to fulfill orders and meet the immense demand for
43
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colonial produce in the eighteenth-century. Despite knowledge of a hurricane season, British
ships plied the treacherous waters of the Caribbean in every month of the year. To meet growing
consumer demand, colonists throughout the empire were forced to ‘weather the storm’ and the
most common government response was not relief but the opening of ports to foreign trade.46
The persistent need for American relief ensured the continuation of business
relationships, despite decrees from the home government.47 Even in the relative stability of early
1785, the inhabitants of the West Indies repeatedly petitioned the government to end the
restrictions on the American trade.48 But as governors became more hesitant to issue blanket
proclamations there was much confusion about the extent of the damage done by a storm. As
Jenkinson’s investigation had already shown, the British government thoroughly questioned the
validity of the information received from the West Indies.
What followed was a constant competition between merchants and officials for control of
the market. New hurricanes resulted in begrudging proclamations that allowed in American
ships, which resulted in tighter controls once the crisis had ended. With each successive Order in
Council, smuggling into the islands became more prevalent.49 False papers, the variable change
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of colors, ‘drifting’ into port, and trade through foreign proxies were all strategies pursued by
American merchants attempting to get back into the empire. One common practice was to rely on
the flourishing trade in British registers in order to ensure regular access to British ports. Similar
to the methods used to ship American goods into the Mediterranean, Americans purchased or
chartered vessels that were sold as ‘well-calculated for the West India trade’. Advertisements
reassured buyers of the safety of the proposed voyage by referring to ships that were ‘last from
Jamaica’ or in possession of an ‘undeniable’ British register.50 One possible alternative method
was to simply rely on a London merchant firm to send a vessel to America and then to the West
Indies, a kind of elongation of the earlier triangular trade.51 Regardless of the strategy pursued,
an examination of merchant correspondence and newspapers from 1785-1789 shows that
American merchants continued to regularly trade with the British West Indies well into the
French Revolution.52
In these same years, British officials put forward a series of measures aimed at stamping
out the smuggling trade. The Antigua Gazette noted the sale in June 1785 of a Maryland ship
seized by customs officials while carrying twenty thousand shingles and twenty-five hundred
bushels of corn.53 As the clampdown continued, newspapers carried the sensational story of a

180. Several historians have noted the broad adoption of smuggling by all levels of society, Wim Klooster, “InterImperial Smuggling in the Americas, 1600-1800,” in Soundings in Atlantic History: Latent Structures and
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TNA, f.310-311.
52 Richard Curson to Nicholas Low, 14 June 1785.
53 Excerpt from the Freeman’s Journal, 24 Aug. 1785.
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ship owned by Robert Morris which put into Barbados in distress and was turned away before a
leak could be fixed.54 In the Leeward Islands, Horatio Nelson earned a name for himself as a
tenacious opponent of the smugglers. At Nevis, Nelson captured four American vessels, but
without any support from the local vice-admiralty court, his campaign was fruitless. Eventually,
the planters were able to successfully turn the tables on Nelson and sue him for £40,000 in
damages. Nelson was forced to remain onboard his ship until the matter was settled out of fear of
arrest.55
Recognizing the complicity of the planters and colonial officials in illicit trade, Charles
Jenkinson pushed for tighter controls on ships’ registers in the House of Commons. Jenkinson
claimed that registers should not be granted to any vessel lacking a certificate showing that the
ship was built in a British dock. Further, vessels should only belong to an individual owner and
the British government should maintain a master list of all British vessels over fifteen tons.56 The
increasingly vigilant British government managed to cut sugar exports to the United States from
the British West Indies by half in 1787.57 For Bermuda, the loss of the American trade and the
most important market for the island’s commerce, ripped the island apart. Governor Browne
announced plans to prevent future abuse of the law by citizens of the United States and
proclaimed his intention to adhere to an “exact conformity to the spirit and intention of his orders
aforesaid.” The reaction to Browne’s vigilance was extreme. The ‘country party’, which had
participated in the illicit trade, became violent and the Governor responded by closing the
54
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Assembly.58 Even in islands where officials did not participate in the American trade, local
planters could attempt to forcibly modify government policy in favor of American merchants.
A variety of factors influenced the government’s change in policy. The new Board of
Trade, which was restructured in 1784, was not made up of mercantilist demagogues looking to
prop up an aged colonial system. Constructed initially as an experiment, the Board constantly
investigated the state of navigation and the flow of trade by interviewing corn factors, consuls,
merchants, and planters. The motives that influenced policy also varied, from a desire to revive
the old triangular trade, to protecting the peacetime employment of British sailors by maintaining
a vibrant commercial fleet.59
The pressure on a governor to supply a colony while maintaining the spirit of the
Navigation Act was extreme. Governors were forced to open the ports in order to guarantee
steady supplies after a hurricane, but in the face of repeated inquiries by the Board into the
conduct of colonial officials, these decrees were increasingly delayed while waiting for absolute
proof of famine.60 Lacking a clear way out, Governor Shirley of the Leeward Islands wrote to the
Board of Trade in January 1790 requesting that the Board take back the governor’s discretionary
power to open the ports. Shirley complained that his council was full of self-interested planters
who would never advise against opening the ports, and that there were already so many small
American ships coming to the islands that an official opening would never be necessary. Though
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Shirley wished to no longer be put in the ‘disagreeable situation’ of refusing to open the ports,
the Board of Trade disagreed and upheld the existing discretionary power. The Board further
reminded Shirley of his duty to only open the ports in cases of public emergency.61 Recognizing
the American trade as a necessary evil, the Board refused to take away the governors’
discretionary power to open the ports, instead reserving for itself the role of oversight and
management of colonial officials who overstepped their duty and violated the Navigation Act.
Just as Americans continued to rely on the empire for markets and commercial contacts, the
empire still needed American goods to support itself.
The debate over environmental disaster and British dependence on American supplies
naturally took on a moral dimension over contemporary concerns about the slave trade.
Hurricanes had a direct connection to the mortality rates among enslaved Africans in the islands.
This created a vicious cycle wherein planters imported slaves in increasing numbers after a
hurricane in order to support the sugar economy. Beginning in 1784, James Ramsay’s two-part
indictment of slavery in the British West Indies called into question the economic viability and
loyalty of Britain’s sugar colonies. Ramsay’s strategy focused on the economic shortcomings of
the planters’ monopoly over William Wilberforce’s indictment of the brutality of the slave
trade.62 Ramsay alleged that the sugar colonies, crippled by their opulence and monopolies,
would gradually drift into the new American empire.63 Reliance on America did not come out of
unexpected environmental disasters. Rather, Ramsay described the West Indian planters,
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gluttonous and blinded by luxury, pursuing profit over the sanctity of the Navigation Act. Instead
of investing in domestic provisions, the planters only produced more sugar and starved their
slaves.64 Anti-planter editorials repeated Ramsay’s position, arguing that a free society could not
hold men in bondage, and even suggesting that the repeated hurricanes that struck the West
Indies were a result of Providence judging the planters who “torture their fellow creatures from
Africa.”65 By 1792 an association in London had formed to promote the boycott of sugar in order
to force an end to the slave trade. The ‘sugar-haters’, as they became known, even penned a
formal address detailing how a single family could affect the profitability of the sugar industry
and arguing for individual complicity. These ‘sugar-haters’ claimed that for every pound of sugar
purchased, “we may be considered as consuming two ounces of human flesh.”66
The response from anonymous West India planters, the West-India Planters and
Merchants Committee, and their representatives in Parliament was a resounding defense of the
necessity of their trade, and their roles as the stalwart defenders of the British Empire. Early on,
the planters perceived an assault on their interests as Parliament considered several measures that
would undermine the sugar monopoly of the British West Indies.67 When Parliament considered
passing the export duty on sugar from the consumer to the planter, in order to lower the price,
planters in Barbados petitioned the House of Commons that it was a violation of their rights as
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Englishmen to fix the price of sugar.68 The petition reminded Parliament that the planters had
already suffered from the economic shortcomings of the fixed colonial system and further
concluded that any new duties on sugar would only affect the living conditions of the slaves in
the islands.
Pro-planter pamphleteers emphasized the importance of the sugar trade to British
commerce, arguing that the abolition of the slave trade would be “the annihilation of the
colonies.”69 It was argued that abolition would not end slavery but rather increase the duties on
colonial articles exponentially and even threaten the security of the islands by reducing the
number of white inhabitants. An Address of the Assembly of Jamaica in 1792 strongly asserted
the importance of the West Indian colonies to Britain’s identity as a commercial nation, and
portrayed the planters as daring pioneers braving a hostile climate in order to contribute to the
wealth of the mother country.70 In London, the West-India Planters and Merchants Committee
published their official response to the abolitionists in order to encourage all those associated
with the sugar trade to petition Parliament.71
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The abolition debate eventually stalled in Parliament as news of the Haitian Revolution
began to spread, and war with France became a distinct possibility. It was nevertheless taken
seriously by contemporaries at the time. This debate not only attacked the planter’s way of life
but also encouraged the public to consider the planters and merchants as traitors looking to
undermine the empire out of a desire for greater profit and luxury. For many, the planters had
become, like their American correspondents, reckless speculators in their own right with no
allegiance to any country.72
In recognizing the potential disloyalty of speculative merchants, the British government
was not alone in pushing back against increasingly aggressive American commercial practices.
As part of the several Navigation Acts passed by the American states, Americans were restricted
from trading in British bottoms. Thomas Stoughton warned his contact in Jamaica that recent
laws in New York had prohibited him from having “any connection in British bottoms.”73 There
were rumors that mobs would burn down English ships coming from the Dutch West Indies,
even if they were owned by Americans.74 Similarly, Thomas English in Boston also noted the
prohibition, but he still believed that his shipment from Jamaica in a British bottom would be
received as American upon arrival.75 Former allies of the United States in the West Indies also
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resisted the American trade. By 1786 all American vessels were refused entrance into Havana
and similar measures had been taken in the French West Indies to suppress foreign trade with
American merchants.76
As the push against American commerce continued, British colonial governors believed
that trade with the other European colonies would limit American commerce while also
provisioning the sugar colonies. In 1787, the Governor of Antigua announced the opening of the
ports to goods shipped from any island in the West Indies.77 The British had long used their free
ports to break down the monopolies of competing colonial empires. As these ports traded in
necessary raw materials without infringing on the monopolies of Great Britain, they were seen as
a viable alternative to trading with America. Yet the free port system was unsuccessful in
excluding American merchants who used foreign ports as a go-between with the British Empire.
Among the foreign ports trading in American provisions, the Dutch island of St. Eustatius was
once again ascendant, but the Swedish, Danish and French islands also offered similar
opportunities.78 Through these islands, American merchants traded lumber, flour, and corn for
colonial produce. The increasing interest in alternative markets is evident in the correspondence
and newspapers of the period. When a hurricane wiped out the sugar cane in the Danish and
Dutch West Indies in 1789, William Constable of New York lamented the loss of two islands

76

Derby Mercury, 6 July 1786; Pennsylvania Mercury, 18 Nov. 1785; Lafayette informed Foreign Secretary John
Jay that the resistance to free trade in the West Indies came from the French merchants in Paris, 19 March 1785;
Morning Chronicle and London Advertiser 7 April 1785 and Thomas Ruperson to Low 24 Feb. 1785, Box 7,
Nicholas Low Papers, LC. John Adams suggested to Thomas Jefferson that an alien duty might be necessary for
French as well as British shipping as the French are also “enemies to our ships and mariners.” See, John Adams to
Thomas Jefferson, 7 Aug. 1785, Founders Online, NARA.
77 Pennsylvania Packet, 9 July 1787.
78 Armytage, The Free Port System in the British West Indies: A Study in Commercial Policy, 1766-1822, 43–48.
Armytage alleges that the planters lost interest after it was clear that the Americans would not be allowed to
participate, but as this part shows, the Americans continued to participate and maintain contact with the inhabitants
of Britain’s overseas colonies through foreign intermediaries. On St. Eustatius, see, Ragatz, The Fall of the Planter
Class in the British Caribbean, 1763-1833, 187.

81

“from where almost all our supplies of sugars were drawn, that article will of course become
both scarce & dear in our market.”79 These islands were important as markets in their own right,
but they also served as conduits into the British and French West Indies. With such fluid
markets, ships were sent out with vague directions to stop at a variety of islands in search of a
profitable sale. In 1788, Thomas English ordered Captain John Taylor to stop at the Swedish
island of St. Bartholomew’s from which goods could be carried into Guadeloupe in exchange for
sugar. In order to carry out the trade, Captain Taylor would need to hire a small boat to carry the
sugar down to St. Bartholomew’s as the French would seize any article of colonial produce going
to America.80 Similar covert strategies were also used to continue trade with the British islands.
The nature of this trade did not go unnoticed. This is seen as early as December 1785 in
the correspondence of Edmund Lincoln, Governor of St. Vincent’s, with Foreign Secretary Lord
Sydney. Governor Lincoln described a commerce carried on by sloops and schooners going to
Martinique, Guadeloupe and St. Eustatius to pick up American lumber and provisions. The
Americans sold these goods to the planters at a 50 to 100 percent profit. The restrictions on the
trade merely ensured a period of extreme price inflation and short supplies.81 Governor Lincoln
claimed Parliamentary regulations had only served to ‘irritate’ the Americans rather than stop
their commerce and worst of all, this trade had enriched Britain’s ‘natural enemies’ in the West
Indies.82 The trade reached such a height by the summer of 1787, that the British government
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began to contemplate targeting American produce from foreign islands. In June, rumors
circulated of new duties for vessels coming from foreign islands, and by August there were
already stories of armed ships targeting smugglers.83 Yet such measures were only effective so
long as the weather cooperated. By the summer of 1792, American newspapers again featured
devastating accounts of the latest hurricane to hit the West Indies. Bermuda and Antigua were hit
particularly hard and by the time the hurricane was reported in American newspapers, the
Governor of Bermuda had already opened the ports in order to rectify the ‘very alarming
situation’ of the island.84
The American trade continued because the Navigation Acts were constantly reinterpreted
to suit the needs of the British government. Laws were modified, amended, and even ignored in
colonial governments and at Whitehall in order to ensure the steady continuation of British
commerce. American merchants continued to gain access to the British Empire by manipulating
these loose rules but also through mutual cooperation and dependence on their British
counterparts. Rather than trading in a vacuum, these merchants used local contacts to learn about
the best market opportunities and methods of subverting maritime regulations. With the coming
of the French Revolution, American merchants would continue to find new opportunities for
their commerce within the empire. Primarily, they sought the chance to act as neutral carriers in
any conflict Great Britain entangled itself in.85
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Gambling with Disaster in the Haitian Revolution
Compared to the numerous disasters of the previous decade, the opening years of the French
Revolution were relatively calm for the British West Indies. Prices were stable and the British
islands had managed to avoid the latest hurricanes to strike the Caribbean and continue to
prosper despite the limitations placed on American trade. When the slave rebellion in SaintDomingue began in 1791, it was immediately viewed as a contagion that threatened the stability
of the British colonies. To protect themselves from a revolutionary epidemic, British colonial
officials responded with increasingly stringent border controls and the monitoring of foreigners
in the islands.86 As an unprecedented slave rebellion, the commercial impact of the Haitian
Revolution provoked the involvement of a wide range of actors throughout the Caribbean,
including: American statesmen, British colonial governors, and American suppliers operating
throughout the West Indies. The rebellion spurred on American merchants into action and
supplies were sent in vast quantities to Saint-Domingue. This led to an inevitable over-saturation
of the market, which was further exacerbated by the dwindling supply of colonial produce as
sugar and coffee plantations were burned to the ground. The British government also attempted
to profit from the revolution by filling the void created in the sugar market by the fall of SaintDomingue, but the rapid expansion of sugar production required the British to rely further on
American suppliers. For everyone involved, the competing forces of the oversupply of provisions
and the undersupply of colonial produce complicated the potential opportunities offered by such
a crisis. The Haitian Revolution, then, represents the limitations of a trade centered around
disaster, and the importance of having the latest information in order to sort out possible
opportunity in-between the lines of general devastation.
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By the time the insurrection began in 1791, American merchants were already wellestablished in Saint-Domingue. Just as in the British islands, Americans faced several hurdles in
gaining access to the French West Indies. Early on, the French government had opened up trade
with American shipping, but specifically prohibited American flour and the exportation of
valuable French colonial produce. While merchants were able to use several methods to subvert
these mercantile barriers, the danger of being caught had real consequences for smugglers. The
American firm of Perkins, Burling & Co. at Cap-Français recognized the dangers of exporting
coffee, as they warned a contact that if caught they could be banned from doing business in the
island.87 To ensure that their vessels did not ‘drift’ too close to the shore, American vessels were
also seized by guarda-costas if they remained near Cap-Français for more than twenty-four
hours.88 These restrictions could persist even in the aftermath of a devastating hurricane hitting
the island, and Americans were specifically mentioned in an edict prohibiting all foreign trade
under pain of imprisonment and confiscation of goods.89 The actions taken by the French
colonial government still proved ineffectual in preventing Americans from accessing the islands.
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By 1786, the French West Indies imported goods worth an estimated £21 million from the
United States.90
The French Revolution further opened West Indian markets for American goods.
Inspired by the actions of the National Assembly, the colonial elite of Saint-Domingue saw the
Revolution as an opportunity to gain a degree of independence. In April 1790, the town of St.
Marc attempted to separate from the rest of the colony. When the Assembly in St. Marc
announced its intention to open the ports to foreign merchants, a civil war broke out.91 At the
same time that merchants on the island learned of the rebellion at St. Marc, news also came of a
revolt by troops stationed in the Antilles. These disturbances brought about an immediate halt to
business for several firms at Cap-Français as they waited for further information in order to
better assess the market.92
During the general uncertainty on the island some merchants were more than willing to
brave the risks. From Paris, Gouverneur Morris wrote to William Constable of a potential
scheme to supply Hispaniola with lumber, and carry in return sugar from the island to Holland.93
American merchants also clearly recognized similar opportunities in the island; the following six
months witnessed widespread market fluctuations as American produce flooded the market. In
June 1790, and again in March 1791, newspapers carried hundreds of advertisements and lists of
arrivals from Hispaniola as well as accounts of American produce selling at low prices in the
90
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French West Indies. The trade reached such heights that merchants at Cap-Français claimed that
they were unable to sell anything due to the “great number of vessels in this harbor.”94 Coffee
from Hispaniola quickly became the only produce that could turn a profit, and often this was
purchased by American merchants for re-export to Europe.95
These occurrences of market glut and downturn were also interspersed with periods of
intense activity. ‘Troubles’ at Martinique had prevented the cultivation of the sugar-cane, which
in turn increased demand and resulted in extravagant prices for sugar in Europe.96 This was
reiterated by New York and Philadelphia firms, which noted the increasing demand for sugar in
America by May 1791.97 Despite the confusion caused by the parties vying to control SaintDomingue, The Connecticut Gazette confidently asserted in June of the same year that, “peace
and tranquility are returning, and the prospect of a good crop is very flattering.”98
Only a few months later the Gazette was proven wrong as news of the slave insurrection
reached America and prompted another surge in mercantile activity. The widespread availability
of news about Hispaniola meant that any delay in informing a business contact could be
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catastrophic to a speculative venture. On September 17, 1791, New York firm Gelston &
Saltonstall began formulating plans for a massive investment in sugar loaf but their scheme was
already too late. On the same day, the Independent Gazetteer reported on a letter from Port-auPrince which claimed that flour was no longer selling in the colony due to the scale of the
arrivals, and added that a dry season had ruined the sugar cane. Despite these horrible conditions,
the letter noted that merchants continued to invest, “notwithstanding all our advices, the
shipments are continuing.”99 By October, it was proclaimed in the New York Journal, that
“American produce is a drug at present in this place.”100 Gelston & Saltonstall were forced to
call off any further sales of produce as the destruction of the island’s staple crops had made
prices completely unpredictable. The firm was forced to wait for further information before
proceeding, yet as they indicated to a fellow American merchant, “[we] dread the information
that may come next.”101 Only a month into the insurrection it seemed as if the demand for
American goods had already disappeared. The firm concluded that any participation in the trade
at this point was merely gambling and would lead to the ‘ruin of many’.102
While historians have largely focused on the impact of the slave revolt on the psyches of
America’s slave-holding elites, contemporaries were much more concerned with the political and
economic implications of the slave rebellion.103 Newspapers provided merchants with the latest
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arrivals, price currents, and printed reports from faraway markets, which acted as an addendum
to their existing commercial networks. Indeed, as merchants waited for news of prices to
stabilize, they consumed the latest accounts of the insurrection from the island in great detail.
Often these accounts contradicted one another, and merchants were forced to determine which
version of an event they would invest in. The dependence on newspapers again illustrates the
inherent risks and uncertainty of business ventures based on disaster.
It was within this context that merchants read the news that over 200 sugar plantations
had been burned by October 1791. Newspapers reported that business had come to a complete
halt as the merchants of Port-au-Prince and Cap-Français were busy fighting the rebellion. The
port cities were under siege and all the citizens were arming to protect against the possibility of
an ‘insurgent’ setting fire to the town. Each issue brought new totals of the number of dead on
each side, and more importantly for merchants, economic intelligence on the number of
plantations burned and the total cost of the damage to the island – estimated at 111.8 million
livres by the end of the year.104
For the neighboring British islands, the impact of the Haitian Revolution was two-fold.
First, the British colonial government viewed the spread of the revolutionary spirit as a disease
that could potentially infect their own slaves. In response, colonial governments exerted
increasing control over borders and immigrants through a series of state decrees. Second, the loss
of Saint-Domingue offered an invaluable opportunity for British planters. The importance of
Saint-Domingue for the world’s supply of colonial produce is difficult to overestimate as the
island provided forty percent of the world’s sugar and fifty percent of its coffee. Yet the
opportunity of adding it to America, see, Nathaniel Cutting to Thomas Jefferson, 19 April 1791, reel 2, Nathaniel
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economic advantages for the British islands were limited by an inability to meet the level of
demand created by the loss of such an important market. This was largely due to the
extraordinary demand in Europe for sugar. In fact, despite the collapse of Saint-Domingue,
Europeans were consuming more sugar by 1807 than before the French Revolution.105
The identification of the Haitian Revolution as an epidemic came out of similar fears of
the French Revolution. Contemporaries clearly recognized the link between the two, and
discussed a general ‘fear of infection’ for other islands.106 The instability of the islands in the
West Indies led to an expansion in local government’s internal policing powers in order to
monitor foreigners, and foreign slaves, who might carry with them the ‘levelling influenza’.
Inquiries were made into the state of neighboring islands, and intelligence about Saint-Domingue
was passed across imperial borders as all West Indian planters feared the consequences of a new
outbreak.107 According to the Governor’s Council of Jamaica in November 1791, slaves on the
island had so far remained peaceful but additional forces were required to check against
immigrants who might come with “symptoms of the same phrenzy which rages a few leagues
distant.”108 Colonial officials responded to the contagion by continuing to issue proclamations
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which monitored foreigners and targeted slaves specifically. Slaves from Saint-Domingue were
barred from Jamaica in December 1791, unless they were accompanied by ‘two responsible
housekeepers’.109
Taking place within a broader context of state expansion and growing rationalization of
the police and the army, the home government also recognized the dangers their colonial
possessions faced in this period.110 This appears most evident by the initial orders given to
Ninian Home, Lieutenant Governor of Grenada, at the commencement of his office in 1792.
Home was told to remain vigilant to the ‘movements’ of the nearby foreign islands in order to
guard against the admission of “all strangers of a dangerous and suspicious character.”111 Taking
his orders seriously, Home published in the public papers an act for regulating ‘strangers’ and the
government began collecting the names of immigrants and requiring security for their good
conduct. Despite these measures, Acting-Governor Samuel Williams, wrote anxiously of the
immense numbers of French émigrés flooding into the island, threatening Grenada with
instability and famine.112 While the outbreak of war in 1793 gave colonial governments the
power to expel all dangerous foreigners, the islands still faced the very real threat of famine.
Indeed, the ever-present danger of famine in the West Indies now took on a more sinister
dimension in the shadow of the Haitian Revolution. As the Governor’s Council of the Bahamas
warned, any scarcity in the islands now had the potential to spark another slave revolt.113 The
dual specters of slave rebellion and war with France made it absolutely necessary that colonial
109
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officials guarantee a regular supply of provisions from the United States in order to avoid
another Saint-Domingue. So long as these two threats remained, American merchants would
have a place in the empire.

1. Price of sugar in Jamaica April 1790 to December 1792

The dangers of famine and ‘strangers’ only further hindered British attempts to replace
Saint-Domingue as the world’s chief supplier of sugar and coffee. From the outset, this was an
uphill battle, as the prices in Jamaica in the eighteenth century were commonly 22 to 93 percent
higher than in Saint-Domingue. While British sugar eventually made up 57 percent of the total

92

market, the immediate result was a rapid increase in the price of sugar.114 From October to the
end of December 1791, the price of sugar in Jamaica increased 110 percent. Making the market
more unpredictable, the relative increase in the price of sugar was interspersed with wild
fluctuations in the market, echoing the price changes in the French West Indies. In one week in
January 1792, the price dropped 60 percent.115 The high cost of sugar ruined several London
houses as sales ground to a halt.116 Desperate to meet the extraordinary demand, it was reported
that British merchants had sent agents throughout the West Indies to buy up all of the available
sugar. To offset these drastic prices, the British government also considered regulating the price
of sugar at home as well as granting permissions for the manufacture of foreign sugar, to the
outrage of West Indian merchants and planters.117 The demand for increased production was a
third factor in the empire’s continued reliance on American merchants to ensure the steady
supply of provisions and a market for British sugar.
The New York firm Stewart & Jones recognized the opportunities the Haitian Revolution
brought to the British West Indies. Weathering the storm brought on by months of price
fluctuations, the firm proposed a new venture with Alexander Longlands & Co. of Jamaica in
1792 to carry rum and sugar to North America. In March they assured their Jamaican contact that
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the market had improved for West Indian produce as the ‘tumults’ in the French West Indies
worsened, resulting in even greater demand.118 Yet their confidence soon waned. By May,
Stewart & Jones noted that the high price of rum and low price of provisions had forced a
suspension of the commerce between the two houses.119 The situation remained fluid over the
summer of 1792. By the end of May, Stewart & Jones believed that the price of rum would
decline due to a massive shipment which had just arrived at port. In July the firm revised their
projections again, they now claimed that trade with the island was only profitable for ships
coming from Europe, as there was a prohibition against American vessels to guard against
another glutted market.120 It was only by the end of the summer of 1792 that Stewart & Jones
had finally managed to send a ship to Jamaica. The firm continued to correspond over the course
of the year on the high price of colonial goods with contacts in London and Jamaica, supplying
market information to their British commercial contacts when they could not provide
shipments.121
The Haitian Revolution opened up several opportunities for daring merchants willing to
risk unstable markets and even the ‘infection’ of liberty for great profits. In comparison to earlier
crises, merchants had access to the latest information from local officials, diplomats, and
prominent local businesses. Yet the widespread availability of ready information on SaintDomingue could not help merchants manage the risk of investing in a shipment to the West
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Indies. Provision merchants required a crisis in order to exploit the loopholes and loose
enforcement of mercantile barriers, but the scale of the revolt in the French West Indies had
disastrous market implications for everyone concerned. Profiting from a revolution proved to be
a costly endeavor.

Conclusion
This chapter has illustrated the stories of several American merchant firms as they tried, and
largely failed, to continue American commerce with the British West Indies. Not every merchant
venture was a failure, but by studying commercial mishaps over windfalls we can further
understand the conditions under which transatlantic merchants operated. Failure also offers a
window into how contemporaries understood the historical moment. As merchants adapted to
new markets based on preconceived notions of identity and commerce, they often
underestimated the ability of states to adapt with them. Rather than a series of failures, this
period should be more accurately defined as one of intense commercial creativity for states and
merchants. The inherent risks involved in complex speculative ventures required the
participation of only those men who had an ‘aggressive, atavistic, speculative streak’.122 Often
disregarding their own country’s political ambitions, American merchants broke through the
commercial barriers of several different European empires. For Great Britain, this was a period
of experimentation as well, as officials attempted to grapple with the practical meaning of empire

122

Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit of Enterprise: Merchants and Economic Development in Revolutionary
Philadelphia, 163.

95

in the aftermath of the American Revolution.123 In a period defined by reaction and
experimentation, the latest news was vital to guiding both states and merchants.
Perhaps most importantly, given the failure of their schemes, American merchants
participated in the exchange of commercial information with the empire. Price lists and state
edicts were coupled with rumors of war and baseless speculations as the foundation for
commercial news. This information was most vital in light of so many failures as merchants
attempted to learn from past mistakes in order to avoid future hazards. While merchants used this
information to ‘manage’ risk, the quality of the information they exchanged shows how limited
they were in that endeavor. Gambling on a venture based on dubious information, their schemes
reveal how they understood international politics, diplomatic relations, and the inner-workings of
empires. The latest information allowed merchants to choose the best port, vessel, and flag for
their commerce. In this regard, commercial nationality was often constructed around market
opportunity. The following chapters will explore how American merchants negotiated their
conceptions of national identity with the British admiralty courts during the French
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.
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Chapter 3: Neutering ‘Real Americans’, 1793-1802
This chapter and the next use the typical merchant voyage during wartime as an
analytical lens. Chapter 3 looks at the debate over the identity of the crew and the ship at sea
during the initial stages of the war (1793-1802). Chapter 4 then examines the fate of American
ships captured and tried by the British admiralty courts during the Napoleonic Wars (18031809). Taken as a whole, these two chapters highlight how the different parties (sailor, merchant,
privateer, admiralty court judge) understood and attempted to manipulate national identity for
their own ends. The different interpretations of what it meant to belong to a certain nation
illustrate how immensely difficult it is to define national identity in the eighteenth century.
Despite trade barriers and passionate rhetoric, ships, products, merchants, and seamen all
travelled seamlessly across borders between 1793 and 1809 in their pursuit of greater profits.
It is particularly important to complicate the study of the origins of nationalism as the field has
flourished in recent years. Works by Nathan Perl-Rosenthal and Nathan Rafferty have shown
how American sailors fought in court and aboard ships to force the government into producing
an official definition of national citizenship.1 Scholars of the British Empire have similarly
looked at debates over nationality in this period and have highlighted the increasingly narrow
and strict definition of belonging pursued by ministers in London, often to the detriment of
colonial subjects. As seen in Chapter 2, the British state increasingly viewed West Indians as
disloyal because of their economic ties to American merchants. Coupled with this was an
increasing sense, from the perspective of domestic Britons, that British West Indians were
racially inferior. While these recent studies have served to highlight the parameters of identity by
focusing on the disenfranchised periphery, they also run the risk of reaffirming national identity
1
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as a tangible, concrete fact of history; implying that those at the center possessed a uniform sense
of what it meant to be American, British, or French. Rather, national identity should be seen as a
concept that was continuously manipulated and renegotiated by many members of the
community. As Kathleen Wilson has recently explained, national identity, like all identification,
generally lacked a stable and continuous frame of reference.2 As is shown below, the transient
nature of overseas commerce makes this point even more important, since sailors and merchants,
whose court cases contributed to nationality laws, often were not permanent residents in any
given country.
The first section of this chapter looks at the impressment of American sailors in the
British Empire. It considers how merchants and state officials dealt with the issue of
impressment amidst a general scramble for men to man merchant and naval ships. The forceful
removal of seamen from merchant vessels by the British Royal Navy has garnered much
attention from historians of the Early Republic in recent years, despite the relative indifference of
most Atlantic merchants of the period. While diplomats – and historians – tended to discuss
impressment and the capture of neutral ships in the same breath, they were in fact distinct
phenomena, involving two very different social classes. The demands of the war and the
maintenance of the empire required vast numbers of able-bodied seamen to man British ships; as
such, the British government was often indifferent to appeals for the release of ‘American’
seamen impressed into the Royal Navy. As is shown below, this intransigence did not limit the
creativity of the British government in expanding the definition of ‘Britishness’ to include
foreign sailors to meet the needs of the moment. On the part of merchants, who relied on sailors
2
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to man their ships and facilitate the movement of goods across the sea, impressment is
surprisingly absent from their correspondence. If the amount of ink expended on a topic is any
reflection of interest or concern, then merchants were far more concerned with sailor desertion
than the dangers of the press-gang. The harsh reality was that, from a commercial perspective,
individual sailors were imminently replaceable on a neutral merchant vessel in wartime. The
general disinterest of the commercial class to defend national honor and fight the press-gangs
suggests that historians need to reassess the relative impact of such national issues on all levels
of society.
While the first section highlights the many similarities between British and American
seamen in the eyes of the British government, the second section focuses on the suspicion of
difference that led privateers and customs agents to target American commerce as a secret
invading force. As a point of entry, this section looks at the business interests of New York
merchant William Constable during the French Revolutionary Wars. Constable’s global business
connections came into frequent contact with the British and French governments as both a victim
and military contractor. Like many Americans, Constable soon discovered that the key to
wartime profits was in successfully proving one’s own Americanness while abroad. A task made
immensely more difficult by the willingness of neutral American merchants, like Constable, to
adapt and self-fashion their way into new markets. Such strategies made all neutral commerce
suspicious to the privateers that swarmed the Caribbean and Atlantic waters. The continual
contact with the West Indies made Americans appear subversive and dangerous to British
officials, who had already called into question the loyalty of their own subjects.3 This
simultaneous expansion and contraction of British identity, to include foreign sailors and exclude
3
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American (and West Indian) merchants, allows us to situate British nationalism within the
broader context of the discriminatory and universalizing trends found in the United States and
France in the same period.4
In order to dig further into the competing views of nationality at sea, this chapter draws
on a wide range of sources. Contemporary newspapers featured sensational accounts of
American sailors and ships captured by Great Britain and France. As the previous chapter
discussed, newspapers often passed on rumors and unsubstantiated reports as the latest
intelligence. These unverified accounts contributed to a rising national discourse of America
pitted against the belligerent powers, and it also shaped the strategies of merchants looking to
avoid wartime hazards. American and British diplomatic dispatches reveal how the two
governments negotiated competing philosophies of nationality, but also the striking disconnect
on the part of British diplomats between theories of unbreakable allegiance and impressment
practices. Finally, admiralty court papers and merchant correspondence demonstrate how neutral
American merchants stretched the bounds of neutrality in wartime while supplying the British
military in the West Indies. All of these documents show how individuals and institutions
reshaped and molded nationality for their own ends. In fact, what united the neutral American
merchant to the press gang and the statesman crafting new wartime policies was a similar
understanding of the fluidity of national identity at the end of the eighteenth century.
In studying the ship and the crew, this chapter examines American merchants and sailors
as they constantly negotiated their identity as distinct from the British Empire and even the
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French Republic. The chapter argues that while war in 1793 technically brought new
opportunities for neutral American commerce, the war also called into question how states
should go about defining American identity. The British, American and French governments all
issued repeated and often contradictory decrees concerning national allegiance during the war.
Added to this, was the immense power of commerce to spontaneously reshape national identity.
Origin, destination, family, war service or even general suspicion could condemn a sailor to the
press gang or a vessel to the privateers swarming the coast. While the American government
strove to maintain its neutrality, American commercial practices often called into question this
neutral identity. In looking at the first part of the voyage from port to court, negotiation over
identification is the key to understanding how merchants, naval officers, and admiralty court
judges grappled with the limits of national identity and legitimate commerce.

The British State (Im)presses the ‘American’ Sailor
On April 4, 1800 Captain James Steward arrived at New London, Connecticut, after a long
voyage to the West Indies. Captain Steward brought with him a damning report of British
conduct towards American seamen in the British Empire, reprinted in several local papers:
“I was retaken by the Acasto of 44 guns, a British ship, commanded by Capt.
Edward Fellows, who came on board the Sally himself, ordered my chest open,
and with his own hands took out of it 1250 dollars, and ordered one of his people
to take about 200 oranges, (being all I had) for himself, and carried them away;
the people plundered the cabin and steerage of other articles…Capt. Waterman of
New York was treated in the same manner, with many others; and Mr. Savage,
the American agent at Kingston, informed me that he forwarded to the Secretary
of State, by commodore Truxton, an attested list of the names of one thousand and
one American seamen, who had been impressed by the British in that single
port.”5
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Captain Steward’s story highlighted some of the most notorious aspects of British policy towards
American seamen: the indiscriminate seizure of men, the robbery of the vessel, and the general
disrespect shown to American officers. Yet Steward’s account, printed in the Connecticut
Gazette and other newspapers, is only a partial story. The inconsistencies in Steward’s version of
events began to emerge in other papers, revealing a general uncertainty about the nature of
impressment.
The story first appeared in the American Mercury on April 17, 1800. Here, it was printed
with a warning from the editor that the report came from a ‘stranger’ and therefore the paper was
unable to vouch for its authenticity.6 In the first version of Captain ‘Stewart’s’ story 1001 ‘bona
fide’ American seamen were discovered to be impressed in the West Indies, and the British
officers stole 1,250 dollars from Steward/Stewart. Subsequent versions tripled the amount of
money stolen by the British but nevertheless maintained the claim of 1001 impressed seamen.
But later investigations into Steward/Stewart’s story concluded that only 53 seamen were
claiming American protection, instead of 1001. It was further argued that the ‘American’ ship
captured and robbed by the British was actually Swedish property, sailing under Swedish colors,
and taken as salvage by the Court of Admiralty at Jamaica.7
Deciphering Steward/Stewart’s account, and uncovering the fate of American sailors
impressed in the West Indies, reveals the continued uncertainty and liminality of national identity
for mariners in the late eighteenth century. Beyond the realm of public discourse and high
politics, the role of impressment in American commerce takes on a much more ambiguous
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dimension. This section explores impressment through two avenues of analysis. First, it looks at
how the British state and sailors understood national identity through the impressment of
‘foreign’ sailors. Here, I argue that the state proved highly adaptable to meet the needs of the
moment and often responded to diplomatic demands for the release of American sailors.
Impressment resulted in the negotiation of specific identity claims between state officials,
merchants, the Royal Navy, and sailors in their travels across the Atlantic. When accused of
Englishness and impressed into the Royal Navy, sailors participated in an explosion of official
documentation produced by consuls, customs officials, and traders. Yet impressment was merely
one facet of a wider story of commerce and identity manipulation. Sailors also transitioned
between identities through desertion from one ship to another. Therefore, this section secondly
looks at the relative silence on the issue of impressment in merchant correspondence and
highlights the few and sporadic discussions of sailors aboard merchant ships. Desertion, rather
than impressment, I argue was a much more pressing concern for transatlantic merchants. From
the perspective of commercial correspondence, sailors were essential cogs but also dangerous
burdens that could hold back the success of a voyage.
Since the seventeenth century, the Royal Navy faced a continual ‘manning problem’,
which only became more difficult at the onset of each new war. By the time of the French
Revolutionary Wars, the Royal Navy had mobilized a force of 130,000 men, a feat which placed
extraordinary demands on the maritime population of the British Empire.8 While the navy first
focused on the collection of experienced volunteers, it was soon forced to turn to the official
Impress Service on land and the loosely regulated press gangs on the high seas to meet wartime
demands. Impressment, too, initially searched for experienced or ‘able seamen’ to man the Royal
8
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Navy, and these men were offered bounties to join up. Exemptions were also offered to all
masters, chiefmates, fishermen, whalers, privateers, and other protected persons in order to
ensure that the steady flow of overseas trade continued uninterrupted.9 In essence, skilled seamen
were a commodity, at times in great demand, but also susceptible to devaluation based on
fluctuations within the market. Contrary to contemporary opinion, impressment was never a
universal system directed at once towards all seafaring individuals in the empire.10
Despite its gradual approach and own internal logic, the controversy surrounding
impressment was multifaceted. Impressment threatened traditional English liberties by forcefully
controlling the movement of sailors who acted as essential cogs in Great Britain’s overseas trade.
In the French Revolutionary Wars, this violation of English liberty was echoed by American
politicians, pamphleteers, and impressed sailors who all claimed that foreign impressment was a
challenge to American independence and an insult to republican liberty. When pushed to it, the
press gangs themselves contributed to their tyrannical and arbitrary reputation by seizing every
man in a seaport town or by blatantly disregarding official documentation while onboard
American ships. A ‘hot press’ had the potential to pick up hundreds of men, but it could also
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provoke a mob, which would forcefully assault the press gang as it conducted the men on board.
In 1803 there were as many as 88 riots in Great Britain alone in response to the press gangs.11
This reputation for brutality was widely repeated throughout the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries and by historians of the Royal Navy and Early American Republic. Nicholas
Rogers has described impressed sailors as slaves serving the state in perpetuity in order to
“preserve other people's freedom and independence.”12 Echoing this view, Paul Gilje has
described seamen as survivors and symbols for American liberty in a ‘capricious world’ ruled by
the Royal Navy.13 Other scholars still have connected the plight of impressed sailors to other
disenfranchised classes including enslaved Africans and victims of forced migration.14 More
recently, J. Ross Dancy’s study of the press gang has moved beyond defending or attacking
impressment, by relying on statistics to establish the chief characteristics of the press gang. In the
end, these statistics are inevitably used to prove that masses of men were not ‘thrown into a
foreign world’.15
Recent scholarship shifts attention away from the violence associated with impressment
to its effects on contemporary notions of citizenship, nationalism, and maritime culture. The
works of Douglas Bradburn, Nathan Perl-Rosenthal, and Denver Brunsman greatly expand our
understanding of impressment’s role in shaping the political climate of the French Revolutionary
Wars. They show how sailors played a role in the formation of American citizenship, the
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maintenance of the British Empire, and as a catalyst to the entrenched political divisions of the
Early Republic. By politicizing sailor activity, these scholars have offered a new lens into how
we view the movements, petitions, and court cases of seamen.
Douglas Bradburn has situated impressment in a wider story of English emigration policy
towards the United States. Bradburn shows how republican idealism for the universal rights of
man came into conflict with Medieval English laws preventing a subject from renouncing his
allegiance to the king. For Bradburn, the debate over the right of expatriation helped to establish
formal American naturalization policy, and contributed to the tone of every political debate in
America in the 1790s.16 Yet by solely focusing on periods of conflict, Bradburn has charted a
continuity in English policy that fails to explain the well-known mobility of merchants and
sailors in the early modern period.17
Denver Brunsman has similarly looked at impressment from the British perspective to
show how ‘cultures of impressment’ helped to shape the British Empire. Instead of an arbitrary
system of state tyranny, Brunsman outlines the debates surrounding impressment to show how it
possessed real legal limits and was forced to react to local social, political and economic
conditions.18 Brunsman’s work stresses the agency of sailors who either resisted the press gangs
or chose to serve on naval vessels. In response to previous critics of the system, Brunsman asks
the pertinent question, “If impressment was so bad, why was the British Royal Navy so good?”19
In attempting to answer this, Brunsman challenges historians to recognize more than just the
16
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agency of sailors who chose to resist. Participation in the navy, though perhaps less admirable,
was an equally valid expression of individualism.
In examining how identity was worked out at sea and in the admiralty courts, Nathan
Perl-Rosenthal argues that sailors were ‘border crossers,’ or a transnational group whose
movements between states helped to establish official laws on American citizenship.20 In
studying the documents created by sailors, consuls and the federal government, Perl-Rosenthal
argues that sailors themselves took the first steps in helping to define American national identity.
Between 1796 and 1803 sailors and the American government attempted to produce a coherent
system of naturalization in response to British impressment.21 Much of this rested on the
question of whether allegiance was a choice or an inherited trait. Most importantly, PerlRosenthal makes two significant contributions to the study of impressment and commercial
identity. First, Perl-Rosenthal expands his study to include Admiralty Court trials for captured
neutral prizes, which has enabled him to consider how Admiralty Courts conceived of allegiance
and national origin in relation to ships and the masters of vessels.22 Second, Perl-Rosenthal offers
a chronological distinction between the British state’s treatment of naturalized Americans in the
postwar 1780s from their situation in the Revolutionary Wars. In making this distinction, PerlRosenthal has shown how mariners were able to navigate between states before the war while
also accounting for the tense period of conflict after 1793.
Impressment, then, is placed uncomfortably in a period of increasing restrictions on
claims to British identity. Despite the early attempts by Lord Sheffield to limit British identity by
forcing the Americans out of the empire and Ramsay's claims that the British West Indians were
20
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disloyal and corrupt; war prompted the Royal Navy and the British government to pursue an
incredibly expansive approach to British citizenship. Any sailor, native born or foreigner, who
had previously served for at least two years in the Navy was eligible for impressment. By 1805,
at least 12 percent of the seamen who served in the Royal Navy were from outside of the British
Isles.23 Further, British merchants were permitted in times of war to supplement their crews, to a
maximum of three-quarters, with foreign sailors to make up for any losses they sustained from
press gangs.24 In this climate, British claims of a strict adherence to ‘Once an Englishman,
always an Englishman’ proved incredibly imprecise. Pressed by the American government to
return American sailors, the need to distinguish ‘American’ sailors from British tars arose
quickly - a task made exponentially more difficult by the general makeup of the American
merchant marine during the war. From the British perspective, the matter of wrongfully
impressed American seamen paled in comparison to the considerable “part of the navigation of
the United States carried on by British seamen…”25 It was estimated by Admiral Nelson that as
many as 40,000 British sailors had entered into American service by 1803.26
The challenge of distinguishing between British sailors and native-born Americans
proved particularly acute. It was well-noted that the similarity of manners and language hindered
any quick judgment by a press gang as to a sailor’s identity. Numerous sources over the course
of the decade confirm a pervasive concern on both sides of the Atlantic that very little could be
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done to uncover the ‘real’ or ‘bona fide’ Americans.27 This was reflected in Captain
Steward/Stewart’s controversial list of ‘1001 bonafide American seamen’ and in the
correspondence of American diplomats abroad. Thomas Pinckney, American Minister in
London, complained to his superiors in 1792 that a sailor could declare “that they belonged to
whichever nation might suit their present inclination or convenience.”28 Matters did not improve
with Pinckney’s successor, Rufus King, who continued to press the Foreign Secretary, Lord
Grenville, for a system of mutual recognition between the two governments. Faced with
increasing numbers of impressed seamen, and no clear way of devising a method of
distinguishing ‘real’ from pretended Americans, some American officials could only advise
American captains coming to the British Isles to take ‘only American born seamen’.29 This
uncertainty over a sailor’s true identity testifies to the fluidity of national identification in this
period. Sailors, like ships and merchandise, could ‘circulate’ through different markets and cross
national borders on a whim.30
In attempting to chart a path towards a formal policy of dealing with ‘American’ sailors,
both sailors and state officials turned to paperwork as a means of solidifying, at least
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temporarily, a sailor’s identity. Initially, captains obtained citizenship oaths, attesting to their
crew’s status as American citizens, from their men before leaving port. This method was, of
course, liable to abuse and was generally under strict scrutiny from British authorities. On top of
the disadvantage faced in identifying British subjects on American ships, the British consul
Phineas Bond worried about widespread fraud in citizenship oaths, “the similarity of language &
of manners renders it difficult to discover the fallacy of such oaths, which is certainly too
frequent.”31 Consequently, British press gangs at times chose to ignore these oaths, along with
any associated documents, and pressed men onto their ships anyway.32
American consuls quickly recognized the insufficiency of oaths, and on their own
initiative issued certificates of citizenship to impressed mariners. The relative success of these
documents was mixed. British officials would not technically support any protections for foreign
sailors deemed British, and protections did not ensure immunity. This is made evident by the
case of the American ship Lydia in 1796. Pinckney claimed that documents and oaths on the
Lydia were ignored by a British lieutenant who left the vessel with only three men and a boy to
complete its voyage. Pinckney, now at the end of his tenure in office, openly criticized the
truthfulness of the lieutenant’s testimony and Lord Grenville’s assurance that ‘bonafide
American seamen’ would undoubtedly be released.33
The sporadic refusal to recognize oaths or citizenship certificates, and the generally
unregulated system of impressment that allowed British officers to make sweeping decisions,
31
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contributed to the view that the entire system of impressment was corrupt. This view was
heightened by repeated delays in court and the forceful confinement on ship of sailors who
attempted to apply for American protection. All of this led many to believe that no proof would
save a mariner caught by the press gang.34 American officials, however, attested to the
usefulness of protections in rescuing impressed seamen from the Royal Navy, and defended the
practice when Lord Grenville questioned the authority of consuls to issue certificates of
citizenship.35 While Lord Grenville eventually forced American consuls to halt their issuing of
certificates, he discovered that his own consuls were granting similar documents to British
petitioners in America. This came to light after an impressed seaman presented a certificate
provided by the British consul in Virginia to the Lords of the Admiralty.36
These protections were also inherently controversial for some in the American
government. Thomas Jefferson especially found passports and certificates to be an affront to
republican liberty, as they implied an innate distrust of an individual’s word. As Secretary of
State, Jefferson barred ambassadors from issuing these documents without his permission.
During his presidency, he continued to espouse the view that all individuals found on board
American ships should be regarded as citizens.37 Both governments were deeply uncomfortable
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with the current state of affairs but unwilling to make any change that might result in a drastic
loss in seamen.
The rate of impressment had drastically increased by 1796 leading Congress to pass An
Act for the Protection and Relief of American Seamen. The act attempted to formalize protection
documents by deputizing customs collectors at American ports with the responsibility of issuing
certificates to American seamen before departure. The act even appointed agents to be sent to
London and the West Indies, David Lenox and Silas Talbot respectively, to help expedite the
process of saving American mariners from the Royal Navy. These agents represented an
unprecedented move by a foreign power and their reception was always tenuous. Silas Talbot’s
initial treatment by the Admiralty in Jamaica was so scornful that he was forced to return home
and a replacement was eventually sent in 1799. His replacement, William Savage, had a similar
experience at first and only began to successfully secure the release of American sailors in 1801
with peace on the horizon. Yet Savage’s early experience helps to explain why impressment had
such an enormous impact on popular politics in the Early Republic. Savage claimed that on
several occasions he feared for his life as armed men roamed the docks attempting to prevent
him from carrying out his duties.38 The disrespect these agents experienced made claims of a hot
press all the more believable. It was Savage, after all, who supposedly dealt with Captain
Steward/Stewart and gave him the list of 1001 names of impressed seamen discussed above.
The official reports of the American agents never reached those numbers in any one
location and their successes were monitored closely by American newspapers. The Alexandria
Times in 1801 carried an official list of 82 American seamen on board British vessels at
immediately put suspicion on American ships without passports. For Morris’s earlier support see, Gouverneur
Morris to George Washington, 29 May 1790, Founders Online, NARA. For the later debate over these documents in
the American government, see, Thomas Pinckney to Thomas Jefferson, 13 March 1793, RG 59, M30, NARA.
38 William Savage to James Madison, 24 March 1801, Founders Online, NARA.
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Kingston, of which, “3 have died on board. 6 have made their escape, and 36 have been
discharged.”39 While the numbers may not have appeared encouraging, Savage was optimistic as
a ‘great number’ of American seamen had been recently liberated and local officials had begun
to pay ‘proper respect’ to his position.40 This optimism was echoed by David Lenox in London
who boasted, “in a short time I shall be able to effect the discharge of every Seaman claiming
protection as an American Citizen.”41
By 1801 the British government was increasingly willing to release American seamen,
but this new generosity was also in the context of an end to the war at the beginning of the
nineteenth century. The complicated negotiation of Anglo-American identities persisted into the
Napoleonic Wars, leading one historian to describe the U.S. Navy in 1808 as a ‘BritishAmerican body’.42 Rather than helping to establish a coherent system of citizenship, the
continual mixing of British and American seamen undermined the effectiveness of naturalization
and allegiance policies for both countries. While sailors often relied on state protection in order
to guarantee their freedom of movement and employment, it would be wrong to assume that
sailors, the most diverse and well-traveled body of laborers in any empire, naturally felt the
nationalistic impulses of the revolutionary era.
As described above, impressment inspired widespread political action and offers up a
unique window into how sailors, captains, diplomats and the general public understood national
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identity. Yet notably silent from the historical record are the views of the merchants whose
voyages mobilized these transnational seamen. In the twelve merchant collections consulted for
this chapter, impressment is almost completely invisible from the daily correspondence of
merchants in New York, Boston, Nova Scotia and London. When impressment is mentioned, it
often is merely in reference to the high cost of shipping and other wartime hazards.43 In fact,
merchants were generally unwilling to do anything that might disrupt their wartime trade with
Britain.44 Merchant silence on impressment in itself does not discount the importance of the
press for sailors caught in its web, for diplomats debating the implications of existing policies, or
the emotional weight of protecting a new nation’s honor abroad. What it does tell us though, is
that merchants may have had more immediate concerns than the fates of men whose names they
simply did not care to know.45
Outside of impressment, when sailors do appear in merchant correspondence they are
very different from the liberty-seeking radicals so popular with historians. Sailors were seen as
essential to any voyage, but they also appear in letters as potential hazards to business. A sailor’s
testimony could undermine a prize case in the Admiralty Court, their exorbitant wartime wages
served as a continual drain on profits, and their desertion, like impressment, could potentially
cripple a ship. By studying sailors on the ship, rather than in the consular office, we can gain a
further understanding of how they navigated a world rife with opportunity and risk. Desertion,
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then, should be studied in conjunction with impressment as it equally emphasizes mariner agency
and identity claims.
For sailors, wages served as the engine of mobility. Higher wages tempted sailors to
move from ship to ship, to desert, or even to take the bounty offered by the Royal Navy. It was
widely considered that wages, rather than the appeal of liberty and natural rights offered by the
new republic, was the prime factor in encouraging so many foreigners to join the American
merchant marine. This was understandable, given that wartime wages were always high. By the
end of the Seven Years’ War merchant marine wages went up to 70 shillings a month in winter, a
35 percent increase from standard peacetime pay.46 When at war, merchants complained of few
available men to man their ships and wages without limits. The sudden rise in wages could also
prove extremely disruptive to a voyage planned months in advance, as it could lead to the
suspension of costly ventures to faraway ports. In the midst of war, wages, coupled with rising
insurance premiums, could prove 'too extravagant’ for most, cutting merchants off from
perceived dangerous, but valuable, markets in the Mediterranean and the West Indies.47
Nonetheless, many at the time criticized these economic inducements as poor
compensation for the “loss of honor, liberty, limb and life” Americans suffered on board English
‘prison ships’. This contemporary view has led historians to downplay economic factors in favor
of patriotic rhetoric.48 Though economic rationalism cannot solely explain any historical actor’s

46

Stephen Conway, War, State, and Society in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Britain and Ireland (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2006), 90; Ralph Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the Seventeenth and
Eighteenth Centuries. (New York: Macmillan, 1962), 137.
47 Lynch & Stoughton to John Leamy, 28 Feb. 1794, Lynch & Stoughton Letter book, vol. 2, NYHS; Gouverneur &
Kemble to David Scott & Co, 15 June 1794, Gouverneur & Kemble Letter book, NYHS; Thomas Boylston Adams
to Joseph Pitcairn, 17 May 1796, Founders Online, NARA; Lynch & Stoughton to David Calaghan, 27 June 1794,
Lynch & Stoughton Letter book, vol. 2, NYHS; Cornelius & Alexander Wallace to Low & Wallace, 11 April 1801,
Box 28, Nicholas Low Papers, LC.
48
Washington Spy, 15 June 1796. See for example Raffety’s discussion of this, Raffety, The Republic Afloat: Law,
Honor, and Citizenship in Maritime America, 189.

115

decisions, it should be noted that American officials also recognized the consequences behind
such a rampant rise in wages. Governments were generally unable to compete with the merchant
service, especially as war dragged on, and were forced to turn to impressment. This uncontested
truth of naval warfare and the maritime labor market led Rufus King to admit that even America
would one day need to turn to impressment to supply the navy.49
Many volunteers and impressed seamen in the Royal Navy took the bounty offered to
new recruits, but in doing so they made a choice of sacrificing any future defense for their
impressment to meet an immediate economic need.50 When an impressed seaman’s brother
applied to Secretary of State James Madison for protection in 1801, his case rested on the
question of whether the seaman had received a bounty for his service. Despite the validity of the
seaman’s claims that he was an American, receiving the bounty had made him a de facto British
tar.51 In pursuing such a policy, the Royal Navy essentially claimed that the contract of the
bounty overrode any previous allegiances and accompanying documents. The uncertainty of
impressment may also have encouraged some to enter the Royal Navy on their own terms.
Despite the obvious danger of naval service, the navy generally offered a guarantee of better
food, less work and steady pay.52 Because of this, American captains in the 1790s wrote home
repeatedly on the topic of seamen deserting their ships for British men of war.53
It would be a mistake to assume that captains were mere victims of desertion. Life aboard
ship was a constant negotiation for wages and privileges. Captains could demand strict discipline
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from their crew and even offer recalcitrant seamen to the press gang in extreme cases.54 More
commonly, captains would desert crew members to lower the cost of the voyage. The frequent
sale of merchant vessels often meant the abandonment of its crew at the point of sale. This was
the case of the schooner Jay, whose captain was ordered to sail to Barbados, sell the ship, and
return home, leaving the crew behind on a foreign island with a month’s wages.55 Vessels sold in
foreign ports could leave a sailor destitute without any means of travelling back home.
Abandoned by their captain, deserted sailors were forced to choose between the relative
generosity of the local consul or joining a rival nation’s vessel.56
Desertion by the crew or the captain should not be seen as an exceptional reaction to
wartime demands. Rather, desertion has accurately been described as “a normal part of life in an
extremely mobile profession.”57 Reports of desertion from merchantmen and naval vessels filled
the newspapers in the 1790s. To combat desertion, it was said that Dutch sailors were treated to a
‘continual succession of amusements’ with vessels playing music and distributing liquor to
distract the fleet when inactive. Advertisements were also displayed in local papers offering a
reward for the return of deserting seamen.58 In the Royal Navy, desertion rates in the eighteenth
century rose to 30 percent of the total number of recruits. Deserters from the Royal Navy risked

54

Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-American
Maritime World, 1700-1750, 226.
55 William Constable to Capt. Oliver Smith, 20 Feb. 1796, reel 2, Constable-Pierrepont, NYPL.
56 Francis Coffyn to Gouverneur Morris, 10 Nov. 1793, Gouverneur Morris Papers, RBML; Sir John Temple to
Lord Grenville, 10 May 1794, FO 5/6, TNA; Sylvanus Bourne to James Madison, 10 June 1801, Founders Online,
NARA; Greenleaf’s New York Journal, 1 Feb. 1794.
57
Rodger, The Wooden World, 176.
58
American Mercury, 6 Nov. 1797. The captain of a Swedish brigantine offered a fifty-dollar reward for the return
of two seamen in Boston, Boston Gazette, 27 June 1796.

117

court-martial but prosecution relied on proof of intention to desert, as opposed to being
accidentally left behind, which meant that execution was rare and repeat offenders common.59
While general sailor desertion remained a problem for merchants during the war,
desertion from a merchant vessel to the Royal Navy posed a whole new set of problems. As early
as 1792, merchants were reporting that their captains had lost men to the navy. The merchant
firm of Blow & Milhado wrote to Secretary Jefferson that their schooner, the David & George,
had lost three seamen who deserted at Sierra Leone for a British ship. The seamen claimed that
they had been abused by the captain of the David & George and convinced the British
commander at Sierra Leone to demand their wages from the American captain. Despite the
captain’s claims that the crewmen had failed to fulfill their end of the contract, the British
commander demanded their wages claiming that “he cared not what became of the vessel and
cargo, but if the whole crew said they were British Subjects, and demanded a discharge, that they
should have it.”60 British officers then proceeded to seize part of the David & George’s cargo,
and the slave ship was forced to carry on its voyage with only seven men and a boy. In the
aftermath of cases like the David & George, twenty-eight merchants of New York submitted a
petition to President Washington in 1796 complaining of widespread desertion to the Royal
Navy in Kingston upon Hull and requesting an American consul to protect merchant interests.61
Given the incredible demand for new recruits, the British government was unwilling to
stop American deserters from joining the navy and American seamen continued to desert to
naval vessels throughout the British Empire. Thomas Pinckney reported that in 1792 alone four
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men deserted an American vessel at the Cape of Good Hope, and he noted another case of
desertion at Ramsgate by Americans coming from the East Indies. All of these deserters alleged
that they were British subjects and demanded their wages from American captains.62 A letter to
the Salem Gazette claimed that a British officer compromised a cargo worth £15,000 by taking a
seaman and threatening the captain “with cutting away the rigging and masts of the ship, if
payment of the man's wages…is not made.”63 Rather than the standard-bearers of liberty, sailors
onboard American ships were occasionally willing to exploit a British identity in order to escape
an unfavorable vessel and leverage their wages. Their actions serve to complicate any account of
the experiences of sailors in the Revolutionary Wars. Despite growing state interference in the
negotiation of maritime identity, sailors still operated in a world full of choices. The continued
conflict over the ‘real’ and ‘true’ identity of sailors opened up essential gaps in navigation laws,
allowing seamen to operate in-between the borders of states.
The British and American governments continued to struggle to define a concrete policy
towards their mariners because the flow of labor from one state to another was hardly ever as
clear-cut as the popular pamphleteers alleged. In 1797, Robert Liston, the British Minister to
America, suggested to Lord Grenville a revision to the Jay Treaty which would allow for the
recovery of deserting seamen. Grenville recognized the appeal of such a policy, but warned that
any amendments to the treaty would need to guard against American consuls “claiming as
deserters from American ships all seamen being the king's subjects and who may have entered
into his service or been impressed under due authority for that purpose.”64 No settlement could
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be reached on the question of British and American deserters, as each side depended too heavily
on the mobility of the workforce to meet their demands. As Rufus King explained to Secretary
Pickering, there would be no agreement until a convention had decided on the propriety of
British vessels seizing “not only Seamen who spoke the English Language and who were
evidently English or American Subjects, but also all Danish, Swedish, and other foreign
Seamen.”65
As foreign policy on both sides failed to solve the issue of mariner identity, the Board of
Trade turned to internal reforms in 1794 to help define the nationality of seamen. The Board
feared the increasing influx of foreign seamen onto British merchant ships over the course of the
eighteenth century and proposed a revision to the Navigation Acts in order to protect the
employment of British tars. As Lord Sheffield had claimed in 1784, the carrying trade was
essential to the empire because it served as a “nursery of our seamen.”66 Overseas trade was
meant to train seamen for naval service when the empire was at war. Foreign sailors, unless they
served in the navy, were dangerous as they took employment opportunities away from British
seamen and potentially trained foreign navies. This very fear was celebrated sarcastically in the
Washington Spy in 1796. The paper asked its readership to recognize the hidden benefits of
impressment: “Besides, is there a better school for naval discipline than a British man of war,
and ought we not to be extremely happy, that our seamen are so well situated on board those
vessels for a thorough training by the time our frigates are built. The British, the fools, are
working their own destruction by their impressment of American seamen.”67 The Board put
forward a series of proposals in March 1794 requiring that all vessels in the future maintain a
65
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‘due proportion’ of British sailors, except in cases of sickness or desertion. Masters who
unexpectedly lost the ‘due proportion’ of British sailors would have to apply to the local British
consul for a certificate testifying to their current condition.68 The Board further proposed in the
same month that vessels lacking all British subjects should be barred from importation and
exportation of British goods.69 Lord Hawkesbury, President of the Board of Trade, brought these
reforms before Parliament at the beginning of April 1794 with the stipulation that nothing should
be done until “after the conclusion of this war, when no less than 60 or 70 thousand men must be
discharged from His Majesty’s navy.”70 Similarly, in 1792 it was suggested in the U.S. House of
Representatives that measures were needed for the encouragement of ‘our national seamen’,
which would include a drawback on seamen’s wages and the establishment of an apprentice
system to ensure the growth of a more domestic labor force.71 These proposed reforms clearly
reflected a desire by many state officials to end the transnational mixing of seamen. Yet
sweeping reforms were incompatible with wartime demands, postponing any chance of a drastic
change in the national makeup of sailors until after the Napoleonic Wars.
Together, desertion and impressment continued to challenge any attempt to define a set
national identity for sailors during the French Revolutionary Wars. By looking at impressment
and desertion as two parts of a negotiation between sailors and states over wages and mobility,
this section has complicated the polemical debates surrounding impressment both in the
eighteenth century and by present-day historians. The successful negotiation of an identity claim
was not an impossible task and the historical record shows that the British government was
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willing to release certain sailors on a case-by-case basis. Rescue, though, was hindered by the
near impossibility of distinguishing between British and American sailors in a period of looselydefined emigration policies, few available documents, and the overriding demands of the
marketplace. Further, by looking at desertion along with impressment, this section has shown
how sailors interacted with merchant vessels and the Royal Navy, often playing one off of the
other in order to achieve a better position for themselves. Similar to the experiences of merchants
attempting to navigate the stormy commercial waters of the 1790s, sailors recognized the risks
and opportunities offered by war.
The second part of this chapter continues this theme and examines how merchants
balanced their valuable neutral identity as Americans with their continued participation in the
British Empire. Like sailors, merchants struggled to distinguish American merchandise and ships
from those of the British. Similarities in language and national character continued to make
American neutrality a tenuous idea in the face of French cruisers and British Admiralty courts. In
taking advantage of this identity, Americans relied on economies of information in order to gain
access to new markets and avoid capture. Increased competition with other neutrals and rapid
changes in foreign markets made the latest news, rumor and gossip essential tools for overseas
trade with nations at war.

Shipping ‘Americanness’ in Suspicious Waters
The declaration of war in February 1793 was greeted with much anticipation by the commercial
classes on both sides of the Atlantic. War would mean the suspension of navigation laws in the
West Indies, increased charges on freight, and immense demand for provisions from states
looking to supply their military forces and colonies. War, in many ways, simply exaggerated
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existing market demands. Yet war also confused the rules of the market as states unpredictably
opened ports or embargoed traffic. The establishment of blockades and embargoes, seemingly
the death of any commercial transaction, could provide new opportunities elsewhere as these
barriers artificially inflated demand and prices in neighboring ports and for those vessels willing
to run the blockade. In uncovering these opportunities, despite the inconveniences of war,
merchants relied on information about how a port, and the navy nearby, understood identity. As
American merchants discovered, their new identity made them vital carriers of other nations’
goods, but as the previous section has shown, American identity was largely undefined in these
years. During the war, the belligerent parties often viewed Americans suspiciously as French
smugglers or English spies. The task of merchants was to avoid or disprove these assumptions in
order to successfully gain access to foreign markets. In order to do so, Americans first needed to
prove their Americanness in order to claim neutrality. The letters sent back and forth further
reveal a larger debate taking place between merchants and state officials regarding the limits of
national identity and belonging in the eighteenth century.
It has long been established that the war between Britain and France gave American
merchants a commanding presence in markets as the sole supplier of colonial produce. Douglas
North famously recognized the impact of this trade on the American economy, declaring that
events in Europe from 1793 to 1814 helped to explain “every twist and turn” in the fortunes of
America. For these years, North charted the millions of pounds of sugar, coffee, tobacco, and
food stuffs that Americans carried to Europe and the West Indies. These goods mobilized a
massive domestic shipping force, which in turn led to a rapid expansion in the American
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economy.72 North’s argument has since been challenged by historians who have claimed that the
benefits of American neutrality were offset by the nature of a trade that was socially limited,
commodity-specific, and costly for the nation.73 Yet the relative economic merits of neutrality
are perhaps beside the point. More recently, scholars have moved beyond the question of the
North thesis to consider this trade in the context of American interaction with foreign states in
the Atlantic. Peter Hill, for example, has looked at American trade from the French viewpoint,
arguing that French seizures of American vessels were prompted by the overriding suspicion that
Americans were greedy and unscrupulous traders who were constantly suspected of concealing
their true British identity.74
Suspicions of American merchants concealing their identity were only a symptom of the
greater uncertainties in transatlantic shipping in this era. Silvia Marzagalli and Javier CuencaEsteban have each focused on the ambiguity of trade during the Revolutionary Wars.
Marzagalli’s research into American trade with Bordeaux and the ‘failure’ of the establishment
of greater commercial ties between the two countries has revealed that the ‘French’ merchants
trading with America were often really settled American or Irish traders. These men were fluent
in English and already possessed deep commercial ties to the United States, making the trade
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between the countries a narrow and exclusive enterprise. Cuenca-Esteban has approached
transatlantic commerce in this period from another angle to show that British exports to the
United States during the war were really ‘ghost’ exports that were subsequently reshipped to
promising markets in Spanish America.75 In considering the identity of the merchants and
products moving across the Atlantic, these historians have highlighted the unsettled nature of
transatlantic commerce in the eighteenth century. Exports for one country could be secretly
spirited away to another continent and new American trades with foreign countries may have
simply acted as an extension of preexisting commercial ties.
Given recent historiography, it is safe to assume that war saw an intense interest from all
sides into the nature of American commercial identity. In the previous decade, Americans had
struggled to reacquire the old privileges they enjoyed as British subjects while also avoiding the
immense dangers associated with their new national identity in the Mediterranean. With the war,
Americans were ‘neuter’, meaning neither British nor French, and could therefore move inbetween empires. In this sense, to be ‘American’ during the war was to have all European
markets open to trade. Like impressed seamen, merchants defended their claims of American
identity in courts and on the high seas. This section looks at how merchants attempted to avoid
capture, and position their transactions as neutral and American. In doing so, it also highlights
how the state conceived of commercial identity during war and how flexible such definitions
could be to meet wartime demands. The following chapter will complete the merchant voyage by
looking at how this neutrality was debated in the Admiralty courts and in the popular press.
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Merchant firms throughout the British Empire quickly recognized the commercial
consequences of war for their American contacts. Within a week of the declaration of war in
February 1793, London firm Edward MacCulloch & Co. wrote hurriedly to Nicholas Low that
“[t]he American flag & produce will feel the advantage of being neutral on this occasion.”76 This
sentiment was echoed by other British firms to their American contacts in the following weeks;
the war that many merchants had anticipated for the last five years had finally arrived. The
general consensus of these firms was that Americans would command the carrying trade ‘while’
and ‘if’ they remained neutral.77 The question of commercial success, then, became a conditional
one, equally as dependent on American merchants appearing neutral as it was on their
government acting neutral. Even then, the appearance of being neutral was deeply complicated
since British privateers did not capture American vessels for technically violating their
neutrality. Instead, the language used to justify a prize in these initial years of the war, tended to
focus on the identity of the property on board rather than broader violations of international law.
Privateers claimed that the suspicion of French property and the intended destination of a
ship effectively altered the American character of the voyage. When capturing vessels, suspicion
was given priority over any hard proof in a privateer’s possession. When the American brig
Aurora was captured in June 1793, for example, it was reported that the sole reason for its
detention was the privateer’s suspicion of the American vessel having French property on board.
Similar captures throughout the West Indies were repeatedly justified on this suspicion of French
property. In capturing vessels without real evidence, the privateers were shielded by the
unprecedented new instructions sent to commanders of men of war and privateers on June 8,
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1793. These instructions considered grain as contraband, arguing that the French government
was the only real importer of provisions into French ports. If the French government was the
only real buyer of grain, it was argued, then the possession of any kind of grain warranted
capture. Once a vessel was brought before an admiralty court, emphasis was finally placed on
actual evidence discovered after the vessel was seized. But even in court, suspicions could alter
the degree of proof necessary to prosecute a case.78 Contributing to this web of suspicion, the
British minister to America, George Hammond, declared to Lord Grenville that he would
regularly supply British cruisers with information on all vessels leaving Philadelphia “which I
may suspect of having French property…”79 Hammond’s spying apparently garnered results as
American vessels were repeatedly captured in the West Indies and carried into British ports
during the summer of 1793 under suspicion of hiding their true French identity.80
By February 1794, the British government had declared all of the French West Indies
under blockade. This blockade – really a paper blockade – could never have been successfully
enforced by the navy. The use of privateers though allowed the British to make fixed claims on
territories they could not possibly hold.81 Instead, the point was to push forward a guiding
principle for British privateers, which justified the capture of American ships based on their
suspected destination to the French islands. Capture based on destination was an incredibly
difficult case to settle as smuggling was rampant and legitimate voyages often changed their
78
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ports of call to meet new market demands. Even insurance policies were generally taken out with
a vague destination in mind, often avoiding only specific areas of piracy or blockade. Otherwise,
captains were given a broad ‘liberty to touch’ at any port in Europe or the West Indies.82 This
practice was widely known and perceived as extremely liable to abuse. The American consul in
Hamburg, for example, believed that American captains were secretly shipping wheat to France
while claiming to go to Lisbon. Despite swearing to their destinations, the consul continued to
worry that American ships would sneak off to French ports, which would eventually lead to
capture by British cruisers.83 Like with suspicion, capture because of intended destination rested
on appearances above all else.
Due to the British blockade, and the liberties granted to privateers in the initial months of
the war, the prizes captured in the West Indies were numerous. These successes led Governor
Henry Hamilton of Bermuda to boast in 1793 that his ships had captured £18,000 worth of prizes
in a few months, and that the spirit of privateering had only increased with these successes. Yet
Hamilton also noted in the same year that Bermudians and Americans had intermarried since the
previous war and knowledge of how to subvert the islands’ customs agents was well-known in
America. Hamilton believed the intermingling of Americans and Bermudans had thus far
contributed to the success of the privateers (as Bermudans also possessed knowledge of
America), but he also worried about the potential consequences if a future war with America
occurred.84 Hamilton’s misgivings about the Bermudians were hardly surprising. According to
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Michael Jarvis, Bermuda maintained a much closer commercial relationship with North America
than with Great Britain in the eighteenth century. Moreover, much like the Americans before and
after independence, Bermudians were notorious for their disregard of the Navigation Acts in the
pursuit of profit.85
Hamilton’s uncertainty over the allegiance and identity of Bermudans went beyond the
capture of American vessels. In March 1794, the Attorney General of Bermuda tried Josiah
Meigs for sedition based on comments that Meigs had made in the Attorney General’s presence.
Meigs allegedly insulted the admiralty jurisdiction of the government by insinuating that
America should go to war with Great Britain for the instructions issued to privateers. Even more
damning, it was said that Meigs had offered tacit support for the French Republic, which made
Meigs, in the Attorney General’s view, a “maintainer & abettor of the French republicanism.”86
Meigs was eventually released on condition of good behavior, but not before his friends were
examined to discover any hidden sympathies Meigs may have held for French republicanism.
Meigs’s examination before the Governor’s Council illustrates the increasingly tense and
suspicious atmosphere of the British West Indies in the war years. It also draws attention to the
instability of identity during the revolution; in the eyes of their own government, Bermudians
were at once: French republicans, disloyal Americans, and British privateers.
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Fear of sedition was not helped by the state of the island in 1793. Despite Hamilton’s
boasting to Dundas about the value of his prizes, Bermuda was as poorly supplied during the war
as in any other period in its history. To feed the inhabitants of the British West Indies, it was still
necessary to depend on American goods.87 Despite his fears of American knowledge, Hamilton
opened the ports to the importation of provisions for six months in 1793, and the proclamation
was renewed almost continuously through 1795. British governors in Barbados, Grenada,
Jamaica and in the conquered French islands similarly followed suit.88 Just as in the previous
decade, letters from Whitehall strongly opposed opening the ports to neutral traffic as “highly
dangerous” and as a “measure not only illegal and contrary to the commercial policy of this
kingdom, but subject to improper communications.”89 The Board of Trade echoed this sentiment,
and condemned the opening of the ports to foreign vessels as unjustifiable except in cases of
‘absolute necessity’.90 By 1795, the Jay Treaty temporarily settled the question of foreign trade
in the British islands, but it did not alleviate the fears of the colonial and home governments that
suspicious persons were working in the islands to undermine the war effort.91
Nervous about these ‘improper communications’ with foreigners, Parliament in 1793
attempted to limit the continued border crossings that characterized so many relations in the
West Indies. In order to better control wartime commerce, Parliament passed the Bill for
Preventing Traitorous Correspondence. As the Attorney General explained to Parliament, this
bill was merely meant to prevent trade with His Majesty’s enemies by expanding the definition
87
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of treason to include the sale of provisions and arms. In doing so, the bill also implicitly
recognized that letters between belligerent powers could not be stopped, as it would “destroy all
commercial communication.”92 It would have been uncharacteristically harsh, from the
perspective of the government, for merchants to be barred from carrying on commercial
correspondence with their business contacts in enemy territory. In the same spirit as the
Traitorous Correspondence Bill, foreigners were expelled from the British islands or forced to
justify their presence before the local government. Over the course of the decade, orders were
issued by the Earl of Balcarres of Jamaica (1795) and Governor Beckwith in Bermuda (1799)
ordering the expulsion of all unauthorized foreigners from British colonies.93 Fear of foreign
influence continued despite these efforts, leading Home Secretary Portland to claim that the
insurrection of the maroons in Jamaica was brought about by a cabal of “His Majesty’s Enemies
in Saint Domingo, in concert with those residing in the North American Provinces, and in
Jamaica itself.”94
The tense and confused atmosphere that pervaded the British West Indies during the war
made commerce a dangerous game. In pursuing a profitable voyage, merchants traded in
information about the latest policies, blockades and embargoes. The demands offered by the war
and the repeated opening of the ports often offset the risks of a venture to the West Indies. Each
capture of a neutral vessel increased the risk for all shippers and could potentially explode the
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price for colonial goods at home and in Europe, making risky ventures even more alluring.95 The
temptation to dominate the carrying trade also forced merchants to make sense of British policies
that both welcomed foreign commerce and suspected foreigners as hidden insurgents or enemy
smugglers. In order to understand how merchants handled the risks associated with trade during
the war, it is necessary to look more closely at an individual merchant’s experience. A qualitative
approach has an advantage over considering merchants en masse as it is better able to reveal the
nuances of identity negotiation particular to this study. William Constable of New York provides
an invaluable example of this experience, as his trade with both countries during the war allowed
him to experience these commercial policies, and their inconsistencies, firsthand.
William Constable, born in Dublin in 1752, began his career as a fur trader to the
important London firm of Phyn & Ellice in 1769. By 1800, Constable owned about ten percent
of New York State. While growing his business, Constable made important connections to
several prominent New York families. These connections included the Morris family of New
York, a relationship which he used to his advantage in acquiring a tobacco contract with France,
and as a vital source of commercial information on French policies during the Revolution. Along
with his transatlantic commerce, Constable also participated in land speculation and the early
China trade with mixed results.96
Constable spent the initial years of the war in Europe, where he coordinated his business
transactions with contacts in London, Cadiz, Lisbon, Bordeaux, Canton, and the British and
French West Indies. As has been shown in previous chapters, the breadth of Constable’s business
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contacts was not exceptional when compared to other transatlantic merchants. Nor was he
particularly successful at navigating the stormy waters of commercial traffic during the war. In
fact, Constable fell victim to both the British and French governments despite his valuable
network of informers. Nevertheless, much like the American traders in the 1780s, Constable’s
failures offer exceptional insight into the nature of transatlantic trade and identity manipulation
during the French Revolution. Constable lost ships to the French during the Bordeaux embargo
(1793-1794) and to British privateers while trading in the British East Indies under a foreign flag
(1793). While the belligerent powers seized his property, Constable pursued a scheme to furnish
British troops in the West Indies with cattle, hoping to profit from a valuable victualing contract.
For a study into how merchants attempted to prove their American identity, Constable is
essential. Captured by both, he was forced to learn how best to negotiate his identity, and
because of his troubles we are offered a window into how merchants and states differed in their
interpretations of true allegiance and national identity.
Given the dangerous situation in Europe, Constable believed that the only market left for
American trade was the West Indies. There though, French privateers swarmed the West Indies
searching for British property onboard neutral vessels and declaring all the British islands under
siege. As is described above, Britain pursued similar measures against neutral commerce in their
search for French property, leaving few gaps for American traders to exploit. Nevertheless,
Constable noted eagerly to a contact in 1794 that there was considerable demand for flour in the
islands, and the current American crop was so abundant that it warranted speculation.97 More
importantly, Constable hoped to acquire a valuable government contract to supply British troops
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in the West Indies with cattle. Such a measure by a ‘neutral’ merchant clearly invited
condemnation by French privateers.
At first, Constable’s willingness to pursue a government contract with the British army
appears wholly incompatible with his earlier experience dealing with the British government.
While in Britain in 1793, Constable claimed to have spent every day for six months waiting in
the Admiralty Court of Appeals for a hearing on his vessel, the St. Jean de Lone, in order to
prove his American identity. According to the records of the case, Constable’s goods were found
on board a French ship travelling to America in May 1793. The ship was captured while carrying
goods from the British East Indies, which were to be reshipped to America after stopping in
Europe. Though Constable believed his bill of lading proved that the goods belonged to him and
were American, the admiralty judge was nevertheless struck by the case of a ship so blatantly
“exporting the goods in question from an English settlement upon a foreign bottom.”98 The
captors, similarly struck with the creative identity politics at play in this single voyage, argued in
court that Constable should be considered in fact as a British merchant. The captors claimed that
Constable’s extended residence in London altered his commercial identity and therefore as a
British merchant he and his partners were ‘carrying on an illegal trade’ with the enemy.
Constable claimed his long residence in England was unintentional, but due to the drawn out
proceedings of the current case and his involvement in the bankruptcy proceedings of a
prominent London merchant.
In response to the judge’s questions, Constable tried to prove that he was in fact an
American based on his frequent trips to the Continent and the shipments he had made since
arriving in London to America under consignment to his British contacts (rather than in his own
98
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name). Further, according to Constable, the goods in question were ‘clearly calculated’ for the
American market rather than any market in Europe or Great Britain. For Constable, his intention
to leave the country and his purchase of goods for America clearly revealed his true identity. The
court was less sure though, and the vessel and the goods were again condemned by the Lords
Commissioners of the Admiralty. In 1795, Swiss merchants Pourtales & Co. were able to recover
their portion of the cargo from the Saint Jean de Lone on appeal as neutrals but Constable was
less successful in ever proving his American identity.99 While scholars have been quick to
identify the advantages of neutrality for American commerce in these years, there has been little
consideration of the hurdles put in the way of American merchants making citizenship claims
abroad. As is described in the next chapter, the Admiralty Court offered an important venue for
asserting identity claims, but it also reveals the very different and fluid conceptions of national
origin held by captors, judges and merchants.
Reflecting on his failed trip to Europe, Constable complained that the policies of Britain
and France had forced neutrals to take sides: “The very unsettled state of affairs in Europe deters
us from adventuring thither, for it appears no power is allowed to remain neuter in the contest
with France.”100 At least in Europe, the war had forced everyone to make a choice. Remaining
‘neuter’ only invited suspicion that a merchant was in fact wearing a mask to conceal a more
sinister identity. Perhaps because Constable believed that he was now forced to take a side, at
least outwardly, he turned to directly supplying the British military in the West Indies with
provisions.
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Constable was willing to join with other Americans in supplying the British military
forces in the West Indies due in part to the encouragement of his London correspondent, John
Inglis, of the firm Phyn, Ellice & Inglis. In the spirit of greater cooperation after the Jay Treaty,
Inglis excitedly informed Constable in August 1795 that 20,000 soldiers were destined for the
West Indies, and that they would need to be fed. Inglis explained that the contract was time
sensitive as the troops would sail by September in order to retake Guadeloupe, “[i]f you can
persuade any smart Yankey to set immediately about procuring proper means to carry cattle to
the army you may depend upon it, he will do well & I think I can insure him encouragement &
preference.”101 Less than a month later, Inglis wrote three additional letters to Constable pushing
the deadline back to December of that year and again directing him to send cattle, horses and
mules to the West Indies. By the end of the month, Inglis warned that other merchants had
become interested and it was necessary for Constable to send an agent to New London to buy ‘all
the good fat cattle’ and hire as many ships as necessary for the voyage. Inglis ended his letter
stating that the army being sent to the West Indies, “is such as never appeared in these seas
before.”102 Inglis’s letters further emphasize the importance of acting quickly on information and
the demand for regular letters from a correspondent. By October, Inglis had learned that a
competitor had won the contract to provide livestock for the army, “contrary to my expectation,”
but he nevertheless encouraged Constable to send flour to the military in the West Indies from
America, in order to still profit from the war effort.103
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At Inglis’s continued urging to get involved in the victualing trade, Constable formed a
partnership with the winner of the cattle contract, Cruden, Pollard & Stuart of Barbados, to assist
in shipping livestock for the army. Under the contract, Constable shipped regularly to Barbados
five or six cargoes per month, with the promise of more frequent shipments if the cost of freight
went down.104 Though the business was in high demand, Constable complained frequently of
‘irregular & contradicting’ correspondence, explaining to one of his partners that if he had
followed their earlier advice of stopping the shipments they would have been in a ‘bad scrape’.105
The victualing plan depended partially on Spanish cattle, which was cheaper, to fill the order, but
Britain’s deteriorating relations with Spain endangered this supply system. By September 1796, a
‘Spanish War’ promised an even greater opportunity for American shipments as the sole supplier
of cattle, but it also threatened to put immense strain on the available supply of American beef.106
In response to the rumored war, the cost of shipments increased, but as late as October 12, 1796,
Constable had still not learned of an actual declaration of war and was confidently reporting
contrary information to his contacts. A week later, he learned of the British declaration of war
and wrote worriedly about the future of the contract. In order to avoid privateers, Constable
suggested that they would need to send the vessels first to a French port, but he was concerned
this maneuver would endanger the entire venture as “[the French] seem to know for whom the
cattle are shipped, they will condemn the cargoes nevertheless.”107 Despite his earlier defense in
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a British admiralty court, Constable now clearly understood that his business would make him
appear British in the eyes of French privateers.
Coupled with a renewed French decree targeting neutral shipping in 1796, Constable
worried that the cost of freight and available supply would make it impossible to fulfill the
complete contract. If the government insisted that they hold up their end, he believed it would be
a ‘ruinous undertaking’.108 In response to the new market uncertainty, Constable’s London
contacts ordered a suspension of shipments and purchases for the West Indies in December
1796.109 Further advice from London the following year suggested that the shipments continue
but Constable was dubious, explaining that the French “take all American vessels they can lay
hold of & we must therefore wait for a change.”110
Constable’s position as a neutral in the British empire was always tenuous. While the
French continued to harass American shipments to the West Indies, and consequently postpone
further shipments of cattle, Constable also informed his contact in Barbados that the British were
just as dangerous. He claimed that the British Men of War threatened every voyage, as they
would chase American vessels carrying supplies for the British military ‘upon a suspicion’ that
they were really intended for French ports. Constable complained of his vessels being ‘treated as
enemies’ when his supplies meant for British troops were fired on by the Royal Navy.111 The
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widespread suspicion of American commerce meant that the British were unable to recognize
their dependence on certain neutral trades to continue the war effort.
The main challenge for Constable’s business was effectively proving his American
identity in order to enjoy the neutral protections that came along with Americanness. Constable
attempted to prepare for privateers by equipping his ships with ‘every document, passport &
paper’ that the government would provide for his shipments, but claims of only shipping
American property fell flat. Business was further hurt by the capture of American ships carrying
correspondence to Constable’s contacts in the West Indies. To compensate for this, letters were
sent in ‘duplicates & triplicates & frequently quadruplicates’ but these precautions were offset by
nervous American captains who would throw all their papers overboard when stopped by a
privateer, “for fear their real destination should be discovered…”112 The destruction of papers
was an insurmountable stopgap to commerce. Without regular letters, orders could not be placed
or cancelled, and correspondents remained in the dark to the latest moves of the market and
disposition of privateers. Most importantly, regular correspondence informed merchant
nationality strategies. Letters informing Constable of dangers to American property in the West
Indies were tacit instructions for self-fashioning; to make his property appear less American.
Avoiding risk meant using this intelligence to invest in different ships, cargoes, and destinations.
The only solution to guarantee the delivery of correspondence was the use of other
neutrals as middlemen who would forward letters to contacts in one of the belligerent countries.
This method, while popular and somewhat effective, also increased the time between each letter.
Opportunities were often lost while waiting for a response from months ago. Delays could be
equally destructive to merchant ventures. In 1797 Constable wrote to a contact in Lisbon
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informing him that he had just received the last six months of letters sent to his address, the poor
timing of which resulted in goods coming to a ‘bad market’ and arriving when ‘the season was
too far advanced’.113
The situation of American commerce by 1797 was desperate. Repeated French
depredations threatened the viability of American merchant firms and many suffered bankruptcy
due to the general uncertainty of trade.114 American newspapers reported that the French and
Spanish privateers captured so many vessels in 1797 that it was impossible to reach the
Windward Islands.115 The victualing business was so hazardous that Phyn, Ellice & Inglis
informed Constable in July that American trade could only continue under British protection.
Recognizing the need to protect some American trade, the British regularly convoyed American
vessels through the islands and even across the Atlantic. Yet, this protection was also limited as
American vessels were often abandoned during the voyage and the French viewed any British
protection of neutral vessels as proof of British nationality.
Since official British protection had its own inherent dangers, it was necessary for
merchants to pursue strategies they had used in the previous decade in order to save their vessels.
Recognizing the dangers associated with their American identity, merchants attempted to cover
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American property through the use of foreign vessels. A typical example of this can be seen in an
insurance policy taken out by the New York firm Gouverneur & Kemble, for their property on
board a Danish ship headed to Saint-Domingue: “The vessel will be cleared out and invoiced as
Danish property bound for Cape Nicola Mole in Hispaniola from St. Thomas altho she is
intended to take another direction.”116 Similar to the previous decade, newspapers advertisements
further reveal American firms actively trading in foreign flags, offering: British prize ships,
Bermuda-built sloops ‘to any of the Windward or Leeward Islands’, Danish vessels for Europe
and India, and Swedish ships for the Mediterranean.117 The trade in foreign flags was not perfect,
and vessels flying foreign neutral colors were captured after Britain occupied the Danish West
Indies in 1801.118
The hostility of the French and the undependable protection of the British convoy led
American officials to become concerned with their merchants provisioning the British military.
When the French consul in Charleston learned that American merchants in the city had
contracted to supply the British troops in the West Indies with a shipment of horses, he formally
protested the transaction as a violation of American neutrality. In response, local officials
requested the suspension of the shipments. Bewildered by these actions, the British consul, John
Hamilton, protested that the Governor of Virginia must have been aware of the deal and accused
the Americans of waiting until a postponement would have caused the most ‘heavy expence’ to
the British. Hamilton further argued that any blockage of the deal was a violation of American
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neutrality in favor of the French.119 After several men attacked American ships carrying British
property in the port of Charleston, Hamilton even claimed to know of a conspiracy of men in
town to undermine the British war effort, but the mayor refused to act without further proof.120
For Hamilton, American refusal to supply the British was a sign of their failure to live up to their
neutral American identity. Increasingly, as the war progressed into the nineteenth-century,
American merchants would discover that if their business interests did not lead them into taking
a side, a side would be chosen for them.

Conclusion
Even as peace was on the horizon in 1801, the need for supplies for the British military persisted.
In 1801, William Savage, the American agent in Jamaica, indicated to Secretary Madison that
the British demand for American beef was still great, and the island alone would purchase twenty
thousand barrels.121 Though the signing of the Jay Treaty saw a noticeable shift from British to
French depredations, the British continued to capture American ships, despite their dependence
on foreign supplies. By 1799 Constable was clearly done with the cattle scheme, telling his
brother that the West Indians held an irresponsible amount of debt, and concluding dismissively,
“These West Indians will not do.”122
Dependence on foreign vessels, the constant intermingling of nationalities, and the
sharing of seamen across navies all served to undermine the legitimacy of American identity
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during the war. The Napoleonic Wars in the following decade continued many of these same
issues as ‘American’ seamen were once again impressed into the Royal Navy and American
merchants took an even larger part of the carrying trade during the first four years of the war.
Though impressment continued, the debate over proper commerce shifted from a question of
relative ‘Americanness’ to the limits of neutrality in wartime. Given American conduct during
the 1790s, many, especially in Great Britain, questioned their role in perpetuating the war. In
these debates, Americans were compared to the Dutch during the Seven Years’ War who
unscrupulously traded with both sides and profited from the suffering of all of the participants.
As the next chapter reveals, the debate over neutral identity in the admiralty courts and the
popular press attempted to finally limit American participation in the British empire by
representing neutral commerce as a subversive act of war against Great Britain and its interests.
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Chapter 4: Intentional Enemies: Neutrals before the Court, 1800-1809
On February 2, 1800, Sir William Scott, the newly-appointed judge of the High Court of
Admiralty, decided the fate of an American ship known as the Polly. Scott’s ruling for this single
ship travelling with colonial produce from Havana to Spain, by way of Boston, would have an
enormous impact on the future of neutral trade in the early years of the Napoleonic Wars. In this
case, Scott declared that neutral vessels were able to legally trade between enemy colonies and
the mother country so long as the goods were first imported into a neutral port. As a result of
Scott’s ruling, the American neutral trade grew rapidly, quickly overtaking European rivals in
transatlantic shipping. By 1805, this trade had become so extensive that European merchants
tended to describe valuable West Indian commodities as American exports. Yet, as Britain
gained control over the Atlantic, and Napoleon attempted to seal off the continent, the pressing
need for American middlemen dwindled in comparison to the relative benefits of an economic
war. Finally, by December 1807, the commercial landscape of transatlantic shipping had
permanently shifted with the passage of the Embargo Act by the U.S. Congress. The decision by
the American government to end their participation in neutral trade may have averted war, but it
also opened up all remaining American shipping to confiscation by the two warring powers.
The years between the Polly and the Embargo provide a framework for studying the
changing position of neutrals within the British admiralty courts. By examining British admiralty
court records within the context of state formation and economic warfare, we are able to chart
how precedents established in superior courts affected debates over merchant identity taking
place in the West Indies. Neutral merchants, and their captors, actively mobilized the language of
Sir William Scott’s famous decisions in defense of their conduct while at sea. As the courts
served as a venue for constantly renegotiating the meaning of neutrality, they also provided a

platform for new government policies. When the economic war between Britain and France
intensified, the British government used the admiralty courts to secure the imperial economy,
enforcing a protectionist agenda onto neutral trade. American merchants found in violation of
state decrees were classified as belligerents and their property was condemned in court. This
process of transforming former British subjects into enemies provides a window into how states
and individuals understood nationality and the role of international commerce in war.
This period, then, highlights the gradual evolution of American neutrals into enemies of
the British government. In the years after independence, Americans trading abroad had struggled
with the malleability of their identity, a challenge that became even more difficult when war
broke out in 1793. As has been shown, privateers looking to seize an American ship depicted the
Americans onboard as Frenchmen in disguise. Press-gangs claimed to be incapable of
distinguishing between natural-born American citizens and recent British immigrants, and
impressed members of both groups on the grounds of a perpetual British identity. Similarly,
French officials, skeptical of English-speaking foreigners during the Revolution, accused
Americans of concealing their English identity, seizing their ships in port while they searched for
spies. While many of these ideas persisted into the Napoleonic Wars, the language used by
belligerents changed subtly over the course of the war. Americans were no longer secretly
French or English, but instead they were viewed as de-facto enemies: individuals whose actions
had caused them to lose their neutrality. The argument that neutrals had failed to ‘remain neutral’
placed all of the blame on neutral conduct, essentially ignoring the active role of the state in
redefining the limits of acceptable commerce.1
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The years leading up to 1807 witnessed the institutional growth of the British Empire, as
Britain gained dominance over the sea after the Battle of Trafalgar (1805). With trade lines
relatively secured, mercantilist regulations lost the loopholes and loose enforcement of the early
modern period, taking on the characteristics that historians have often associated it with: a
restrictive commercial system hostile to competing foreign interests. Along with exploring the
more effective enforcement of commercial policy, this chapter focuses on the struggle of
American merchants to supply European markets in the face of the steadfast opposition of both
warring powers. An examination of the records of the High Court of Admiralty, American and
British diplomatic dispatches, popular pamphlets, newspaper editorials, and merchant
correspondence, illustrates the adaptability of merchants and the state to meet the commercial
and political pressures of the war.
This chapter contributes to the recent interest in nationality and international commerce
by placing complicated negotiations over the identity of the merchant, ship and voyage within
the context of the growing ability of the British state to govern the empire. The rationalization of
British mercantilist policies during the Napoleonic Wars effectively narrowed the field of
legitimate commerce in wartime. The period from 1798 to 1807 saw the dynamic evolution of
‘the neutral’ in law and public consciousness from a morally ambiguous supplier of consumer
goods to a malicious war profiteer whose trade with belligerents undermined the war effort. This
chapter argues that the debate over concepts of neutrality should be situated within the wider
discussion of national allegiance and commercial identity which had consumed the British
Empire since the American Revolution. The mercantilist rhetoric that pervaded reforms in
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colonial governance and admiralty courts attempted to force a choice on American merchants: to
rejoin the British Empire or stand with Napoleon.
The first section of this chapter examines admiralty court practice and the evolution of
international law under the leadership of Sir William Scott (1745-1836). The chronological
framework of section one is situated around a ten-year period beginning with Scott's appointment
to the High Court of Admiralty in 1798 and ending with the Orders in Council of 1807. In these
years, neutral merchants shifted from important sources of maritime trade to hidden enemies
undermining Britain’s war effort. Scott’s appointment and reform of the British admiralty courts
provides an invaluable lens for studying this period. The local courts were reformed under a
singular vision of admiralty court practices and the rule of law. This served as a break with the
previous system of local autonomy, which had allowed for a more fluid interpretation of
commercial identity in admiralty court cases. These reforms were just one part of a broader
project by the British state to increase control over transatlantic shipping and colonial
governance.
Section two examines the different types of evidence used in the admiralty courts to
condemn neutral vessels. In focusing on the years after the Essex, this section shows how the
standards of evidence used in court decisions relied heavily on the recent reforms to admiralty
court law. Just as Chapter 3 highlighted the importance of ‘suspicion’ in the capture of American
vessels, this section focuses on the role of ‘intention’ in determining the guilt of a vessel before
the admiralty court. ‘Intention’ was always important in admiralty law to prove the violation of a
blockade, but the focus on ‘intention’ by the court increasingly pushed the law into a largely
indefinable area for the consideration of evidence. The value and nature of the goods onboard a
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ship might inform a vice-admiralty court judge of a merchant’s true ‘intention’ to secretly land
those goods on a French island, regardless of any exculpatory evidence.
The scholarship surrounding commerce during the Napoleonic Wars can be divided into
two distinct but overlapping trends. The first looks broadly at commercial relations between
Britain, France and the United States. These studies encompass everything from commercial
policy to impressment and the decisions of the British admiralty courts. The literature on this
topic has largely focused on the causes and characteristics of the economic war that resulted in
the British Orders in Council, Napoleon’s Continental System and the American Embargo of
1807, all of which eventually culminated in the War of 1812. The second branch examines the
experiences of merchants trading in the Atlantic and the Caribbean as well as that of European
and American neutrals operating within Napoleon’s Continental System. This scholarship has
ranged from the macroeconomic results of neutral trade in relation to the fortunes of the nationstate, to closer studies of individual men and women who smuggled coffee past customs agents
and lone ships negotiating their neutrality in tumultuous wartime waters.
Histories of the economic effects of the Napoleonic Wars date back to Alfred Mahan and
Henry Adams in the nineteenth century. These American historians largely focused on the
economic aspects of the war as it benefited American neutrality and eventually led America into
a war with Great Britain in 1812. From this nineteenth-century perspective, economic evidence
mattered only so much as it related to national pride and power. While focused almost entirely
on diplomatic figures and relations between these states, these broad nineteenth-century histories
nevertheless supplied the economic, diplomatic and legal lenses still used by scholars today.2 For
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the European perspective, Eli Heckscher’s foundational study of the Continental System helped
to develop the focus on civilian experience during the war by looking at economic over military
factors. Heckscher was able to expand on several of the points made by Mahan while also
reinterpreting them in light of a mass of economic data. Like Mahan, Heckscher saw the British
Orders in Council and licensing system as an attempt to re-impose mercantilist policies on the
former American colonies, effectively depriving the United States of its commercial
independence. However, by repositioning the economic policies as a battle between Britain and
France, rather than a prologue to war with America, Heckscher opened the door for historians to
examine the effects of economic war on the economies and daily lives of neutrals and
belligerents.3
Since Heckscher, historians have established the contours of the Continental System and
its real effect on British and neutral trade. Here, historians have noted that the Continental
System was more detrimental to British industry than previously imagined, and that its
inconsistent application on the continent allowed for divergent experiences for those living under
the self-blockade. Kenneth O’Rourke has used trade data to show that among the three powers,
Britain emerged from the war as the economic ‘victor’ while the United States suffered the most
from the repeated trade embargoes and blockades.4 Increasingly, historians have moved beyond
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the ‘blockade’ and its principal actors, to focus on a ‘system’ with many moving parts. Under the
Napoleonic System, the experiences of the Baltic States show the uneven application of
Napoleon’s universal economy. Neutrality could be immensely profitable for cities like
Hamburg, but direct subjugation had the potential to ruin an economy with drastic price
increases, the loss of territory and a crippled merchant marine.5
The devastating impact of the war on local economies was a significant factor in shaping
the general outlook of trade for many merchants. However, it is important not to ignore the role
of governments in determining merchant success as well as the scope of international trade in
wartime. Silvia Marzagalli has recently pushed for a view of international commerce that focuses
on the mutual interests of state policy and merchant activity. According to Marzagalli, American
commerce should be understood by studying it in conjunction with the activities of the American
consular service. Merchants depended on consuls, who were often state agents as well as local
traders, to provide important commercial information, but consuls were also merchants’
advocates with a foreign state looking to seize their goods and condemn their ships. In such a
climate, merchants depended heavily on local consuls for protection and guidance in order to
carry on their trades.
At the same time, in emphasizing the importance of government intervention, scholars
have also argued for a global perspective on trade. This is a perspective which emphasizes the
often overlooked connections between ports in different countries regardless of the evidence

Variorum, 1996); François Crouzet, L’économie britannique et le blocus continental: 1806-1813, 2 vols. (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1958).
5 Katherine B. Aaslestad, “Lost Neutrality and Economic Warfare: Napoleonic Warfare in Northern Europe, 17951815,” in War in an Age of Revolution, 1775-1815, ed. Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2010); Though depicted as a blockade, Davis and Engerman have suggested that the results of
Napoelon’s Continental System varied in time as well as geography, see, Davis and Engerman, Naval Blockades in
Peace and War an Economic History since 1750.

150

coming out of national trade statistics. While making new connections, such a view does not
wholly preclude the role of the government as a commercial actor. These historians though have
minimized the importance of commercial regulations in favor of the fluidity and unpredictability
of global trade.6 Much of the focus on commerce in this period has centered around the
constraints on neutral trade, but as Katherine Aaslestad argues, the Continental System and the
Orders in Council helped to create a ‘shadow economy’ for smugglers to funnel British goods
into the continent under the nose of Napoleon’s customs agents.7
In order to integrate individual merchant experience into the broader histories of the
Continental System and trade during the Napoleonic Wars, it is necessary to turn to how
historical actors conceived of their dual identity as both merchants and subjects of the state. A
broad range of recent studies has examined the relationship between trade and identity in this
period. These scholars have shown how the study of nationality can help to explain the makeup
and direction of international commerce. Reinvigorating older traditions which focused on
national pride to explain state policy, Mlada Bukovansky and Paul Gilje have each looked at the
ideology used by the American state in the lead up to the War of 1812. Bukovansky argues that
American foreign policy can only be understood by viewing neutrality as integral to American
identity. More recently, Gilje has shown how the early American political system was based
around ideals found in the popular slogan ‘free trade and sailors’ rights’. As Federalist and

6

José Luís Cardoso, “Lifting the Continental Blockade: Britain, Portugal and Brazilian Trade in the Global Context
of the Napoleonic Wars,” in A Global History of Trade and Conflict since 1500, ed. L. Coppolaro and F. McKenzie
(New York: Springer, 2013); Silvia Marzagalli, “American Shipping and Trade in Warfare, or the Benefits of
European Conflicts for Neutral Merchants: The Experience of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1793-1815,”
Kyoto Sangyo University Economic Review, no. 1 (March 2014): 1–29.
7 Katherine B. Aaslestad, “War without Battles: Civilian Experiences of Economic Warfare during the Napoleonic
Era in Hamburg,” in Soldiers, Citizens and Civilians: Experiences and Perceptions of the Revolutionary and
Napoleonic Wars, 1790-1820, ed. Alan I. Forrest, Karen Hagemann, and Jane Rendall (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2009).

151

Republican politicians debated free trade and America’s economic enemies, the government was
able to mobilize the populace’s support for war against Britain with this rhetoric.8
As trade continued to develop over the course of the war, the identity of merchants
became more pliable. Traditionally, the national character of the owner of a ship was a key factor
in determining the results of an admiralty court decision. Margrit Schulte Beerbühl has reexamined the British licensing program to show the malleability of an owner’s identity in
determining legitimate neutral commerce. Even when the United States and Great Britain were at
war in 1812, the licensing system allowed for American neutrals to trade with the continent
under the British stamp of approval.9 Taking note of the layers of criteria used to define a neutral
in the admiralty courts, scholars have further emphasized the importance of identifying property
and ships taking part in neutral voyages. The definition of contraband was hotly contested in the
eighteenth century, as it varied by country and treaty.10 Though historians of international law
have frequently emphasized the legacy of precedents and traditions behind admiralty court
decisions, recent studies of neutral trade have highlighted the complicated factors that
determined neutral identity. This has led Eric Schnakenbourg to question whether a neutral
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voyage was defined in court by an adherence to the rules or merely by an absence of any
culpable evidence.11
As Britain and France became embroiled in an economic war, neutral merchants were
forced to navigate an increasingly hostile ocean. This chapter contributes to recent scholarship on
economic warfare’s effects on conceptions of nationality and allegiance by examining the
experiences of neutral ships tried by the British Admiralty Courts. As the records of these courts
during the Napoleonic Wars reveal, the national character of any given vessel was not fixed but
amorphous; a ship’s identity changed depending on space and time. The multiple identities a ship
possessed, from its origin to its destination, overlapped and complicated commerce to such a
degree that courts were forced to rely on hearsay and conjecture in order to decipher the true
identity of commercial transactions during wartime.

The Admiralty Court System under Scott
The British admiralty courts played a decisive role in shaping neutral commerce during the
Napoleonic Wars. This section uses the first decade of Sir William Scott’s tenure on the High
Court of Admiralty (1798-1808) as a chronological framework for conceptualizing the evolution
of admiralty law and the politicization of the courts during the Napoleonic Wars. The
transformation of the courts under Scott provides the necessary context for understanding how
neutral identity was constantly renegotiated during the war. While the British courts endeavored
to put forward a claim of tradition and precedent in their rulings, a study of admiralty court
11
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decisions and merchant experience before the courts reveals the malleability of national character
during the war. In its rulings, the court tacitly acknowledged that outside forces constantly
reshaped the identity of a commercial voyage. The decisions discussed below further illustrate
how the court struggled to make sense of an increasingly complex commercial world where
transactions were not limited to individuals of the same nation. As this section and the evidence
examined later in the chapter reveals, the courts attempted to handle the complexities of trade by
forcing merchant identity into set categories. In doing so, the court revealed the ability of
merchants (and the state) to reform identity to fit the momentary needs of the market. In short,
admiralty court records show that commercial identity during the Napoleonic Wars was
constantly in flux as it was broken, lost, converted and concealed.
As Scott’s modern biographer, Henry Bourguignon, has shown, the High Court of
Admiralty was repeatedly forced to deal with the ‘chameleon-like’ merchant practices common
in eighteenth-century commerce. Merchants often resided in foreign countries and took part in
international joint-ventures. Nationality in the West India trade was particularly hard to pin down
because, in the words of Scott’s predecessor, Sir James Marriott, the islands were “full of
renegadoes of all nations.”12 Especially during war, contact between foreign islands was constant
and attempts to prevent correspondence and trade often stumbled in the face of real war-time
demand. Governors might expel foreigners from the island, and blockades could cut off an
individual port from the rest of the West Indies, but these measures simply obscured trade rather
than preventing it. With neutral commerce, sweeping proclamations from colonial governors
merely made the discovery of bona fide neutrals and belligerents all the more difficult. The
12
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courts were far more effective when they recognized these complications as an opportunity for
judges to condemn a voyage on multiple levels: the nationality of the owner, the origin of the
property, the intention of the captain, or even the origin of the ship.
When Scott first took over for Sir James Marriott in 1798, the High Court of Admiralty
was overwhelmed by the volume of cases on its docket. The number of untried cases was partly
the fault of the unregulated and poorly organized system of vice-admiralty courts. These courts
were often conducted by unqualified men who depended on prizes for their income, and as a
result, colluded with privateers in the capture and condemnation of neutral vessels. The strain of
the workload on the aged Marriott resulted in numerous delays for merchants waiting for their
cases to be tried. The experience of William Constable, who waited every day for six months for
his case to be heard, is just one example of the hundreds of cases that came before the High
Court of Admiralty.13 The numerous delays proved expensive for neutrals, as valuable cargoes
could be tied up in court for years on appeal. Recognizing the plight of American merchants, the
American Minister to London, Rufus King, complained loudly to Foreign Secretary Lord
Grenville in 1798 of these delays, observing that the ‘infirmities’ of Judge Marriott had virtually
“incapacitate[d] him” and forced others to suffer under his “caprice, inferiority and incapacity.”14
It is unsurprising that American diplomats celebrated Scott’s appointment, as they
believed he would bring precision and objectivity to a flawed court. American diplomats had
already cultivated a close relationship with Scott during the negotiations over the Jay Treaty in
1795, in which Scott provided a guide to admiralty law for the American ministers. Following
his meetings with John Jay, Scott often engaged in informal discussions with American
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diplomats concerning his views on the law and even sharing his ideas for the reform of the
current system of vice-admiralty courts. Scott proved to be an invaluable resource for Americans
looking to instruct their countrymen in the British view of legitimate commerce. In order to
provide ready information on admiralty court precedents, Rufus King arranged for the
republication of Scott’s decisions in America, found in Robinson’s Reports of cases argued and
determined in the High Court of Admiralty.15 Before the publication of Robinson’s Reports, the
established views of the court could only be found in the occasional printed pamphlet and
newspaper article. Inaccurate reports hindered the appeals process and made it more difficult for
merchants to learn the official position of the court.
Increasingly, Scott’s main responsibility was the maintenance of the British Empire. In
this regard, he acted as an important reformer of the entire admiralty court system in 1801. The
vice-admiralty courts were widely viewed as corrupt, especially by neutral traders and foreign
diplomats: some were established illegally on conquered French islands, and in general the
courts refused to follow the latest instructions sent by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty
and the Board of Trade.16 Under the advice of Scott, Parliament vastly reduced the number of
admiralty courts from nine to two in 1801. The government’s view of the earlier courts was best
expressed by William Scott in 1807 in reply to the petition for a new court at St. Lucia. Scott
argued that the reforms put in place were meant to remedy the ‘mal-administration’ of the viceadmiralty courts which had resulted in a series of abuses including: “the disposition shown by
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those courts to condemn without sufficient caution, all prizes brought before them for the
purpose of drawing as much business as possible to the respective courts, and thereby increasing
the fees on which the emoluments of the officers entirely depended.”17 The new system would
instead focus on installing only qualified judges whose salaries would make them independent of
the prize system. This was part of a wider program of tightening control over Britain’s imperial
possessions in the nineteenth century, which also included closer monitoring of the discretionary
power of governors to open their ports. New courts could only be formed through a petition to
the Board of Trade, and while their number gradually increased again over the course of the war,
the stricter requirements on the new courts firmly established the government’s authority over
admiralty law.
Accompanying the reform of the vice-admiralty courts were Scott’s groundbreaking
decisions on neutral commerce and the legal definition of blockades. Both of these issues
reshaped transatlantic trade by creating a rigid system of rules for neutrals and belligerents to
follow. Within the first two years of Scott’s appointment to the High Court of Admiralty, he had
placed Great Britain in a position to dictate international law, setting a foundation for
interpretations of the law which would last into the twentieth century. In addition, Scott’s rulings
offered the British government an avenue for narrowing the parameters of acceptable commerce
by reinterpreting the meaning of his decisions in later years.
In the case of The Betsey (1798), Scott condemned the paper blockade established in the
West Indies to stop neutral commerce with the French islands. Paper blockades allowed the navy
17
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to exert its authority over all enemy territory without actually dedicating the manpower
necessary to enforce its claims. In The Betsey, Scott established three criteria required for a
breach of blockade: the existence of an actual blockade, knowledge of the blockade, and a
violation of the blockade by the captured ship. By forcing the Admiralty to maintain a blockade,
rather than merely proclaiming a paper blockade and depending on privateers to loosely maintain
a force, Scott undercut a key measure of the war. As the previous chapter discussed, paper
blockades were incredibly controversial for merchants as they were generic in their enforcement
and a violation of traditional maritime practices of ‘touching’ ports in search of a profitable
market.18 Scott’s limitations on the implementation of blockades extended to the war on the
continent as well as the West Indies. In 1798, Scott challenged the Admiralty’s claim of a
blockade of Havre by pointing to the occasional relaxation of the blockade as proof of its
illegitimacy. Scott restored several captured ships, stating that the court found that “If the ships
stationed on the spot to keep up the blockade will not use their force for that purpose, it is
impossible for a court of justice to say there was a blockade actually existing at that time, as to
bind this vessel.”19 While the rules may have cut in favor of the neutrals, they also encouraged
more rigorously maintained blockades of belligerent ports. All of this made smuggling more
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difficult by delimiting neutral defenses before the court to three possible criteria: insufficient
force at the port, ignorance of the blockade, and accidental violation of the blockade.
The most pressing issue faced by the court at the turn of the century was the question of
the ‘continuous voyage’ of neutral vessels between enemy colonies and the mother country; a
trade that allowed France and Spain to subsist and maintain their empire despite Britain’s naval
superiority. This trade was technically in violation of Britain’s Rule of 1756, which claimed that
a trade illegal in peacetime could not become legal during a war. However, the Rule of 1756 had
not been enforced with any kind of consistency since the Seven Years’ War.20 After
independence, American merchants enjoyed access to European colonies, especially in times of
crisis. With the start of the war in 1793 this trade had rapidly expanded, despite momentary
blockades and occasional state decrees protecting colonial monopolies. In the Immanuel (1799)
Scott revived the Rule of 1756 with the doctrine of the continuous voyage, arguing that neutrals
were barred from carrying on a trade between two enemy ports. If a neutral stopped briefly along
the way, as in the case of the Immanuel, to retrieve or dispose of cargo, this action did not
sufficiently ‘break’ the voyage, however circuitous. While the Immanuel supplied future courts
with evidence to condemn most neutral shipping, Scott a year later offered neutrals a pathway to
protecting their trade. The Polly (1800) reiterated the Rule of 1756 and the doctrine of the
continuous voyage but it also reminded the captors that neutrals could import the produce of an
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enemy colony for their own use. Scott acknowledged that this importation, if ‘bonâ fide’, may be
re-exported to Europe, declaring somewhat vaguely:
“It is not my business to say what is universally the test of a bonâ fide
importation: It is argued, that it would not be sufficient, that the duties should be
paid, and that the cargo should be landed. If these criteria are not to be resorted to,
I should be at a loss to know what should be the test; and I am strongly disposed
to hold, that it would be sufficient, that the goods should be landed and the duties
paid.”21

With the Polly, Scott established that import duties were the only available test of a sincere
importation into a neutral country. The payment of duties showed the clear intent of the neutral
carrier to ship goods for home consumption, but Scott also acknowledged that there would be
few checks on what happened to the cargo after it was imported. Scott, then, provided
justifications for captors and captives to defend their actions in court, and the effect of these
rulings can be perceived in the language used to discuss maritime trade after the Polly.
The impact of the Polly on neutral commerce was immediate. Rufus King, armed with
judgment in the case of the Polly, wrote to Lord Hawkesbury in March 1801 complaining of the
condemnation of an American vessel in the Bahamas. In March, King requested that the British
government issue strict orders to the vice-admiralty courts in order to protect the neutral trade
between America and the Spanish colonies. A month later, Hawkesbury had forwarded to Rufus
King a copy of a letter from the British government informing the Lords of the Admiralty of the
recent ruling at the port of Nassau. The letter stated the Advocate-General’s opinion that the
condemnation was “erroneous and founded in a misapprehension or misapplication of the
Principles laid down in the decision of the High Court of Admiralty referred to, without
21
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attending to the limitations therein contained.”22 The instructions sent to the Lords of the
Admiralty may have affirmed neutral rights in the broken voyage but it also revealed the
government’s uneasiness about this trade. In the letter, the Advocate-General acknowledged the
difficulty in determining what amounted to a direct trade, reiterating Scott, he repeated that the
only test available to the court was the payment of duties.23
After the Polly, the value of American re-exports to the continent increased from $40
million in 1800 to $60 million by 1805. The value of this trade directly related to the increased
tonnage of the U.S. merchant marine, which had tripled by 1807. Minor port towns in America
experienced a great boom during the height of the re-export trade, as population and wealth
soared for merchants throughout the United States. In the years after the Polly, American
newspapers were filled with advertisements for West Indian sugar. In New York, the firm of
Edward Goold & Son notified potential customers of large importations of sugar on seven
different occasions between 1800 and 1801. This trade extended to the British islands as well,
where Americans reshipped British colonial produce to the continent, often underselling their
British competitors. In April 1801 alone, the New York Custom-House recorded twenty-seven
different shipments from Bermuda.24
Colonial produce entering New York primarily came from Havana, St. Croix and the
French islands. The sugar was then re-shipped to the continent, often to another neutral port such
as Hamburg. In many cases, the British continued to serve as middlemen for American traders,
22

Rufus King to Lord Hawkesbury, 13 March 1801 and Lord Hawkesbury to Rufus King, 11 April 1801, King,
“The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King,” 1897, 403–5, 427–29.
23 King, 427–29.
24 Mercantile Advertiser, 15 Aug. 1800; Commercial Advertiser, 2 Sept. 1800; Daily Advertiser, 27 Nov. 1800;
New-York Price-Current, 13 Dec. 1800, 28 Feb. 1801, 25 April 1801; New-York Daily Gazette, 7 Jan. 1801. The
Bermuda shipments consisted of colonial produce, reshipped from other British colonies, conquered French islands
and neutral ports, see, List of all ships and vessels that have entered inwards at the naval office in the port of
Bermuda from the first day of July 1807 to the thirtieth day of September, CO 37/62, f.115-17.

161

as British merchants offered to warehouse goods for re-export to Northern Europe. From
Liverpool in 1804, speculators wrote to their American contacts with advice for providing the
best products for the continent, suggesting that prices would continue to rise due to the war and
the French abandonment of Saint-Domingue. One merchant eagerly noted that a ‘violent storm,’
which was rumored to have devastated the West Indies, would provide “another motive…for
increasing prices.”25
In 1803, the Blockade of the Elbe eliminated virtually all European shipping, leaving it to
the Americans to supply the continent with sugar and coffee. The blockade increased the value
and the risk of the Baltic trade, and officially cut Britain off from that part of Europe. American
dominance in the Baltic is reflected in a letter from the American consul at Hamburg, Joseph
Pitcairn, to Nicholas Low in 1804. Pitcairn advised Low of the great demand for colonial
produce and American goods; he promised that higher prices would continue to ‘rule’ in the
spring so long as the war continued.26 Though blockades are typically studied as economic
weapons, British and European merchants continued to see the battle between Britain and France
as an opportunity to leverage their contacts with North America into new markets during the war.
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2. Price list from the Liverpool firms of Tait & Co. for 12 August 1801 (left) and John Thomas Esquire (right) for 31
January 1804.

American domination of the carrying trade during the Napoleonic Wars resulted in a
conceptual shift for the classification of commodities and their origin. Price lists sent to
American merchants from their British contacts specifically detailed the rates for shipping
foreign colonial produce through Britain. Traditionally, these price lists ignored colonial
produce, as it was restricted to native ships, or at the very least these circulars provided some
kind of distinction between goods coming from the West Indies and American domestic exports.
By 1804, the American trade in West Indian products was so extensive that circulars sent to
American houses no longer distinguished in any significant fashion between North American and
Caribbean products. For all intents and purposes, coffee and sugar had been Americanized. Most
price lists by the Napoleonic Wars provided a simple accounting of the rates for imports and
exports for the stated port. Even merchants located in the port of Liverpool, a major hub for the
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British West Indian trade, adapted their circulars to match current market trends. The examples
provided above from the Liverpool firms of Tait & Co. (1801) and John Thomas Esquire (1804)
illustrate this conceptual shift as merchants re-categorized ‘West Indian’ produce into ‘American
exports’. This tacit acknowledgment of American dominance of the West Indian trade is striking
given the heated rhetoric from the 1780s and 1790s in defense of the Navigation Acts.
Overcoming this rhetoric, the price lists showed that some British merchants were willing to
adapt to new market realities.27
While technically allowing room for the expansion of neutral commerce, the post-Polly
period still saw numerous captures of American vessels accused of having conducted a
continuous voyage, carried contraband or violated a blockade.28 The New York Daily Advertiser
warned its readers in December 1800 that, despite the lack of coverage, American ships were
continually brought into the Jamaica Vice-Admiralty Court for condemnation, “without the least
cause whatever.”29 By 1804, the number of ships stopped and searched greatly increased,
resulting in delays which could prove costly for the ship held captive. The American merchant
Dudley Porter complained of his ship being held for two months at Dominica until it was finally
given permission to leave. The two-month delay ruined the cargo which had been eaten up by
worms.30 This dependence on overseas trade may have helped to fund the development of the
early republic in the United States, but it also made the threat of foreign sanctions and domestic
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embargoes even more dire. Porter’s experience also made clear that American dependence on the
definition of a neutral voyage in a single admiralty court decision did not necessarily give
neutrals immunity from harassment while at sea.31
The renewal of the war in 1803 brought with it a coordinated assault on neutral shipping
from the British ministry and admiralty courts, prompted by the concerns of the West Indian and
shipping interests. The West Indian merchants and the shipping industry were responding to
what François Crouzet has termed a “crisis for the imperial economy”; namely, the domination
of transatlantic shipping by the American merchant marine and the relegation of Britain, despite
its naval superiority, to a manufacturing depot.32 In 1804, the Board of Trade began a study of
the annual exports of coffee and sugar from the British West Indies to the United States as well
as the current capability of British North America to supply the West Indian colonies with
provisions. The conclusion of that study, combined with a proposition from the West Indian
merchants, resulted in new instructions sent to colonial governors stating that the ports of the
West Indies should remain shut to the Americans, except in cases of “real and very great
necessity.”33 Governors were barred from opening the ports to foreign ships in general and
especially any ships carrying lumber and salted provisions, the products of British North
America and Ireland. While the ports were still opened during the war, the justification for
31
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opening the ports required a more thorough explanation of the state of the island after a disaster.
The records of the Board of Trade after 1804 are filled with accounts of the condition of each
island and petitions from concerned colonists claiming to be in danger of famine. While similar
to the conduct of the Board in the 1780s, the response rate and rationalization of the system
tightened imperial controls on the ports in the West Indies.34
Unable to fully stop foreign trade with the colonies, the breakdown of the colonial
monopoly nevertheless alarmed the British government. In response to the decline of British
shipping during the war, Lord Sheffield embarked on another campaign to protect the Navigation
Acts from American interlopers. In June 1804, Sheffield presented a petition of the ship-owners
of the port of London to the House of Lords, complaining of the temporary suspension of the
navigation laws during the war.35 Sheffield’s argument was furthered by his publication of
another immense work on trade, Strictures on the Necessity of Inviolably Maintaining the
Navigation and Colonial System of Great Britain (1804). Sheffield’s Strictures set out to chart
the steady decline of domestic shipping in favor of foreign tonnage, and how this decline
affected the very safety of Great Britain. Repeating previous arguments made twenty years
earlier about the constant need for seamen and the danger to the entire economy if the Navigation
Acts were continually violated, the work even alleged that criticism of the navigation laws of
Britain was goaded on by France. By connecting critics to the enemy, Sheffield aimed to silence
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any dissent before the debate even began.36 Taken on its own, Sheffield’s Strictures appear as an
anachronism by an author who failed to recognize the economic realities of foreign trade in
1804. Yet in looking forward, it is clear that Sheffield predicted the coming change in British
policy with the expansion of the economic war against France and neutral powers in the
following years.
The reforms of the admiralty courts and the governance of the West Indies laid the
groundwork for the Essex decision in the summer of 1805. Expanding on Scott’s earlier
Immanuel decision, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, led by Sir William Grant, used
the Essex to effectively end the loophole created by Scott in 1800. The Essex was an American
vessel travelling between Spain and the West Indies, by way of Salem, when it was captured by a
British ship and brought into Nassau, Bahamas. In a short decision amounting to a single
sentence, the Lords of Appeal pronounced that the duties paid on the importation and exportation
of the cargo provided ‘insufficient proof’ that the goods were meant for domestic consumption,
and the vessel was condemned as a lawful prize. Just as Scott had done five years earlier, the
Lords set an entirely new precedent with one innocuous case that called into question the entire
basis of neutral shipping.37 This decision was soon followed up by others which reaffirmed the
Lords’ new view of the continuous voyage. In the William (1806), Sir William Grant stated the
view of the Court that “nobody has ever supposed that a mere deviation from the straightest and
shortest course, in which the voyage could be performed, would change its denomination, and
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make it cease to be a direct one…”38 Specifically citing the Essex decision, Grant claimed that
the British courts had never held that the payment of duties was a universal test of a ‘bonâ fide
importation’ of goods into neutral territory. Grant, in turn, disclaimed the tactics used by neutrals
‘touching’ at a port for the mere purpose of ‘colouring’ their voyage. In ignoring years of
precedent, the Lords of Appeal used the William and the Essex to rewrite history to meet the
government’s new policies in the war.
In light of the Essex, Scott had to resituate his future decisions to meet the ruling of the
higher court. At first, Scott attempted to reconcile the Essex and the Polly. Scott clarified his
earlier decisions by reiterating that the act of mere ‘touching’ at a port did not constitute an
importation, but he nevertheless restored a ship under his earlier guidelines because it had
attempted to break up its voyage. After the William, Scott was forced to fall in line and support
the government’s new position, despite finding little legal basis for the Lords’ view of the
continuous voyage.39 Scott eventually came to terms with the Essex, at least officially, after
reading a manuscript of James Stephen’s War in Disguise; or, The Frauds of the Neutral Flags
(1805), which viciously attacked ‘pseudo-neutrals’ for protecting French trade from the might of
the Royal Navy. War in Disguise, which went into three printings within six months, was widely
seen as an official statement by the British government. This was an understandable view given
that Stephen had close connections to Scott, and the Attorney-General, Spencer Perceval.
Scholars have also connected Prime Minister William Pitt to the suggestion that Stephen publish
the pamphlet anonymously in order to avoid any accusations that it was official government
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policy.40 For Scott, War in Disguise seems to have convinced him that patriotism and the war
demanded that Britain target neutrals in order to hurt the enemy.
The Essex did more than nullify the importance of duties in neutralizing a voyage, it also
shifted the burden of proof from the captors to the neutral carrier. Now, neutral ships were faced
with the almost impossible task of proving their neutrality before a tribunal in order to avoid
condemnation.41 In order to decide whether a neutral vessel was worthy of condemnation, the
courts focused on the ‘intention’ of the trader, a vague standard that relied on all of the actions of
the vessel after it had left port. The vagaries of ‘intention’ exposed neutral commerce, without
the protection offered by the Polly, to rampant condemnation, based on a variety of factors
including the origin of the ship, its destination, and the testimony of the crew. Intention could, of
course, change en route so the original intent was not a sufficient safeguard to prevent the seizure
of a neutral cargo.42
The Essex decision was accompanied just a few months later by Britain’s victory at the
Battle of Trafalgar, solidifying Britain’s dominance of the seas. The following two years
witnessed Napoleon’s Berlin and Milan Decrees that established a self-blockade of Europe and
barred the importation of British goods into the continent. Any neutral ship that came into
contact with a British vessel was considered ‘denationalized’ under the Milan decree, essentially
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criminalizing neutral commerce with the British.43 Britain responded with the Orders in Council
of November 1807, which proclaimed a blockade of all French ports and the ports of Napoleon’s
allies. Neutrals were forced to stop in Britain on their way to the continent and purchase a license
or face condemnation. The Orders essentially redirected all commerce to the continent through
Great Britain, forcing neutrals to participate in Britain’s war effort and allowing the British
economy to openly profit from neutral trade. To the United States, these Orders appeared to be a
reestablishment of the Navigation Acts, relegating the United States back to colonial status.44
While the Orders were officially defended as purely retaliatory measures against Napoleon’s
decrees, many openly questioned whether America was their true target. The London Morning
Chronicle complained that the ministry concealed its true intentions of injuring America behind
a ‘mass of words’ that would only lead to contradictory interpretations in the admiralty courts.45
The Morning Chronicle’s observation seemed to come to the forefront when Scott himself was
obligated to justify the conduct of the new Orders in the case of the Fox (1811). With the Fox,
Scott reiterated his view that the Orders appeared to violate international law but he argued that
the British nation was coerced into the extreme measure of targeting neutral commerce because
of the ‘gross outrages’ perpetuated by France.46
In America, the Essex decision and the Orders in Council were greeted with alarm.
Memorials were submitted to the U.S. Senate by the merchants of over half a dozen ports
including Philadelphia, New York, and Boston, all complaining of these new restrictions on
trade. The merchants of New York went so far as to challenge a system of regulation that relied
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on condemning certain types of trade based on the intention of the merchant. The New York
merchants argued that their business was based on circumstances, and it was impossible to
predict intention. The merchants further claimed that it was against the principles of ‘reason,
equity and law’ to condemn a business already suffering under so much risk because of the
motives of the merchant. Opposing the Rule of 1756 and the unjust seizures of their ships, the
merchants concluded by calling for “no innovations on the law of nations.”47
The American government responded to the decrees of the belligerents with an embargo
in 1807, cutting Europe off from the valuable neutral trade that had sustained belligerents and
neutrals during the war. The effects of the embargo on either belligerent power was minimal
compared to the ramifications in America. Some were infuriated by President Jefferson’s refusal
to go to war in response to the continued issue of impressment and the Orders in Council. Others
explicitly violated the embargo by dispatching their vessels before customs officials could
officially close the port, and by maintaining a steady traffic across the Canadian border.
Violations of the embargo due to the incompetence and corruption of customs officials
undermined the reputation of the American government at the same time that European powers
seemed to be strengthening controls over their own economies. While Britain’s West Indian
colonies subsisted on provisions coming from Canada, the U.S. government and economy
suffered from drastic price fluctuations, a monumental fall in customs revenue and an
increasingly divided United States.48
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Admiralty Court Evidence and the Reshaping of Neutral Identity
In December 1805, the American ship Baltic was captured and carried into Bermuda by a British
naval vessel. The ship’s supercargo, a naturalized Frenchman, claimed the vessel was en route to
Philadelphia from the Isle of Bourbon when it was seized. The supercargo defended the vessel
and cargo as the property of Richard Gernon of Philadelphia, an American citizen. After the
vessel was summarily condemned before the Vice-Admiralty Court of Bermuda, Gernon had his
British contact, William Vaughan, file an appeal in London where the case was again condemned
by the court in June 1809. The Lords of Appeal ruled in favor of the capture and were aided by
the precedent established by the Essex four years earlier. The captors provided three reasons for
the condemnation of the vessel: the property was the enemy’s; the real destination was Bordeaux
rather than Philadelphia; and the outward cargo was in ‘concealed’ contraband.
On the face of it, the story of the Baltic was a fairly straightforward one of neutrals
trafficking in enemy goods during the Napoleonic Wars: capture meant condemnation in a
hostile court. Yet the case of the Baltic tells us much about the nature of transatlantic commerce
and merchant identity in this period. First, despite a lengthy war depicted by many in apocalyptic
terms, this one case involved a British merchant, representing an American, who had hired a
French supercargo to trade with an enemy colony. The overlapping nationalities of the several
persons involved in the Baltic’s voyage testifies to the complexity of international commerce at a
time of stringent commercial regulation. Courts were aware of multinational deals involving
fellow countrymen, enemies and neutrals, but such deals only made classifying a cargo with a
certain nationality even more difficult. Secondly, the Baltic is important because of the
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arguments made by the captors in condemning the voyage. These arguments encompassed the
three main types of evidence impacting a voyage’s identity: the national character of the crew
and owner, the origin and destination of the vessel, and the origin of the cargo onboard. While
the totality of the evidence against the Baltic may have made for an easy condemnation, it also
revealed the many factors involved in negotiating an identity on the high seas. In interpreting this
evidence, the court made nationality even more amorphous by relying on motivation or
‘intention’ to act as their guide; interpreting evidence and condemning vessels based on where it
could potentially lead a voyage rather than any tangible proof.49
Given the increasingly restrictive policies of the British government with regard to
neutral trade, the conduct of the admiralty courts may appear less important in retrospect.
However, the contents of these decisions, and the weight of the evidence, offers insight into how
the admiralty court understood identity and legitimate commerce in this period. A closer analysis
of the different types of evidence that determined an admiralty court decision bears further
examination. The cases studied below reveal the degree of nuance and complexity in admiralty
court rulings. Looking more closely at admiralty court decisions also helps to explain the role
that ‘intention’ played in those rulings. These cases show that the admiralty courts constantly
adapted their understanding of the law to meet the commercial demands of Great Britain. The
language used in the vice-admiralty courts also reflects the ability of the superior courts to force
local institutions to uphold the latest precedents. It also shows how those superior court decisions
could be repackaged by vice-admiralty courts to meet local demands and uphold condemnations.
Finally, this section highlights the myriad of sources that affected the national character of a
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transatlantic voyage by studying the importance placed on a vessel’s origin and destination, the
identity of the crew, cargo and owner.
Before delving deeper into the evidence brought before the court, it is first necessary to
establish what types of evidence the court relied on in making its rulings. The examination of
witnesses was a standard part of any admiralty court case; sailors, captains, supercargoes and any
passengers on board the ship were all questioned by the court. While varying slightly from case
to case, witnesses were each given thirty-two questions encompassing the vessel’s ownership,
previous voyages, the national origin of the captain, the owner and the cargo, the destination of
the ship, and any information on the passengers and papers on board. Their responses were then
compared to the ship’s papers, which included: bills of lading, affidavits of the owners, customs
house clearances and any additional evidence submitted to the court. This systematic approach
ostensibly uncovered secret information about the voyage that the captain may have hidden from
the captors – a pursuit that became even more important once the court began to rely on intention
to interpret the evidence. While fairly uniform in their approach, these examinations could
produce startling discoveries in court, such as when a cook and mariner broke with the rest of
their crew to announce that the American ship, The Britannia, had been previously captured by a
British privateer in the West Indies, directly contradicting the testimony of their captain in open
court.50 In order to protect the legitimacy of a neutral voyage, the testimony of the crew had to
remain consistent, or the entire endeavor would fall apart.
The identity of the crew, vessel and owner was often the focus of debates over the proper
classification of neutrals in the admiralty courts. As shown in Chapter 3, the crews of merchant
vessels were much more diverse than strictly allowed under the law, especially in wartime.
50
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Occasionally, a too diverse crew could arouse the interest of the admiralty courts, provoking
greater scrutiny of the ship’s papers as in the case of the Thomas. The Thomas reportedly
possessed a multinational crew of all countries ‘except French’, which seems to have contributed
to the court’s suspicions of the ship in general. Nathan Perl-Rosenthal has further noted earlier
cases in 1746 and 1756 where the courts allowed privateers to seize ships based on the crew
complement, but such occurrences were rare.51 Rather, the nationality of the crew infrequently
determined the outcome of a prize case. In general, outside of the watchful gaze of the press
gang, the identity of the crew of a ship, including its master, was largely determined by the
national character of the ship and its owner. This approach to national belonging stood in stark
contrast to the intense debates surrounding the impressment of foreign seamen on American
ships. By situating nationality around the employer, the admiralty prize courts allowed for a
much more malleable conception of identity for sailors, while also relegating the role of sailors
in prize cases to the periphery in favor of the ship’s owner.52 In fact, the testimony of sailors
tended to only carry much weight in court when it contradicted that of the captain or the papers
found on board the ship as in the case of The Britannia.53 The admiralty court’s reliance on
merchant nationality, over the identity of the crew, further reflected an attempt to simplify and
organize a complicated and confusing system of international trade and finance; a trade which
overrode national borders and connected disparate individuals from throughout Europe and
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America. To determine the identity of a merchant, admiralty courts used residency as an
adaptable means of handling merchant migrations while also enforcing British policies on neutral
commerce.
Determining a ship’s national identity based on the residence of its owner appears as a
relatively simple endeavor. The testimony in court focused on the birth, current residence, and
marital status of the owner. Merchants could further submit affidavits and corroborating
documents in support of a claim on national identity. Yet matters became infinitely more
complicated when dealing with transatlantic partnerships and voyages conducted in wartime. In a
series of cases, Sir William Scott attempted to create a coherent doctrine of merchant identity
based around intention and residence. Scott argued that birth only determined national character
so long as the merchant continued to reside within his country of origin. If a neutral merchant,
for example, relocated to a belligerent country, his trade was liable to condemnation as he had
effectively transformed himself into an enemy subject. As in his other cases, Scott placed a
heavy emphasis on intention, arguing that a merchant must show signs of intending to relocate
from a belligerent country in order to maintain a neutral identity.54 Government officials were
not immune to this doctrine either. In the 1790s, Fulwar Skipwith, while serving as U.S. consul
at Martinique, saw his property captured and condemned because Skipwith, it was argued, had
become a French merchant through his trade in the French West Indies. Skipwith spent a decade
attempting to prove that he was an American citizen, but he was unable to offset the nearly
universal opinion that his trade had transformed his identity. As King’s Advocate in 1795, Scott
dealt personally with Skipwith’s case, where he opposed the appeal, stating “I cannot
recommend an appeal for I am of opinion that on any just & admitted principle of the law of
54
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nations, the property of Mr. Skipwith is liable to be considered and treated as the property of a
French merchant.”55 As judge of the High Court of Admiralty, Scott extended this view to
include British officials trading in foreign countries, arguing in 1802 that the British consul at
Embden should be considered German for the purposes of his trade on the continent.56
If state officials were not protected from these identity politics, private merchants were
even more exposed. The experience of George William Murray in two cases before the High
Court of Admiralty and the Lords of Appeal show the complex thinking of the courts in regard to
national origin. Murray was a naturalized American citizen, who, born in England, had relocated
to New York in 1784. Murray admitted in his court testimony that he had lived in Holland,
France, England and the United States in his commercial pursuits; though he had relocated his
wife and family to New York and expressed to the court a deep-seated desire to live in America
since childhood. Murray’s first case, the Harmony (1800), gave Scott an opportunity to discuss
his views on residence at length. In the Harmony, Murray was represented as a partner of an
American firm, residing in France. While the captors believed Murray’s birth in England was the
simplest route to condemnation, as they depicted him as a British merchant trading with the
enemy, Scott disagreed. He instead concluded that time was ‘the grand ingredient’ for
determining residence and merchant identity. After a thorough examination of the ship’s papers
and Murray’s letters to his brother and business partner, Scott believed that Murray showed no
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intention of leaving France and the cargo was condemned. While Scott attempted to use the
length of residence as the guiding doctrine in this case, the text of the judgment of the Harmony
reveals the court’s discomfort with the question of residence in international trading partnerships:
“The active spirit of commerce now abroad in the world, still farther increases this
difficulty [of determining residence] by increasing the variety of local situations,
in which the same individual is to be found at no great distance of time, and by
that sort of extended circulation, if I may so call it, by which the same transaction
communicates with different countries; as in the present cases in which the same
trading adventures have their origin (perhaps) in America, travel to France, from
France to England, from England back to America again, without enabling us to
assign accurately the exact legal effect of the local character of every particular
portion of this divided transaction.”57
Scott relied on time and intention for his ruling, deciding that Murray had ‘superadded’ a French
character onto his American identity and English birth. Once added, it appears that Murray’s
French character was very difficult to dispose of. Five years later, in the case of the Active (1805)
before the Lords of Appeal, Murray attempted to defend a shipment made from Bordeaux to
New Orleans in 1804. Having learned from his earlier experience in court, Murray claimed that
he had returned to America in 1800 after the failure of his previous house of trade. Murray had
only travelled to France in 1803 in order to complete some outstanding business, part of which
required the shipment of the cargo on the Active. Murray concluded his long accounting of his
life to the court with the statement that it was never his ‘intention’ to remain in France, actively
adapting the language of his earlier condemnation into his defense. Yet Murray’s captors and the
vice-admiralty courts had also learned from earlier precedents, and it was argued that the
Harmony had already established Murray’s residence in France “as to make his property liable to
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confiscation.”58 Despite having left France, traveled through Europe, returned to America and
ended his previous partnership, Murray was still French in the eyes of the court.59 Murray’s case
underscored the problems faced by the admiralty courts in determining identity, as well as the
growing limitations of the state to regulate global commerce through the narrow category of
national origin.
If the movements of merchants proved hard to classify, then deciphering a ship’s origin
and destination was often even more convoluted. Decisions based on destination stressed the
ability of identity to evolve in the middle of a voyage. In the post-Essex period, destination
became even more important as each belligerent attempted to blockade the sea and the land, and
the doctrine of the continuous voyage seemingly reigned supreme. Both the blockade and the
continuous voyage put a neutral’s motives at the center of the court. Relying on this ambiguous
form of evidence, admiralty court decisions attempted to systematize the use of intention by
focusing on the direction, destination and value of the voyage. In doing so, the court attempted to
make up for its uncertainty when dealing with ‘intention’ with strong language that claimed to
uncover the ‘real’, ‘ostensible’ and ‘bonâ fide’ meaning of the voyage.
As Scott had established in 1798, the violation of a blockade required proof of intention,
but this was particularly hard to prove when neutrals argued that a blockade did not even exist.
When the Admiralty proclaimed a blockade of the coasts of Martinique and Guadeloupe at the
start of the war in 1803, neutrals used Scott’s arguments to have the blockade countermanded.
James Madison, in a letter to Edward Thornton, the British Minister to the United States, argued
that the Martinique blockade lacked ‘sufficient force’ to cover the collective four hundred miles
58
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of coastline needed to legally blockade the two islands. In response, the British ministry
officially limited the scope of the blockade to the seizure of contraband and the blockade of
specific ports, but local vice-admiralty courts and privateers often ignored these orders in their
pursuit of neutral vessels.60
British privateers brought a series of neutral vessels in for adjudication for violating the
‘blockade’ of Martinique and Guadeloupe. Under interrogation, captains claimed to have heard
news that the blockade was raised, despite the claims of the privateers. Samuel Evans, captain of
the Samuel, reported that his ship had ‘found a good market’ at St. Pierre, Martinique,
successfully passing through the blockade without any interference from British vessels. Other
neutral ships captured by privateers echoed Evans’s testimony, reporting that their vessels had
easily accessed the port of St. Pierre; other neutral vessels were witnessed in the port; there was
no sign of any armed vessels in the area; and finally that their home government had not received
any notification of the blockade before they embarked on their voyages.61 In making these
arguments, American captains showed a sophisticated understanding of current admiralty court
precedents, repeating Scott’s doctrines back to the court when under interrogation. Despite these
claims, the papers of the Lords of Appeal show that several ships were condemned for violating
the blockade, and dozens of others were undoubtedly captured but never received a hearing.62
The treatment of these cases by the Lords of Appeal varied drastically. Samuel Evans’s ship,
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which entered Martinique on June 30, 1804, was restored on appeal, but the Robert which
arrived on May 21, 1804, was condemned, “because the blockade of Martinique was violated.”63
In all of these cases, the destination was not in dispute, but the meaning of the destination proved
to be a debatable point.
The court cases rested on the question of knowledge of the blockade and whether the
blockade was legally enforceable. In each case, the master and the crew consistently reported
their ignorance of the blockade. One crew member even helpfully suggested to the court that
perhaps his ship was actually seized because of the French property on board, rather than due to
a blockade violation.64 The captors in response, relied on the testimony of the local British
commander, Samuel Hood, whose orders filled the accompanying appendices to the blockade
cases. Yet Hood’s orders were broad and increasingly lacked definitive end dates and locations,
opening the cases up for interpretation.65 After the Essex, the courts tended to side with the local
commander on the question of whether a blockade was in force, but the debate in the viceadmiralty courts is nevertheless significant because it points to the ability of captured neutrals to
negotiate their cases through the language of the court. The testimony of the crew also calls
attention to the relative effectiveness of the Royal Navy, which could not enforce its claim to be
everywhere at once, often leaving ‘blockaded’ ports unguarded in pursuit of other goals.
The conduct of a vessel after it left port could also potentially transform its identity,
calling into question its intended destination. In 1806, the Osiris was captured on a voyage from
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New York to St. Thomas by the HMS Ethalion and carried into Antigua. The master of the
Osiris, John Morris, in his examination, stated confidently that St. Thomas was the destination of
his ship. Morris was able to name the merchants he expected to meet on the island, and claimed
to have known them for several years. Morris further claimed that he never deviated from his
course, “when the weather would permit,” and denied any allegation that he had ‘sailed wide’.
The testimony of the crew corroborated Morris’s claim that their destination was the Danish
West Indies and the ship had not altered its course to an enemy port. In response, the crew of the
Ethalion, in an affidavit, argued that the Osiris had deviated from its logical course. The captors
based their claim on their ‘judgments as seamen’ which they believed persuasively showed that
the path taken by the Osiris was ‘intricate and dangerous’ if the true destination was the Danish
West Indies.66

3. Map for the voyage of the Osiris (1806), provided by the crew of HMS Ethalion
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In defense of their claim, the captors compiled a map (see above) which outlined the two most
logical courses for the captured ship (no. 1 & 2) as well as the actual voyage of the Osiris (no. 3)
and the site of its eventual capture near the enemy island of St. Martin’s (no. 4). The captors
further argued that their ship was operating at the time under French colors, which they believed
encouraged the captain of the Osiris to “bring to sooner than he otherwise would.”67 The captors
concluded that it was the vessel’s ‘intention’ to enter St. Martin’s, and therefore condemnation
was warranted on the grounds that the vessel was carrying contraband (naval stores) and sailing
“under a false destination, to an enemy’s port.”68 Vice-Admiralty Court Judge Edward Byam
heard the case in August 1806, and accepting the map and the testimony of the Ethalion, Byam
declared the ship and cargo to belong to the enemy.69 Perhaps persuaded by the lack of any
documentary evidence to the contrary, the Lords of Appeal heard the case, nearly three years
later, and overturned the original verdict. The case of the Osiris showed how courts and captors
exploited the direction of a vessel to prove the true intention of a merchant voyage. Direction
could be ascertained from sailor’s experience and it did not necessarily depend on any
corroborating evidence. The captors’ preconceptions of Morris’s intentions, combined with their
knowledge of admiralty court precedents and the local waters, helped them to formulate a
persuasive case for the local court despite lacking any real evidence to prove their claims.
Finally, contraband had the potential to reshape a merchant voyage in the eyes of the
court. The definition of contraband in the eighteenth century was largely unsettled as neutrals
argued that contraband only covered war materials while belligerents viewed contraband as
extending to naval stores and even provisions. Neutrals carrying contraband were accused of
67
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providing ‘aid and comfort’ to the enemies of Great Britain, by allowing besieged ports to
continue to thrive despite the efforts of the Royal Navy. While the idea of ‘free ships make free
goods’ had largely fallen from favor, especially with the collapse of the last League of Armed
Neutrality in 1801, Americans still maintained their right to carry provisions and enemy colonial
produce to markets in the West Indies and Europe.70 After the Essex, British courts were liable to
view any goods coming from belligerent territories as the property of the enemy; there was in
fact a ‘legal presumption’ of guilt when dealing with questions of contraband.71
When J.W. Irwin’s ship, the Mary, was captured and carried into Bermuda in January
1807, he learned that the basis of his seizure stemmed from the value of his cargo. The captain of
the privateer explained that Irwin’s cargo would not pay for the expenses of the voyage if he
intended to trade at Jamaica, concluding that his cargo was instead meant for Saint-Domingue.
Corroborating this, a mate aboard the Mary confirmed the privateer’s suspicion that the ship was
really destined for Saint-Domingue. The sailor provided the additional claim that the ship was in
fact smuggling ammunition to the island. The captors proceeded to tear apart Irwin’s ship in
search of further proof of Irwin’s true “intention to smuggle the cargo into that island.”72 Irwin
was shocked by the seizure as his ship was in fact British, carrying on a trade between America
and the West Indies. Believing in the safety of his identity, Irwin wrote to his business contact
William Wallace (nephew of Nicholas Low and partner in the New York firm, Low & Wallace)
predicting that the ship would not be condemned on “the ridiculous information of this
scoundrel,” but he worried that the number of men on board and the arms on the ship would
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influence the court’s decision.73 Tentatively confident in the recovery of his ship, Irwin worried
that the delay of a trial would ruin his cargo. When the vessel was eventually condemned in
April, Irwin reported that the condemnation was based on two factors: the account of two mates
(one examined drunk) who based their testimony on rumors from the other members of the crew,
and a cargo that was inadmissible in Jamaica. In defense of his cargo, Irwin pointed to the
proclamation of Eyre Coote, Governor of Jamaica, on November 27, 1806, which allowed for the
importation of provisions into the island. Irwin complained that his counsel ignored this
argument in favor of claiming that the court could not try a smuggler without proof of
smuggling. In Irwin’s view, the evidence hardly mattered as the judge came to court with his
verdict already written down. Since Irwin’s barrister failed to take any notes during the trial,
Irwin was forced to scribble down the sentence for insurance purposes:
“…but taking all the circumstances into consideration such as her being a stout
built vessel, well-armed and strongly manned and every way calculated for the St.
Domingo trade and having a cargo on board which could not legally be imported
into Jamaica he should consider her as bound to some part of St. Domingo and as
such she must be condemned as being engaged in an illegal trade.”74

In the case of the Mary, the Vice-Admiralty Court of Jamaica chose to ignore the proclamation
of the island’s governor in favor of their own suspicions based on what was discovered aboard
the ship. The classification of the British ship’s cargo as French property had ramifications
beyond the courtroom because such a ruling could negatively affect the insurance policy on the
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voyage. Low & Wallace in New York learned that the North American Insurance Company, who
underwrote the policy, was prepared to withhold payment unless proof could be provided that the
cargo could be classified under the terms of the policy: ‘Goods per British Brig Mary’.75 If the
British Brig Mary was in fact French, the insurer was no longer liable to cover the claim. As the
case of the Mary shows, even beyond the courthouse, the reclassification of commodities could
have a real impact on merchant business.
When a cargo’s identity was not easily fixed, the court could split the national character
of a ship into multiple parts, reserving the right to condemn each part on its own merit. This
approach allowed the court to circumvent instructions sent by the Admiralty or even
proclamations of the local governor. The courts also maintained that if one part of the cargo was
enemy property, it could implicate the rest of the voyage in a scheme to fraudulently ship
belligerent goods under a neutral flag. This approach also helped to distinguish the different
parties involved in an individual merchant venture, further expanding on the layers of evidence
available to the court.
The division of the cargo based on ownership alone could quickly become extremely
complicated. In October 1805, the Adeline was captured in a voyage from Guadeloupe to New
York, its cargo on board, primarily sugar, was jointly owned by three New York firms: Nathaniel
and George Griswold, J. Macardier and Bertrand Dupoy. Further confusing the identity of the
property involved in this case, Bartlet Sheppard, the captain of the Adeline, worked for a separate
company, a Connecticut firm which owned the vessel engaged by the charter-party. Because of
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his temporary relationship with the merchants chartering the Adeline, Sheppard’s testimony was
vague and confused, often forgetting the names of individuals involved and even the amount of
cargo on board. When pressed, Sheppard was forced to refer the court to the ship’s papers on
numerous occasions.76 To simplify the case, the Vice-Admiralty Court at Nova Scotia split the
cargo into thirds: condemning Bertrand Dupoy’s share, requesting further proof for J. Macardier
and restoring the ship and the remaining cargo to the Griswold brothers. The case of the Adeline
shows the dangers of international commerce within a court system seeking to label individual
transactions with a particular identity. When captured by the British vessel, Captain Sheppard
was told that his ship had been stopped “on account of the vessel’s being chartered, and having
more cargo on board than she carried out.”77 When the case came before the Lords of Appeal,
the Lords decided in favor of the American merchants but ordered further proof to be made
within nine months for the property owned by Bertrand Dupoy. Dupoy’s inability to convince
the courts in Nova Scotia and London of the authenticity of his property seemed to stem from his
role in the charter party. The Adeline’s captain was able to tell the court more about the Griswold
brothers, who were connected to the owners of the ship, than he was about Dupoy himself.
Sheppard’s testimony on Dupoy rested only on his residence in New York as a merchant. Unable
to give any further information on the nature of Dupoy’s business, Sheppard again simply
referred to the ship’s papers and professed his ignorance. Other court records reveal that the
entire shipment was Dupoy’s idea, based around his connections to Deville & Rezeville in
Guadeloupe. Initially, Dupoy attempted to rectify the court’s doubts by submitting several
documents testifying to the various stages of the transaction and his own citizenship as an
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American, but it is unclear whether he ever won over the court as there does not seem to be any
record of further proof being provided.78
By focusing on the evidence used in admiralty court cases we can trace the effectiveness
of Sir William Scott’s doctrines and his reforms implemented in the vice-admiralty courts. While
the vice-admiralty courts continued to chafe against the latest Orders in Council and instructions
sent by the Admiralty, the records nevertheless reveal that the local courts were in an
increasingly dependent position. Tighter controls on the court led to judges who more closely
followed the language and tenor of the superior courts in their rulings. Echoing Scott, these
courts used ‘intention’ as their guide in scrutinizing evidence and determining the innocence of a
captured neutral ship. The Essex though showed that the local courts did not answer to Scott, but
rather to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, whose political agenda manipulated the
language of Scott’s decisions to safeguard the economic welfare of the British Empire. In doing
so, the courts continuously adapted their rulings to meet the complex strategies pursued by
neutrals in safeguarding their trade with the enemy.

Conclusion
In the years between the Essex and the Embargo, neutral merchants attempted to work within the
admiralty court system to defend their rights. Mobilizing the decisions made by Scott in 1798
and 1800, neutral merchants effectively defended their commerce from external attack. By
examining the records of the admiralty courts in detail, this chapter shows how captains, viceadmiralty court judges, and privateers participated in the debate over neutral commerce and the
development of international law. In 1805, the growth of the British state and the reinvigoration
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of the continuous voyage allowed for courts to once again redefine and condemn neutral
commerce based on its destination, ownership and property. By situating the interpretation of
evidence solely around hidden intentions, all evidence could be second-guessed and construed
into making neutral voyages appear sinister in the eyes of the court.
The measures taken by Britain, America and France from 1806-1809 laid the foundation
for an increasingly restrictive commercial system in the Atlantic World. If the years following
the Essex saw the gradual deconstruction of neutral identity, then the last six years of the war
would see a rapid expansion of British commercial identity to include anyone willing to pay for a
British license. As the next chapter reveals, after 1809 the British government implemented the
licensing of foreign ships to rapidly expand the umbrella of acceptable commerce to include
licensed neutrals. This system served to effectively engulf all transatlantic shipping within the
British commercial empire. The opening up of British merchant identity only came after the
admiralty courts had established the limits of legitimate commerce, classifying most neutral
activity as belligerent. The British institutionalization of the licensing system, and the
encouragement of neutral smuggling to the continent and the West Indies, allowed for a final
shift in Anglo-American identity. While some Americans were classified by the British state as
‘pseudo-neutrals’, or belligerents in disguise, the licensing system allowed for other Americans
to reenter the British Empire for a fee.

189

Chapter 5: Licensed American Traders, 1809-1815
By 1807 neutral commerce appeared to be at a standstill. In Europe, France’s Continental
System tightly controlled all foreign access to France, its territories and that of its allies.
Meanwhile, the British blockade of the Continent, under the Orders in Council, similarly limited
trade with Europe, preventing shipments to any port adhering to the Continental System.
The situation was little better in the West Indies. The Essex decision had ended the ‘broken
voyage’ and neutrals were now presumed guilty until proven innocent. Both France and Great
Britain separately targeted neutral shipping with great zeal, seizing any neutral vessel which had
come into contact the enemy. Believing that neutral trade was a potential a powder keg, Thomas
Jefferson instituted an embargo to prevent any American vessels from antagonizing the warring
parties into declaring war. American ships would remain home rather than become embroiled in
a foreign war.
Despite the best efforts of the French, British and American governments, commerce
persisted in the years of the war after 1807. Often, merchants simply subverted their own
country’s economic restrictions and worked closely with foreign business contacts to facilitate
the movement of goods. Essentially, this meant that every merchant operating in the Atlantic
World became a smuggler in order to maintain their business during the years of blockade and
embargo. States were complicit in this endeavor. The commercial system established in 1807
was the highest expression of mercantilist doctrine: all unlicensed foreign commerce was
declared illegitimate. States now claimed sweeping control over their borders and their subjects’
contact with foreign entities. These restrictive economic systems were not simply passive walls
blocking out the outside world. Instead, each state greatly expanded its regulation of commerce
by establishing licensing systems. Now, any merchant attempting to trade past a blockade was

forced to pay a fee and act as an official agent of the state. A license provided protection from
seizure by privateers and the navy, but this official sanction also transformed a merchant’s
identity. From the perspective of the licenser, purchasing a license was a public statement of
allegiance to the new commercial order. For other governments, license holders were simply
smugglers operating under a veneer of legitimacy. Licensing, in effect, blurred commercial
identity, making a single merchant at once: a foreign agent, a licensed smuggler, a loyal subject
and a traitor.
This chapter will examine the consequences of the licensed system for both international
commerce and popular conceptions of national identity. To do this, the chapter will focus on the
British licensing of foreign commerce at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. While France and
America also licensed certain trades in these years, the British system was by far the largest and
most sophisticated system in use. The chapter will begin by examining the divisive public debate
which licensing provoked. Licenses brought to the public mind questions about the nature of
allegiance, sovereignty, and commercial freedom. Few of these questions were easily answered,
and this debate set much of the groundwork for dividing the United States on the eve of the War
of 1812. The chapter will then focus on how licensing actually worked by examining two case
studies of the licensed trade: the American provisioning of the British army in Spain and
Portugal and the licensing of neutral commerce in the West Indies. Americans who helped
provision the British army, especially after 1812, were viewed as traitors by their fellow
countrymen, but the trade persisted and proved to be one of the most profitable transatlantic
trades during the war. The trade with Spain and Portugal reveals the commercial and political
consequences for merchants trading with the enemy under the license system. Finally, the trade
to neutral islands such as the Swedish island of St. Bartholomew’s represented the limitations
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and opportunities created by Great Britain’s licensed system for the Greater Caribbean. By
forcing merchants trading with neutral ports to operate under British licenses, the British
overrode the commercial sovereignty of other states. All commerce in the West Indies now fell
under the umbrella of the British empire’s license system. The Royal Navy’s unchallenged
control of the seas meant that neutral merchants required the tacit approval of the British
government to trade with the United States, Europe or the West Indies. On the other hand, the
British reliance on the island revealed the limitations of the new system. Much like St. Eustatius
during the American Revolution, St. Bartholomew’s served a pivotal role in moving goods and
information through the British empire. In relation to British licensing, St. Bartholomew’s was
emblematic of the larger flaws which had developed in the system as a whole. By 1809 the
empire was over-extended and had become largely unstable. The conquered Caribbean islands
created a hinterland where migrants, goods and ideas could slip past imperial barriers. During the
War of 1812, the holes created in Britain’s blockade at St. Bartholomew’s in the West Indies,
New London and New Haven on the eastern coast of the United States, and Passamaquoddy Bay
on the Canadian border continued to reveal how individuals contested the borders of Britain’s
new licensed empire.1
For almost a decade the licensing system transformed international commerce. Great
Britain and its dominions acted as the entrepôt for the world. All trade and even correspondence
required the empire’s approval. The licensing system had the potential to greatly expand the
British empire. In this sense, licensing was a mercantilist milestone in the final years of the
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Navigation Act. More importantly, the system offered an alternative view of mercantilism.
Rather than a restrictive system catering to the few who monopolized foreign trade, licensing
liberalized membership in the empire by granting access to any merchant willing to pay a fee.
The occasional licensing of vessels to trade with the enemy was a generally accepted
practice in early modern European warfare. For the French Revolutionary Wars, the British
government initially began licensing vessels for overseas trade in 1797 as a means of facilitating
their free port traffic with the Spanish West Indies.2 But it was not until 1806 that licensing took
on a new importance as a response to Napoleon’s Continental System. In the following years, the
number of licenses issued by the British government increased exponentially as a way around
Napoleon’s blockade. The government invested heavily in licensing with over 18,000 licenses
issued to merchants by 1810.3 Licensed trades were further encouraged by insurance companies
which insisted on licenses for policy-holders to guarantee that insured vessels obtained
protection from the Royal Navy while at sea. Despite political opponents who claimed foreign
licensing was an assault on national sovereignty, merchants recognized the appeal of purchasing
a license and safeguarding their shipments from capture. The cooperation of private
organizations and individuals with the state effectively placed most of the maritime trade in the
world under the stewardship of the British government and the Board of Trade.4
Historian’s treatment of the licensing system has been rather uniform over the last
seventy years. There are few book-length treatments of licensing. Instead, licensing is generally
2
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featured as a minor episode in the greater story of economic warfare between Britain and France,
or licensing is depicted as just another example of the internal division of the United States
during the War of 1812. While neither approach is inaccurate, both are limited in scope. The
majority of scholars have simply acknowledged what amounts to a startling fact about the British
empire under the licensed trade: commercial membership in the empire potentially included
everyone (outside of France) in the Atlantic World.
Scholarship on the impact of the licensed trade revolves around two main themes: how
licensing reshaped everyday commerce and how licensing served as a weapon of economic
warfare. These two interwoven ideas were first brought forward by Eli Heckscher in his
groundbreaking study of the Continental System. In Heckscher’s view, the licensing system was
the ultimate expression of mercantilism as it placed all foreign trade in the hands of the British
government. Licensing furthered the state’s mercantilist goals by placing a major emphasis on
exports. Further, license holders trading with Great Britain were required to export a sum of
equal value in order to guarantee a favorable balance of trade for the mother country.5 While the
French licensing system was an essential part of the ‘new order of things’, Heckscher believed
that British licensing was always strictly meant to be a response to the Continental System. In
making this distinction between British and French commercial philosophies, Heckscher seems
to have underestimated the extent to which licensing upended all trade during the war.
The claim that the licensing system was simply Britain’s most effective economic
weapon in the last years of the war has continued to preoccupy scholars. Yet, as a weapon, it
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remains unclear who the license system was actually meant to be directed against. Many have
argued that neutrals, rather than France, were the true target. Henry Bourguignon’s study of the
career of Sir William Scott concluded that the ministry quickly moved beyond France to create a
‘discriminatory’ system intended to enrich British businesses at the expense of neutral trade. In
contrast, others have argued that the license system was meant to absorb neutral trade rather than
destroy it. According to Stephen Neff, the license system was used to conscript neutrals into
working for the British government as “instruments of Britain’s economic warfare program.”6
Brian Arthur has recently combined these two earlier views in his study of Britain’s system of
economic warfare against the United States in the War of 1812. Arthur views licensing in tandem
with the system of blockades as an effective tool in restricting trade and making the American
economy heavily dependent on British licenses.7
Others have moved away from economic warfare to consider how licensing restructured
everyday trade for merchants operating in the Atlantic World. Placing the impressment
controversy on its head, Michael J. Crawford has emphasized how merchants and military
officers blurred the lines between English and American identity, turning travel on the high seas
into a ‘tragic comedy’ of mistaken identity.8 Faye Kert’s study of privateering during the War of
1812 illustrates the appeal of licensing for merchants. Kert argues that licenses were imminently
profitable for merchants because few vessels carrying licenses were ever captured and three6
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quarters of those seized were eventually released.9 Given that transatlantic merchants lacked few
alternatives by 1812, the temptation to license vessels under the British government was a
powerful one.
While most studies have acknowledged the similarities between the licensing policies of
Great Britain during the Napoleonic Wars and the old colonial system of pre-Revolutionary
America, none have really considered this idea in-depth. Nor has the scholarship on the licensing
system considered the full implications of licensing’s effect on identity and belonging in the Age
of Revolution. If admission to the empire required nothing more than the payment of a licensing
fee, then anyone trading in the Atlantic World could potentially claim the protections of a British
subject. This was recognized by many engaged in the licensed debate at the time. In an editorial
featured in the Massachusetts Republican Spy, the danger licensing posed to national allegiance
was spelled out to the reader: “In getting and submitting to this license, we surrender our
independence to king George, &c renounce the name and title of freemen.”10 The mundane
purchase of a shipping license was in fact a transformative moment for the vessel and its owner.
Licensing not only transformed individual merchants, it also reshaped all foreign
commerce by drastically altering the flow of traffic and manipulating the importance of markets.
Licensing forcefully opened up the closed Continental System to trade with the outside world.
As Silvia Marzagalli has recently explained, the Continental System only occasionally brought
maritime trade to a standstill, instead, it “diverted maritime trade routes more than it stopped
trade entirely.”11 The ports of Hamburg, Malta, Heligoland, Gothenburg and Gibraltar gained
unparalleled importance as the British exploited these ports as holes in Napoleon’s system. To
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trade with Europe, a merchant was forced to either smuggle goods past French customs officers
or take the more dangerous route of circumventing the Royal Navy’s blockade. At Heligoland,
the most important port in Northern Europe during the Continental System, merchants brought
goods to the small island for re-export to the Continent. Over 200 British merchants relocated to
the island, establishing 140 warehouses to support their booming trade.12 An Order in Council of
May 30, 1809, confined the Heligoland trade to British ships and British license-holders. By
limiting this smuggling trade to those who purchased a license, the ministry ensured the
popularity of their new licensing scheme. Demand for licenses was so great that the government
invested the British governor of Heligoland with the power to issue licenses - a power strictly
confined to the crown as it authorized trade with the enemy.13
For the British empire, the license system largely replaced the occasional proclamations
issued by colonial governors to allow foreigners past Britain’s Navigation Act. During the War
of 1812 the Board of Trade opened Bermuda to a licensed trade with the United States in neutral
vessels. Bermuda would act as an entrepôt to the rest of the British West Indies, funneling
American flour to where it was most needed, often directly supplying the Royal Navy which was
currently fighting American privateers in the Caribbean. Further licenses were granted to protect
vessels conveying American flour from Bermuda to Barbados, and for shipping coffee and sugar
from Bermuda to the United States.14 By designating one port of entry and controlling the trade
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with licenses, the British could closely monitor access to their colonial possessions and avoid the
mercantilist headaches associated with previous American trades. The actions of the Board of
Trade were the culmination of the stricter regulations issued to colonial authorities over the
previous decade.15 Rather than sporadic exceptions to the rule, which might weaken the
effectiveness of Britain’s mercantile policies, licensing allowed for a more coherent approach to
commercial regulation.16 All foreign vessels were now suspect, and only license holders were
allowed to navigate the seas ‘freely’.
In 1809, the admiralty court case of the Goede Hoop provided the government an
opportunity to explain the license system to the rest of the commercial world. In his ruling for the
case, Sir William Scott explained that licenses were traditionally given only as special exceptions
to the general prohibition against trading with the enemy. However, Napoleon’s Continental
System had changed the general practice of war. Napoleon was accused of targeting commerce
in general and removing the neutral ports that Great Britain relied on in wartime.17 Rather than
documents of ‘special and rare indulgence’, licenses would now be granted “with great liberality
to all merchants of good character,” in order to support Britain’s overseas commerce. As there
were few neutrals left in Europe, Scott understood that the license trade required that British
merchants partner with the enemy. Scott further claimed that such transactions required absolute
secrecy in order to sidestep Napoleonic customs officials. Finally, Scott used the Goede Hoop to
later licenses see, Board of Trade, 29 Sept. 1812 and 6 Oct. 1812, BT 5/21; For the expansion of these policies, see,
Board of Trade, 6 Oct. 1812, BT 5/21.
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bolster the power of the British ministry; he argued that the crown had sole authority in issuing
licenses, and that the court did not have the power to reinterpret licenses beyond the text of the
document.18 With this case, Scott established that Britain’s overseas trade for the length of the
war would entail a full-scale smuggling operation, conducted under a veil of secrecy, and
legitimized by the government through the issuing of licenses to enemy ships.
Some historians have noted that the willingness of the government to adapt to changing
situations, and continue to reform the inner-workings of the empire, is evidence of the strength of
mercantilism at this late date.19 Yet the demands of the licensing system forced the British
government to legalize illegal trades which violated traditional commercial principles. When the
British Consul at Boston, Andrew Allen, illegally issued his own licenses to American merchants
in 1812, Sir William Scott admitted that Allen’s actions violated the “friendly and peaceable
nature of an ambassador,” by encouraging Americans to trade with the British in a time of war.
However, the Orders in Council of October 13 and 26, 1812, retroactively legalized Allen’s
actions and secured a valuable trade for the British armies battling Napoleon in Spain.20 Laws
were rewritten to support the new system and justified as a necessary war measure. The
adaptability of the commercial system actually weakened the laws which undergirded the
Navigation Act.
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Licensing also had unforeseen consequences by establishing a market for British identity.
Licenses, both counterfeit and legitimate, were sold throughout Europe, Britain and America.
The purchaser of a British license was allowed to enter the British empire and trade with Great
Britain and even the enemy. While the system aimed to control the totality of international
shipping, it was never fully consistent. There were several types of licenses offered to
enterprising merchants. Licenses issued by the Board of Trade were known as ‘Sidmouth’s’ and
‘Prince Regents’. These licenses, technically, were the only documents that could legally permit
a British subject or ally to trade with Britain’s enemies. However, the Board of Trade failed to
anticipate the demand for licenses and numerous other governmental authorities began issuing
new licenses to any merchant looking to temporarily work for the British government. As noted
above, the British governor at Heligoland issued his own licenses, but these were at least
authorized by the Board of Trade. When the War of 1812 began there was a flood of new
licenses issued by admirals, ambassadors and consuls looking to secure supplies from America
despite the war. The first among these was the British Minister to America, Augustus Foster,
who began issuing licenses in early 1812. Foster was soon followed by Vice-Admiral Sawyer,
commander-in-chief of the North American Station, who issued his own licenses when war
broke out with the United States in 1812. Sawyer was concerned about maintaining the flow of
grain to Britain’s military forces on the Spanish Peninsula so he took it upon himself to issue
licenses. In doing so, Sawyer drafted British Consul Andrew Allen to help distribute licenses.
Allen himself began issuing his own licenses by reinterpreting a letter of instruction sent to him
by Sawyer.21
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To further complicate the world of licensed trade, the French government began
providing their own licenses to compete with the profits brought in by the British. Napoleon’s
licensing system was never as effective as its British counterpart, suffering from bureaucratic
inconsistencies and extreme micromanagement. The French government even attempted to
control commerce by designating ‘good cities’ in America (New York, Boston, Baltimore and
Charleston) that the French would trade with and even ‘good cargoes’ by banning all West
Indian produce.22 Added to this, French licenses were used as a means of extortion for captured
American vessels held in French ports. Rather than dealing with complicated questions of
blockade and neutral rights, the French government now seized cargoes based on a much simpler
premise: whether the ship possessed a French or British license. For the French, a system of strict
licensing provided a means of capturing unauthorized vessels without further justification. Yet
this was also the system’s greatest weakness. In America, French licenses hurt the standing of
the French government by providing further ammunition for British diplomats. The British used
French licenses to justify their own licensing system as well as proof that Napoleon had failed in
his promise to repeal the Berlin and Milan decrees.
By 1814 the British licensed trade with the enemy had ended. As Napoleon lost control
over the annexed territories after the disastrous 1812 campaign, the Continental System
collapsed and licensing went with it. Meanwhile, the whole of the American coast was under a
strict blockade by the Royal Navy, which resulted in an end to new licenses issued to American
merchants. A variety of factors contributed to the end of the license system. Peace in Europe
limited the demand for American foodstuffs. Also, the opening of the Baltic provided an
22
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alternative source of lumber and provisions for British forces. Finally, the British government
decided that it was no longer politically profitable to encourage divisions in America by
licensing merchants to trade with their nation’s enemy. Though the height of the licensing
system only lasted seven years, in that time the British arguably managed to do more to
undermine their navigation system than all of the unregulated American commerce since the end
of the War of Independence.

Debating the License System
From the start licensing during the Napoleonic Wars was controversial. Opposition to licensing
brought together disparate groups in both the United States and Great Britain who feared the
potential consequences of merchants purchasing a new identity. American opponents of the
licensing system viewed it as a threat to national sovereignty. They openly questioned the loyalty
of anyone who would betray their country for profit. Ship-owners throughout Britain worried
over the potential economic losses for their industry if the government protected foreign shipping
from seizure. Essentially, the British ship-owners believed that the empire had overreached and
that the Navigation Act would suffer for it.
In Britain, opposition to the licensing system came swift and early. Lord Sheffield’s
vigorous defense of the Navigation Act in 1804 proved to be an early warning against the future
license trade. Sheffield warned that for the mere price of £10 foreign entrepreneurs could bring
about a ‘suspension’ of the Navigation Laws. Speaking of licenses and governor’s proclamations
in the same instance, Sheffield claimed that loosening the effectiveness of the Navigation Act
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would ultimately open the door to smugglers and the enemy.23 For many, Sheffield’s warnings
were prophetic. Joseph Phillimore argued in an 1811 pamphlet that Britain was now completely
dependent on foreign ships for its trade with Europe. Phillimore took the unique approach of
defending at the same time the rights of neutrals and the importance of maintaining the
Navigation Act. Phillimore abhorred the immorality of investing in a trade based entirely on
deception.24 In two separate pamphlets, Joseph Marryat similarly warned that licensing was too
unregulated. Licenses effectively broke down the legal distinction between British and foreign
ship-owners and created too many exceptions to Britain’s vital Navigation Act.25 In sum, all of
these pamphleteers believed that the British government was guilty of violating its own
commercial laws. Further, they accepted the notion that Britain’s prosperity was inextricably tied
to its adherence to the Navigation Act. Finally, they believed that tradition – rather than
innovation – would save Britain from Napoleon.
The pamphleteers were joined by members of the British shipping interest who
reasonably saw foreign license holders as a threat to their industry. In 1810 the Merchants and
Ship-Owners of Hull sent a petition to the Board of Trade requesting the immediate end to
licensing. When the Board failed to act, the Hull Merchants continued to meet and discuss the
dangers that licensing posed. In 1812 the Hull Merchants convened a meeting at the local
guildhall to consider further opposition to the license system. At that meeting, the ship-owners
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complained that licensed ships were draining bullion from the country. Worse still, these ships
were carrying saltpeter straight to the guns of the enemy. The assembly voted to submit a new
petition, this time to Parliament, seeking redress.26
In Parliament, MP Brougham agreed with the ship-owners’ sentiments. Brougham noted
the numerous bankruptcies that had occurred since the Orders in Council, he then argued that the
license trade had greatly diminished British tonnage while at the same time offering employment
for enemy sailors. Brougham also revealed that the system was managed so poorly that a clerical
error had resulted in increasing the worth of a license to £15,000.27 Brougham’s points were
keenly felt by many in government, but nevertheless licensing continued unabated until 1814. As
Sir William Scott had explained in the Goede Hoop, licensing was an exceptional response to the
economic situation brought on by Napoleon’s commercial system. As a weapon of economic
warfare, licensing could not be simply abandoned until the war was won.
If the British government was unwilling to stop the license trade, some in America
believed that they could convince potential customers to boycott licenses. Given the United
States’ tumultuous relationship with Great Britain by 1809, it is unsurprising that opposition on
the other side of the Atlantic was much more virulent. In America, the debate over the licensing
system centered around questions of national sovereignty and personal loyalty. The tone for this
debate was set by President James Madison in March 1809. Just a few days into his first term,
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Madison described licensing as a ‘tribute’ to a system of ‘usurpation and monopoly’.28 If
licensing was a weapon, Madison believed that it was pointed directly at America rather than
France. As such, the harsh language employed by Madison and his political allies only became
more severe when America went to war with Great Britain in 1812.
The general theme of the opposition in America was that licensing was a re-imposition of
the old colonial system. Newspaper editorials called Britain the ‘tyrant of the ocean’, and
accused its officials of running a ‘piratical government’.29 There was a general fear that British
influence was infecting American political culture. Since the start of the French Revolution,
national politics had adopted an internationalized discourse, wherein political opponents were
decried as secretly ‘French’ or ‘British’. The license system heightened the rhetoric as some
Americans were now actively working for the interests of the British government.30 The sale of
licenses provided fodder for conspiracy theories which claimed that America was suffering from
a subversive British influence. Responding to the Orders in Council, the Washington National
Intelligencer in 1808 complained that the British had overtaken American culture: “Everything
now-a-days is to be British. Our coats are to be British. Our laws are British. Our busiest
politicians are British. The law of nations is to be British. The very beverage which an American
sips at his morning’s repast or evenings’ recreation, is also to be British.”31 Now, the paper
warned, the British were threatening the freedom of the seas by requiring licenses for all
shipments to the empire. Once war broke out between the two nations the British influence over
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American daily life only became more sinister. The news that American merchants were
smuggling provisions to the British army in Canada and that licensed American traders were
shipping goods to British forces in the West Indies and Europe, led one newspaper to proclaim:
“down down with the tories the Anglo-American tories!”32
As in Britain, there were also several petitions sent to the U.S. government in opposition
to British licensing. The ‘Citizens of the first Congressional District of the State of Pennsylvania’
submitted an address to Madison in 1810 supporting armed resistance and swearing, “That the
commerce of the United States ever has and ever shall under Providence be conducted without a
British License and without the protection of the British Navy.”33 Similar sentiments were
repeated by the citizens of Richmond, Watertown, and even at a meeting of Massachusetts
Republicans.34 The general consensus was that a British license was a ‘tribute’ to a foreign
nation at a time when neutral rights were ‘trampled upon’. Petitioners called on Congress to act
by prohibiting the license trade, and punishing license-holders. Some even concluded that the
only solution to the license problem was an embargo or war.
From the very beginning, Republicans in Congress were deeply opposed to the license
trade. Republicans believed that licensing would solidify the Orders in Council and allow Great
Britain to claim sole dominion over transatlantic commerce. In March 1809, Congress
considered the extreme measure of stripping American license-holders of their citizenship.
However, Congress’s willingness to act did not necessarily guarantee results. Many in Congress
were concerned about whether they possessed the legal authority to disenfranchise citizens but
they nevertheless saw the debate as a form of protest against foreign encroachment. By pushing
32
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for a disenfranchisement bill, Congress was also offering a tacit acknowledgment of Napoleon’s
claim in the Berlin and Milan Decrees that inappropriate contact with the British had the
potential to ‘denationalize’ a vessel.35 The bill quickly passed the House of Representatives, but
it stalled in the Senate and debate over licensing continued. Other punitive bills similarly
stumbled over the question of whether to oppose all licenses on principle or simply licenses
forced on American commerce by the British.36
When the war with Britain began, matters only became worse. There was a steady
movement for the first year of the war to once again punish any American who obtained a British
license. License takers were viewed as traitors who had thrown their lot in with the enemy. In the
lead up to the war, the editor of the American Advocate proclaimed that license holders were
“Englishmen, and ought to be so treated on every occasion.”37 Prompted by Madison’s charge to
Congress to stop a “corrupt and perfidious intercourse with the enemy,” legislation was finally
passed by the Thirteenth Congress to ban the use of enemy licenses in 1812.38 Rather than
disenfranchisement, Americans found in possession of a license would be found guilty of a
misdemeanor and forfeit twice the value of the licensed cargo. These measures were only
partially effective at stopping the license trade, and Congress was forced to rely on a new
embargo to stop the tide of British goods flooding into America.39
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For merchants’ ships at sea, the debate over licensing had an immediate effect. American
privateers swarmed into the Atlantic searching for prizes during the war. While their principal
targets were valuable British convoys, the privateers held particular scorn for American licenseholders. Readers of Niles Weekly Register, a Baltimore paper, were able to track the progress of
these privateers each week as more American vessels were brought in for possession of a British
license. The publisher, Hezekiah Niles, labeled these vessels ‘semi-American’ and eagerly
documented each capture for his readers along the following lines: “Ship St. Lawrence, from
England, with a British license full of most valuable British goods, worth from 3 to 400,000
dolls. captured by an Eastern privateer and sent into Portsmouth, NH where she was condemned.
The vessel and property is affected to have been American.”40 From Niles’s perspective, these
vessels had lost their American identity by adopting a British license. To further prove that
license-holders were ‘traitors’, Niles recounted how American privateers would pretend to be
British sea captains in order to lure a captured vessel into revealing its true identity. One captain
not only showed his license but told the American privateer that he had supplied specific British
naval ships with provisions, admitting “that he had no doubt if he fell in with an American
privateer he should be hung.”41 Niles undoubtedly agreed with the ship’s captain, as he made it
his mission to convince his readers that license holders were traitors who worked for the British
military against their own country. For proof of their complicity, Niles printed the entire text of a
license issued to an American merchant:
“By Herbert Sawyer, esq. Vice-admiral of the Blue, and commander in chief of
his majesty’s ships and vessels of war employed, in the river St. Lawrence, along
the coast of Nova-Scotia, in the islands of Anticoste, Madelaine, St. John, and
cape Breton, and the bay of Fundy, and at and abound the islands of Bermuda or
40
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Somers-Islands, &c &c Whereas, Mr. Andrew Allen, his majesty’s consul at
Boston has recommended to me Mr. Robert Elwell, a merchant of that place AND
WELL INCLINED TOWARDS THE BRITISH INTEREST, who is desirous of
sending provisions to Spain and Portugal, for the use of the allied armies in the
Peninsula; and whereas I think it fit and necessary that encouragement and
protection should be afforded him in so doing.”42
For Niles, the implication was clear: license-holders worked for the ‘British interest’. He warned
his readers to be wary as the seacoasts of America were now infested with traitors.
Licensing split many American merchants from their fellow countrymen. This was
mainly due to a general underlying uncertainty regarding whether the licensed trade with the
enemy was genuinely treasonous. Despite the rhetoric of pamphleteers and newspaper editors,
the American government desperately needed the customs revenue provided from foreign trade.
Further, Congress failed to act on the licensing trade for the first year of the war – an indication
that even American officials were uncomfortable condemning all licensed trades outright.43 The
British picked up on the opportunity offered by this internal division and began favoring the New
England states during the war in order to encourage further discord. A report provided to
Secretary of State Earl Bathurst stated confidently that “Great Britain has many friends in the
United States…Those friends principally inhabit the Northern and Eastern states.”44 This advice
was clearly taken to heart, as the British held off on blockading New England until the end of
1814. Up until this time, licenses were still issued to ‘the Eastern states exclusively’ as a measure
meant to divide the nation commercially as well as militarily.45
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What is most striking about the debate over licensing in the Atlantic World is that
licensing came at a time of increased suspicion of a state’s own subjects. Since the outbreak of
the French Revolution, political discourse was largely defined by the detection of foreign
influence. The Continental System itself was based on the idea that contact with an enemy
infected a neutral, turning neutral ships into belligerents.46 In the licensing years, these ideas
continued to spread, despite the increase in the number of foreign traders within the British
empire. Official reports from British North America indicated that a secret cabal of French spies
and American ‘emissaries’ were working to stir up rebellion among the Native American tribes.
And such suspicions also persisted in the West Indies where the Governor of Bermuda
complained on several occasions to the British ministry that his opposition in the House of
Assembly was primarily American in principle and education.47 Meanwhile, American
newspapers continued to lament the failure of the American criminal code to punish ‘traitors and
spies’ in their midst.
There were those on both sides of the Atlantic who defended the license system as a
reasonable solution to wartime circumstances. Officially, the British ministry claimed that the
license system was not intended to force all neutral traffic through the empire. Instead, Lord
Castlereagh informed the British Minister to America Augustus Foster that the official position
of the government was that the license system was meant as a favor to neutral business during
the blockade of the Continent. Castlereagh even authorized Foster to offer the Americans an end
to the license system if they agreed to “the principle of rigorous blockade against the French
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dominions to the exclusion of our own trade equally with that of neutral nations.”48 The
government may have offered to exchange one weapon for another, but their proposal would
never have been accepted by the American government. Such an agreement would have ended
all American trade with the Continent until Napoleon repealed the Berlin and Milan Decrees,
effectively forcing America to side with Great Britain during the war.
Even in America, some publicly defended British licenses as a necessary medicine to
fight off “the invincible Herald of Lucifer (the French emperor)…”49 Further, it was
acknowledged that licensing had already become a universal practice during the war so
opposition was pointless. As an American newspaper explained, there was little Americans could
do about licensing: “the practice prevails in Europe in the most powerful nations. Numerous
French vessels carry on trade under English licenses, and almost innumerable English vessels
prosecute a very beneficial commerce with French licenses; and thus submit to circumstances.”50
When Congress considered further penalties for Americans taking licenses, it was pointed out
that licensing was simply a product of the war, and that Britain had every right to seize ships
trading with the enemy. If the whole commercial world accepted licensing, then America only
hurt itself by refusing to participate.51
The debate over licensing, then, highlighted both the dangers and opportunities that
licenses offered. Licenses made trade more versatile and malleable, transforming neutral cargoes
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into protected British property on the high seas. After commercial restrictions in Europe all but
ended the profitability of transatlantic commerce, licenses offered a means of survival for
American merchants during the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809 and the war. As the British
government had sole control over the trade, there were more opportunities for American business
under the licensing system. Through licensing, Americans traded with Nova Scotia and New
Brunswick, the British West Indian islands, Spain and Portugal, and the markets of Europe
through the ports of Malta and Heligoland. Yet all of this trade provoked troubling questions
about whether an American merchant could remain American while in possession of a British
license. Many in the press denied this dual identity, but the trade nevertheless flourished as no
one seemed at all certain what it actually meant to be a licensed American trader.

Wartime Commerce and Licensed American Traitors
In order to better understand the role of licensing in transforming transatlantic commerce, this
section looks at the licensed trade of Thomas Handasyd Perkins to Spain and Portugal during the
Peninsular War and the War of 1812. Finally, the section then turns to the experience of
American and neutral merchants who invested in licensed shipping to the neutral island of St.
Bartholomew’s. Perkins and his fellow merchants were forced to navigate the complicated and
controversial licensing system that had turned the commercial world on its head. For years,
neutral merchants exploited loopholes and inconsistencies in the law in order to carry on their
trade with the British empire. Licensing changed everything by strictly defining all legal
commerce rather than merely focusing on what constituted an illegal trade. Now that all
unlicensed trades were illegal, merchants were forced to purchase licenses in order to protect
their businesses. The licensing system offered merchants like Perkins the chance to earn a
fortune in a closed economic system, but its complete dependence on the goodwill of the British
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government was a severe burden for ships trading with the enemy. When new blockades were
announced or licensed markets were glutted with provisions, commerce was at a standstill.
Licensing may have opened up the empire to foreign trade, but it also forcefully eliminated the
freedom of the seas.
The firm of J & T.H. Perkins was well-placed to take advantage of the licensed trade.
Thomas Handasyd Perkins, who was a member of Boston’s elite merchant class, founded the
firm in 1792 with his brother to take advantage of the Haitian Revolution and to pursue a
profitable trade with China. Along with establishing businesses in new markets, the firm
maintained important contacts in Asia, the West Indies, and Latin America throughout the
Napoleonic Wars.52 The firm’s diverse business interests may have contributed to its survival
during the embargo and the war, but access to so many markets required the firm to base much
of its business around smuggling past foreign and U.S. customs officials. Perkins’s commercial
correspondence is full of references to ‘Spanyardize’ American ships, English manufactures
transformed into French products, and a heavy trade in false origination papers, passports, and
flags. Given the firm’s history and business practices, the adoption of British licenses was a
natural evolutionary step in the pursuit of new markets for Perkins’s goods.53
Since 1809 Spain and Portugal were the most important consumers of American grain
exports. The Iberian Peninsula was always an important trading partner for American grain (with
125,000 barrels shipped in 1805) but Britain’s invasion of the Peninsula in 1808 and the
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devastating war that followed created heightened demand for provisions to feed the army as well
as the local populace.54 After an initial decline during Jefferson’s embargo, American shipments
strongly recovered by 1809. By 1811 over 2,000 American ships carried 835,000 barrels of grain
into Iberian ports. A number which just increased the following year to 938,000 barrels. Despite
the British occupation, Spain and Portugal were viewed by the American government as neutrals
rather than British allies. Making Spain and Portugal neutral allowed American merchants to
continue selling to the Peninsula during the Non-Intercourse Act and even during the War of
1812. Iberian neutrality, however, was complicated by the fact that the entire American grain
trade was licensed by the British government and directed towards supporting the British army
fighting Napoleon.55
For American merchants, the day to day provisioning of Spain and Portugal was in many
ways very similar to previous disasters Americans had profited from. Merchants received news
from European contacts about the state of the market, often searching their letters for keywords
such as ‘scarcity’ or ‘famine’ and ‘high prices’ to determine the profitability of the trade. As
T.H. Perkins proudly stated to Richard S. Hackley in Cadiz, “From the scarcity of flour in the
Mediterranean and the state of the crops in Spain & Portugal, we feel persuaded a saving price
will be found for our shipments.”56 Commercial news was structured to provide such valuable
information to merchants. When the New York Evening Post reported on the latest military
events in Spain the paper analyzed the activity of the army and the actions of the government,
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then an economic conclusion was provided for the reader: “Rice is in brisk demand, as it is
generally understood that Spain will be in great want of provisions, and a considerable advance
has taken place.”57 The demands from Spanish and Portuguese markets created a convenient hole
in the Royal Navy’s blockade of the Continent, but enterprising merchants quickly learned that
official British licenses would be required by all merchants looking to exploit this latest
opportunity.
The majority of the trade to the Peninsula went through commissioned merchants
appointed by the British government to negotiate contracts with flour merchants in America. The
most prominent of these commissioned merchants was F.T. Sampayo, a Portuguese subject, who
served as a British agent for supplying the army, and William Wood the former Consul at
Baltimore. Overwhelmed by the demands from the Peninsula, Sampayo and Wood worked
closely with American merchants to consign shipments to Spain and Portugal. Sampayo and
Wood’s business faced a hurdle: to facilitate the traffic in American provisions, licenses were
necessary, but the only legal authority which could grant new licenses was the Board of Trade.
When America declared war on Great Britain, it was no longer clear whether new licenses would
be issued. In order to expedite the shipment of grain, Vice-Admiral Sawyer in August 1812 acted
on his own authority and granted 180 licenses to any vessel willing to carry provisions. The
majority of these licenses were sent to Sampayo and Wood for distribution to American
merchants willing to send supplies to the Peninsula.58
Since 1811 Perkins had partnered with the Boston-London firm of Higginson & Co. to
carry on a trade with the Peninsula. Recognizing the value of this business, Perkins even
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maintained a constant agent at Cadiz to protect his interests and provide him with the latest news
about the state of the market. Perkins was very aware that his business depended on the active
military presence of the British army. The army was the determining factor in predicting the
swings of the market, as Perkins explained in a letter to his agent Richard Hackley in June 1811:
“Were we confident that GB would still continue her armies in Portugal & her fleet in the ports
of Cadiz & Lisbon; we should not hesitate to make large contracts for flour & wheat deliverable
in October.”59 A month later, Perkins wrote to Hackley again, this time he observed with
satisfaction that recent battles between the two clashing armies had devastated the Iberian
countryside. Perkins believed the labor shortage and crop damage from the war would diminish
Spain’s agricultural output, creating scarcity and heightening demand. Perkins concluded his
letter by promising to continue shipping provisions to the Peninsula into the winter.60
America’s war with Britain in 1812 was accompanied by new commercial concerns.
Perkins worried that the war with Great Britain might interrupt his steady trade with the
Peninsula. He firmly believed, though, that the “cruisers of GB would not interrupt supplies
intended for the suffering inhabitants of Spain & Portugal.”61 Despite his concerns about the
heightened potential of capture, Perkins continued to invest heavily in the trade to the Peninsula,
sending 8,000 barrels of flour in September 1812 alone.62 To protect his shipments, Perkins
needed to acquire new licenses, as any British licenses issued before the start of the war were
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now invalid.63 After his vessels were captured, the importance of having adequate documentation
became paramount. But the licensing of ships was never a perfect safeguard against capture and
condemnation. By the end of 1812 Perkins had received news that several of his vessels were
captured. Each ship carried a British license at the time of capture, and their stories show the
dual dangers of licensed shipments during the war. The Ariadne was captured and tried in the
United States for trading with the enemy. The Miser and the Topaz were captured at Gibraltar for
failing to immediately produce a license when stopped. These cases all illustrate the inherent
dangers merchants faced in investing in a trade consumed by mutual suspicion and complicated
questions about allegiance and legitimate commerce.
On October 15, 1812, Perkins’s ship the Ariadne, was captured while en route to Cadiz
by the U.S. Brig Argus commanded by Arthur Sinclair. The Argus approached the Ariadne under
British colors and convinced the master to reveal his license. Though the ship was captured and
tried for possessing a British license, this did not stop the prize crew put on board the Ariadne
from using Perkins’s license on the voyage home in order to escape British cruisers. Henry
Denison, the leader of the prize crew, informed the Secretary of the Navy that the captured ship
escaped two British cruisers “by making use of the license and a little finesse.”64 The multiple
identities exploited in the taking of the Ariadne shows the fluidity and malleability of national
identity under the licensed trade – even the U.S. Navy became temporarily British to protect their
prize and crew.
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At trial, the case of the Ariadne also provides an excellent illustration of the potential
dangers Americans faced in their own country while attempting to maintain their overseas
businesses during the war. When the war began, Perkins was concerned about the risks posed by
British cruisers. Just a few short months later, his ship was now held captive by his own navy.
Along with Perkins, other elite Boston firms had placed cargoes on board the ship, including:
Thomas C. Amory and Company, Nathaniel Goddard, Samuel G. Perkins and Company, Samuel
May, Thomas Parsons and William Parsons. The trial largely focused on the national character of
the Ariadne and its intended customers. The voyage was justified by the Boston merchants in
court as a purely neutral transaction, despite the British license. It was pointed out that since very
few of the ‘enemy’ remained in Cadiz after the recent siege, the ship’s provisions were really
meant for the distraught populace rather than the British army. In summation, the claimants for
the Ariadne argued that a shipment of flour to a neutral port was “as innocent as a voyage from
Baltimore to Boston.”65 For the district court, the arguments pursued by Perkins and the other
merchants behind the Ariadne were convincing and the ship was restored. The captors, however,
were not so easily defeated. The case was then appealed to the circuit court, the original ruling
was overturned and the ship was condemned. In 1817, the case of the Ariadne reached the
Supreme Court for a final decision. The Supreme Court upheld the circuit court’s decision,
basing their ruling on the principle that: “A voyage prosecuted in furtherance of the enemy’s
interests is undoubtedly illegal…”66 Without contrary evidence, the court presumed that any
vessel in possession of a British license was acting in the interests of the enemy. The court’s
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ruling also indicates that licenses remained controversial in America long after the end of
hostilities between Great Britain and America.
The courts’ assumptions about British licenses and the complicity of American merchants
did not stop the grain shipments to Peninsula or the general popularity of the licensed trade. In
fact, after paying bond for the vessel while it was under appeal, the Ariadne left Philadelphia and
continued on its voyage to Cadiz, finally arriving in February 1813. The conflicting opinions in
court regarding the fate of the Ariadne represents a larger division in American society about the
propriety of using British licenses during the war. In 1818, a petition made to Congress
continued to push for relief from the Supreme Court’s decision on the Ariadne. The petitioners
argued that Congress at the time of the capture of the vessel had declined to act against the
license trade, which indicated that the government itself was unsure about the illegality of
licensed voyages.67 The petitioners could have also pointed to ambiguous statements made by
American officials regarding the license trade. While voicing opposition to licensing in public,
several members of Congress allegedly invested in licensed trades according to contemporary
newspaper reports. Even Thomas Jefferson, who was undoubtedly the most prominent opponent
of Great Britain in America, believed that the grain trade with Spain and Portugal was important
to American commerce. Jefferson stated his views on the license trade to Madison in April 1812:
“For I am favorable to the opinion which has been urged by others, sometimes acted on, and now
partly so by France and Great Britain, that commerce under certain restrictions and licenses may
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be indulged between enemies, mutually advantageous to the individuals.”68 War with Britain a
few months later did not temper Jefferson’s views on licensing. In fact, Jefferson and others
believed that by supplying the British army in Spain it would encourage the war with Napoleon
and keep Great Britain distracted. In 1813 Jefferson followed up on his convictions, investing in
a licensed shipment of 450 barrels of flour to Spain; the shipment was stopped only due to the
appearance of a British blockade off of the coast of Virginia.69
While American privateers remained a concern for the length of the war, Perkins also
suffered at the hands of the Royal Navy. Perkins’s other ships captured that winter, the Miser and
the Topaz, were taken to the Vice-Admiralty Court at Gibraltar for trial. Both ships had left with
the Ariadne as part of a major shipment of flour to Lisbon and Cadiz. For the Miser, bad luck
seemed to have doomed the voyage from ever turning a profit. The captain learned after coming
into contact with a British cruiser that the ship’s license was destroyed by rats during the Atlantic
crossing. Lacking any defense in court, Perkins hurriedly forwarded on duplicates of all of the
ship’s original documents hoping that the Miser would be released before the papers even
reached Gibraltar. Desperate to control the situation, Perkins wrote in December 1812 to Richard
Hackley at Cadiz with instructions for every eventuality:
“If under embarrassment when this gets to hand, send this paper to Gibraltar. If
condemned in the vice Admiralty forward it to England to S. Williams to be used
in the appeal. If the ship is cleared it will be well that she has this document on
her home passage as it will secure her against interruption.”70
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Some British privateers refused to even honor the licenses, they waited offshore for vessels to
unload their shipments at Lisbon and capture the American ships returning home with a cargo
full of gold and silver. Corruption was always a problem in the license trade. An English naval
officer made a sizable business out of issuing licenses to American merchants and then
ransoming vessels once they arrived in Lisbon.71
While the Miser waited on the mail, the Topaz was released on December 10, 1812, after
a month’s delay while the court awaited instructions from the British government. However, the
damage the ship experienced while held in port delayed its shipment to Cadiz even further.
Worse still, while the supercargo awaited the court’s decision in Gibraltar he was forced to watch
as other American vessels arrived in port. The supercargo witnessed a visible display of the
importance of arriving first at a market, as ships unloaded their cargoes and guaranteed profits
for their owners. By December, news had arrived that the markets at Cadiz were overflowing
with flour with approximately twenty-five American vessels already in port. John Bromfield in
Cadiz reported home that only an American embargo would save the voyage by artificially
increasing the price of flour.72 By February 1813 the entire venture seems to have been a wash.
Perkins openly lamented his financial woes, stating that of the six shipments he had sent to Cadiz
that year, “not one should have arrived without accident…”73 Added to this, Congress had taken
up the issue of licenses again and Admiral Warren’s blockade of the southern ports of the United
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States cut off a major source of American flour. Perkins worried that if the latest rumor of a
French withdrawal from Spain was true, then the “Spaniards & Portuguese would be left to
cultivate their fields in quiet…”74 Without the constant burden of two invading armies, the
Peninsula would no longer need to rely on imports from America.
Most of Perkins’s troubles in the winter of 1812 may be explained by the conditions
faced by the British army in Spain. There appears to have been a direct correlation between the
Duke of Wellington’s progress against the French army and the relative legality of a licensed
grain shipment from America. Wellington, who always despised relying on American grain to
feed his army, moved as quickly as possible to avoid any further dependence on a country
currently at war with Great Britain.75 Unknown to investors on either side of the Atlantic, the
licensed trade was quickly coming to an end. In fact, many were investing more in the Peninsula.
Despite the numerous problems he faced in 1812, the following year Perkins promised to
persevere, pushing for further shipments, and inquiring whether Samuel Williams in London
could obtain more licenses for the Peninsula.
Perkins’s profits were always susceptible to a sudden change in the trade winds. By
funneling American grain into a single market, the British fueled their armies but they also
ensured an eventual market glut. By the summer of 1813 prices for grain had dropped by two
dollars a barrel, and the British were already considering alternative sources for grain from
Egypt, Brazil and the Baltic. As a result, the tonnage of American vessels fell by almost 75
percent between 1813 and 1814. Profitable grain shipments were further hindered by the Royal
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Navy’s growing blockade which had divided America into friendly and unfriendly zones. The
blockade severely disrupted local markets resulting in widespread uncertainty and price hikes.
For example, Brian Arthur has found that, due to the blockade, a barrel of flour cost six dollars in
Baltimore and almost twelve dollars in Boston. Similarly, Bostonians paid over double the cost
of sugar compared to prices in New Orleans. As it became more difficult to move goods through
America, markets became so isolated that they were entirely disconnected from the rest of the
country.76
The proceeds for Perkins’s shipments to Spain and Portugal were remitted to Henry
Higginson and Samuel Williams of London, further emphasizing the interdependence of AngloAmerican trade. Just as in the previous years, London creditors continued to provide essential
services for transatlantic commerce. Merchants depended on London bankers for credit and for
news from Europe, but the license system and the war also made these connections more
tenuous. Communication between America and Great Britain was closely watched by the U.S.
government, which feared what Americans might reveal to their British contacts. When New
York merchant Jonathan Ogden wrote to his partner and brother Robert Ogden in London, he
informed Robert that any letters sent direct from London “will go to Washington to be there
opened & it is frequently weeks before they get to my hands.”77 To counteract this, merchants
developed tactics to circumvent the watchful gaze of authorities. When T.H. Perkins wished to
contact Samuel Williams in London, he would write to Williams by way of H.T. Sampayo in
Lisbon (the brother to F.T. Sampayo). Perkins instructed Sampayo to forward on his letters from
Lisbon to his contacts in London. Perkins assured Williams that Sampayo could be trusted and
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that Williams should transmit his responses to Lisbon or Cadiz to be then forwarded on to
Boston.78 Other methods of maintaining communication relied on more local enemy ports such
as Halifax, where the firm of Forsyth, Black & Co. assisted several American firms by
forwarding letters to Europe and the West Indies. Canadian businesses acted as a conduit for
American merchants looking to correspond with contacts in the British empire. Perkins himself
maintained a constant correspondence with British-held Martinique and Guadeloupe, Plymouth,
Liverpool and London by way of Halifax.79 Finally, the neutral Swedish island of St.
Bartholomew’s acted as a further intermediary for Americans looking to ship goods past
American and British cruisers as well as a neutral way station for secretly directing letters to the
British empire.
Purchasing licenses for neutral ports allowed Americans to maintain contact with their
correspondents in Great Britain during the war. Yet this system of communication had its
pitfalls. As Perkins experienced in 1812, timing was everything in the provisioning trade. When
merchants were forced to rely on intermediaries to transmit important commercial information
their communications were often delayed or even lost. In order to ensure delivery, duplicates of
letters were sent through multiple channels with the hope that at least one would arrive at its
intended destination. When Jonathan Ogden wished to communicate with the Liverpool firm of
Hobsons & Bolton he directed one letter to be sent on a Portuguese vessel and another copy to be
sent to St. Bartholomew’s. From St. Bartholomew’s, the letter was carried to Bermuda before
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eventually being delivered to Liverpool.80 However, the process of duplication was always timesensitive and could potentially lead to costly errors or omissions further endangering the
potential profits from these adventures.
St. Bartholomew’s was not only a hub for correspondence between America and the
British empire. Similar to the role played by St. Eustatius during the American Revolution, the
island also acted as an important center for West Indian commerce during the War of
1812.81 After the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, St. Eustatius was largely deserted by its population
of cosmopolitan merchants in favor of the Danish island of St. Thomas and the Swedish island of
St. Bartholomew’s. When it became too dangerous to leave an American port with a British
license, ships would travel under a Swedish or Danish flag. Once St. Thomas was captured by
the British in 1807, enterprising merchants were only left with one option. Hundreds of ships
flocked to St. Bartholomew’s in the following years. Some American merchants even became
Swedish subjects in order to neutralize their businesses. The trade in Swedish bottoms during the
war appears very similar to previous neutral trades, with the exception that much of this traffic
was now licensed by the British government.82 Licensing neutral commerce forced many to
question the limits of legitimate neutrality.
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Since Jefferson’s 1807 embargo, American interest in neutral papers had increased as a
means of circumventing American commercial restrictions rather than offering any kind of
protection from belligerent vessels. When the British began blockading the American coast in
1813, merchants once again invested heavily in neutral shipping. Newspapers advertised vessels
that ‘sails remarkably fast’ or guaranteed vessels ‘built in Sweden’ rather than simply naturalized
with the appropriate documents. Others sold vessels which seemed capable of adopting whatever
identity would meet the needs of the buyer, claiming ships “well calculated for the Swedish or
Spanish trade.”83 For a time, these advertisements offered merchants hope of continuing their
trade with the British empire, despite the embargo, blockade and legislation banning British
licenses.
Initially, the British intended to rely on neutral shipping to Bermuda rather than a neutral
island to supply the West Indies. With the Order in Council of October 26, 1812, Great Britain
had transformed Bermuda into the main port for foreign trade with the British West Indies. The
Order authorized the importation of British sugar and coffee into the island for re-export to the
United States. The Order further permitted the granting of licenses to any neutral ship to carry
provisions from the United States to Bermuda. These goods were then redistributed throughout
the West Indies. Finally, the Order allowed for the entry of American vessels under license into
Bermuda, provided those ships originated from the ‘ports of the Eastern States exclusively.’84
Even as an expedient wartime measure, the Order drastically undermined the exclusivity of
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Britain’s colonial possessions. By opening the West Indies to foreign traffic, the government
punctured a Bermuda-sized hole into the Navigation Act. Further, in adapting the West Indies to
the licensed trade, Britain had confessed that the West Indies continued to rely on American
supplies for their very survival.
The plan to make Bermuda into the center of the West Indies was challenged from the
very beginning. British merchants argued that Bermuda was too remote and that it would
unnecessarily increase the cost of transshipment as well as add to the length of an individual
voyage. The many inconveniences surrounding the Bermuda trade came to the forefront in 1813
when hurricanes devastated the British West Indies. Once again, the Board of Trade was forced
to consider how to reconcile the problem of immediate need with the mercantile philosophy of
the Navigation Act. Neutral shipping direct to Bermuda was clearly not working, and a new
strategy was needed in order to feed the colonists and the military forces stationed in the British
West Indies. The Board’s short-term solution was to return to the spirit of the old system of
proclamations by giving colonial governors the power to grant licenses.85 Within the space of a
year, the hole in the Navigation Act had already expanded to undermine the entire commercial
system.
Desperate for relief, the government increasingly relied on neutral ports for supplies. St.
Bartholomew’s transformation into the neutral entry-point into the British empire came about
haphazardly. As early as November 1812, Admiral Warren was reporting to Whitehall that St.
Bartholomew’s had already become the main ‘entrepot’ for supplying the West Indies. Warren
had received applications for licenses to St. Bartholomew’s for American and neutral vessels and
was unsure of how to proceed. In the application for a license, Consul Andrew Allen stated to
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Warren that just as St. Eustatius and St. Thomas were used in previous wars as ‘mediums of
communication’, now St. Bartholomew’s could serve the same purpose for the British. Allen
noted that while it was illegal for an American ship to directly trade with the enemy by taking a
British license for a British port, St. Bartholomew’s could serve as a viable alternative. Allen’s
proposal even spelled out the form of the license for Warren in order to avoid any violation of
U.S. law.86 Neutral commerce, which had so long worked against the interests of the empire,
now worked for it. The American Prizes Act of February 1, 1813, modified previous Orders in
Council to allow belligerents to sell their ships to neutrals. The details of the Act were then
forwarded on to the Governor of St. Bartholomew’s. This was, in effect, “the tacit approval from
Whitehall of American trade under the Swedish flag.”87 Recognizing the significance of this new
policy, colonial governors began explicitly licensing British vessels to stop at St. Bartholomew’s
before proceeding to a U.S. port.
The wholesale takeover of the neutral trade was a great victory for the empire, but to the
military, it was a further sign of weakness. Though Admiral Warren depended on these
provisions to support his winter base in the West Indies, he nevertheless believed that the license
system was too unwieldy. In Warren’s view, the blockade of the American coast proved
ineffective so long as American merchants could pass British forces freely under neutral cover.
Further, Warren questioned the effectiveness of a blockade while the enemy government
continued to collect customs revenue.88
The trade between St. Bartholomew’s and the British West Indies focused on the
transshipment of goods through the island. As the stated port of destination, St. Bartholomew’s
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neutralized a voyage and protected the shipper from capture, namely from the American
privateers swarming into the Caribbean. The journey of the Flora, for example, highlights how
this new trade played out amid war, blockades and a sea of privateers. In February 1813, the
Flora, owned by Samuel Blagge of Boston, traveled from St. Bartholomew’s for New York with
a cargo of sugar, molasses and hides consigned to Blagge’s contact in New York, Robert Dickey.
Having learned that the customs officer for the port of New York was targeting vessels with
colonial produce from St. Bartholomew’s, the Flora changed course for Connecticut and the
ports of New Haven and New London. These two ports had grown over the course of the war to
become the principal smuggling sites for the Atlantic coast of the United States. After six
months, their reputation was already so notorious that they were known by U.S. officials as the
‘St. Bartholomew’s of America’.89 After landing the Flora’s cargo, the goods were shipped
overland to New York. Arrangements were made for the Flora to pick up a return cargo for St.
Bartholomew’s by travelling in ballast to New York. The Flora left New York carrying
important letters from American merchants to their neutral contacts in St. Bartholomew’s. The
correspondents warned that much of the American coast was now blockaded, but that the ports
north of New York were safe for neutral shipping. The story of the Flora shows how commercial
restrictions had the potential to shift international trade to new markets. In Europe, the ports of
Heligoland and Malta had gained new importance as avenues for subverting the Continental
System. Similarly, St. Bartholomew’s, New Haven and New London became major hubs for the
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redistribution of colonial produce and grain. This idea was crystallized by Blagge’s New York
partner who noted that even though most ports were blockaded by the Royal Navy and the war
was set to continue, “Our markets for West India produce is again looking up.”90
Like all neutral trades, the trade with St. Bartholomew’s relied on the active use of
multiple identities in order to outmaneuver privateers and customs officials. The case of the
Albion alias Anna Catharina, taken by a British privateer in November 1813, shows how this
multifaceted trade worked. The ship’s multiple names give an early indication of how
complicated identity could become in the St. Bartholomew’s trade. The Albion was owned by an
American, Richard Foster Breed, who ran a merchant firm in Liverpool, England. In order to
protect itself from capture by American privateers, the Albion traveled with Swedish documents
and under a Swedish name, Anna Catharina. The ship’s papers reveal that the supercargo, David
Austin of Boston, was instructed to first stop in St. Bartholomew’s for information on the West
Indian markets. Though the ship and cargo were claimed as British property, Breed instructed
Austin to consider trying the markets in the Spanish and French West Indies. Given its multiple
identities and destinations, the captors believed that there was every reason to suspect that the
Albion was in fact American property. In the initial years after the Essex decision, the court
probably would have agreed. However, the captors were unable to convince the Admiralty Court
of Appeals which refused to condemn the vessel as a lawful prize.91 In the eyes of the court, the
use of a license, the avoidance of American privateers, the British owner, and the trade with St.
Bartholomew’s trumped the possibility of American collusion.
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Many vessels leaving America for St. Bartholomew’s never actually made it to the
Caribbean, instead these vessels leveraged their Swedish papers to travel to Halifax. In
December 1812, 20,000 barrels of flour arrived in Halifax from Boston under neutral colors.92
Isaac Clason reported on the trade in Halifax to James Madison, stating, “The enemy are
regularly fed by Swedes or by pretended Swedes, with forged papers from Halifax.”93 To avoid
suspicious authorities, merchants were forced to become increasingly creative in their schemes to
ship goods under neutral colors to the British empire. Neutral vessels landed their cargoes in
Nova Scotia at night or even met with the blockading squadron off the coast of the United States.
In one case, a ship under Swedish colors was stopped by a suspicious customs officer and
searched thoroughly for any incriminating documents. The ship was officially destined for the
neutral port of Fayal, but the customs officer discovered a British license hidden in a jug which
indicated that the ship was really heading to Halifax.94
Since the embargo of 1807, the local economies in British North America had greatly
benefited from the disappearance of American shipping. Goods smuggled from America were
transshipped by vessels from New Brunswick and Nova Scotia to the West Indies. During the
embargo of 1807, these ports handled more shipping than the entire U.S. merchant fleet.95 British
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North America’s new commercial role only became more important during the war. While many
merchants engaged in outright smuggling along the border of British North America, the
transshipment of U.S. goods was a far more important trade for both sides. By October 13, 1812,
an Order in Council opened the ports of Halifax, St. John and St. Andrew’s to a licensed trade
with the United States. Since U.S. ships could not legally depart for an enemy port, merchants
arranged for the capture of their own vessels in order to fool authorities in the U.S. that the
shipments were not intended for the enemy.96
A neutral ship could only provide so much protection from American privateers or the
Royal Navy. Several contemporary newspapers followed the capture of vessels accused of
violating their neutrality. In January 1814, Niles Weekly Register reported on the capture of the
Swedish schooner Neutrality from St. Bartholomew’s. Despite its neutral flag and neutral origin,
the Neutrality was captured by an American privateer “on suspicion of coming from Halifax.”97
While there were many reports that British traders were covering their trades with neutral papers,
particular scorn was reserved for those former American vessels that were now under Swedish
colors and British licenses. American vessels would leave the United States and clear customs
for St. Bartholomew’s but these vessels rarely unloaded any cargo on the island. According to
Nathaniel Strong, the American agent in St. Bartholomew’s, “not more than half of the vessels
and sail from the United States…ever were in the island, they proceed direct to the islands of the
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enemy and return from them under forged clearances.”98 Like the American trade to St. Eustatius
in the 1780s, St. Bartholomew’s was merely a way station into the British empire.
Along with destination, there was also a question of the actual identity of the owners of
the vessels engaged in this trade. Privateers, the U.S. Navy, American spies in the British West
Indies, and even the British Admiralty Courts all admitted that neutral ships were often secretly
owned by British or American merchants.99 American privateers enjoyed great success bringing
in vessels carrying Swedish papers and British licenses. In March 1814, the Niles Weekly
Register claimed that American privateers had captured nearly forty vessels worth an estimated
two million dollars in the space of a month. Many of these prizes were neutrals traveling
between neutral ports and listed in the Register as ‘supposed British’ or ‘called a Spaniard, but
with a British license’.100 The following months carried more lists of captured neutral ships.
These captures were justified as it was generally believed that there was a direct link between
neutral license holders and the continued strength of the British military. When a British ViceAdmiralty Court zealously condemned several vessels sailing under the Swedish flag, the Niles
Weekly Register applauded the enemy court’s move against perceived traitors.
British privateers were also deeply uncomfortable with the new status-quo. As shown
above, privateers continued to use post-Essex justifications for bringing in ships: enemy crews,
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suspicious documents and problematic destinations. While their methods had not changed, the
higher court’s treatment of the St. Bartholomew’s trade seemed to completely disregard enemy
ownership of neutral vessels. When a British privateer brought the Robert of St. Bartholomew’s
into Antigua, he declared that the ship had sailed from a blockaded port and there were further
reasons “to infer that the property belonged to the enemy.”101 The Robert sailed from St.
Bartholomew’s in 1813 with colonial produce, landed goods at New Haven, and departed for
Barbados with a cargo of flour. The Robert intended to trade with both sides of a war, profiting
at each end of the voyage. In earlier years, this was grounds for condemnation. Further, the
owners of the Robert, Elbers and Krafft of St. Bartholomew’s, had several other vessels captured
by British privateers – a fact that was generally interpreted as evidence of guilt. However, on
each occasion, Elbers and Krafft prevailed in the Admiralty Court of Appeals.102 In effect, the St.
Bartholomew’s trade with the British West Indies was more vital than any potential revenue
from prizes taken by British privateers.
In 1813, Perkins’s firm struggled to make the transition to the neutral trade in Swedish
bottoms after the devastating losses which had occurred the previous year in Spain. Perkins
wrote dejectedly to an associate in Martinique that ‘business was dull’ and with the blockade of
all of the ports south of New York, supplies could only come in neutral bottoms.103 Perkins’s
poor experience with the license system helps to explain why he testified at the trial of Andrew
Allen to verify Allen’s signature on the British licenses granted to several Boston merchants.104
It would take until December 1814 before Perkins felt confident enough to recommend his
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contacts ship any more goods for America. On December 31, 1814, Perkins could no longer
resist engaging in the neutral trade. He wrote to a contact in St. Bartholomew’s that the
uncertainty of the war had depressed the market, but the latest news hinted that the war would
continue for a number of years, if true, “the price of sugar & coffee must be very high & will
probably induce us to take the hazards of shipments to y[ou]r place in which case we shall have
the pleasure to address you.”105 Five days later, Perkins sent a similar letter to another resident of
St. Bartholomew’s soliciting a potential business opportunity. Perkins informed his contacts on
the neutral Swedish island that they should respond to his letters via Forsyth, Black & Co. of
Halifax or Samuel Williams in London. Like his business in Spain, Perkins’s latest scheme was
ill-timed as the war had already ended before his letters even arrived at their intended
destination. Nevertheless, the letters themselves are important. Even when business dried up and
the Royal Navy’s blockade covered the entire American coast, Perkins still actively maintained
his contacts in the empire. In writing these letters Perkins continued a tradition of American
merchants since independence of relying on British contacts to relay information, protect his
interests, conceal his business and advocate for him with the authorities. The information,
however discouraging, that Perkins collected from his British contacts was the most important
commodity in his possession.

Conclusion
The license trade was the culmination of decades of reforms of the navigation system of the
British empire. By 1807, with nearly complete control over the seas, the British claimed sole
authority to regulate international trade in the Atlantic. In this sense, licensing fulfilled the
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ambitions of the Navigation Acts by banning all foreign traffic not permitted by the British
government. Licensing decisively tipped the balance of trade in Britain’s favor. As the sole
purveyor of colonial goods, Britain had become the world’s marketplace. The power of this
monopoly to reshape the market is clear. As the license trade reveals, foreign consumers and
merchants actively broke their own society's laws to gain access to products only the empire
sold. Despite popular misgivings, many were more than happy to form a partnership with the
‘tyrant of the ocean’.
While licensing was a testament to the adaptability of mercantilist policy to meet a crisis,
the system also greatly weakened the effectiveness of the Navigation Act. Even though only
licensed British traders were able to move freely through the Atlantic, it was now incredibly easy
to become a British trader. The text of the license stipulated that everyone ‘not French’ could
obtain a license. After paying a fee, these licensed traders carried British products to foreign
countries or, worse still, they returned home with a cargo of specie drained straight from British
coffers. The government attempted to rectify the deficiencies in licensing by constantly adjusting
the system and ending licensed trades as soon as a market was sustainable. But the damage was
already done.106 For the short term, the empire depended heavily on foreign shipping to move
goods and information until the war ended. Looking forward into the nineteenth century, it is
clear that licensing greatly contributed to the downward spiral of Britain’s closed navigation
system.
Licensing also further complicated British identity. The empire had struggled with
distinguishing British subjects from Americans since the end of the American Revolution. By the
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1805 Essex decision, the British finally had a response to Americanness: Americans were
enemies, little better than the French in the eyes of the courts. Within three years, many
Americans were suddenly transformed into licensed British traders working to actively support
the empire’s war effort. Even with the outbreak of war in the summer of 1812, there seemed to
be a strong belief within the British government that the commercial interest in America was
aligned with Britain. It was believed that this interest would never support the war and by
purchasing a license, these merchants had already taken a side. Instead of supporting the war,
through various channels, American merchants actively supported their nation’s enemy by
sending supplies to Canada, the West Indies and Europe. The War of 1812 may have helped
many in America distance themselves from their legacy as a colony of the British empire, but the
war also emphasized the continued interdependence of American and British trade.
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Conclusion
This dissertation has focused on continuity in the Age of Revolution. After spilling a lot
of blood and gold to win independence, American merchants smuggled, falsified, and negotiated
their way back into the British Empire. Despite the supposed rupture caused by their colonial
revolution against the mother country, American merchants saw no contradiction in their newly
won identity and their place within the empire. Likewise, a period that began with the British
government viewing disloyal members of the empire as ‘bayonet subjects’ ended with licensed
American traders, whose loyalty to the crown began and ended with the wartime commercial
privileges the license purchased. In the end, belonging within the British Empire could not be
broken down into simple binaries of loyal subject and foreigner. One could in fact appear
disloyal or even independent and still belong. The innumerable configurations of foreigners who
participated in the empire challenges the traditional trajectory of modern citizenship outlined by
most historians.
Continuity is also evident in the two Anglo-American wars which bookend this study.
During the revolution, American merchants joined British, French, and Spanish merchants as
Dutch burghers on the neutral island of St. Eustatius. Similarly, British and American merchants
relocated to the Swedish island of St. Bartholomew’s, and after paying a naturalization fee, the
merchants turned the island into a conduit for trade traveling between the West Indies and the
United States during the embargo and War of 1812. For both St. Eustatius and St.
Bartholomew’s, peace brought economic disaster as merchants relocated to more traditional
ports. Those who remained attempted to take advantage of the opening of South American
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markets and portrayed the island as a free port for supplying privateers, but St. Bartholomew’s
had little to offer in peacetime amidst an expanding sea of free ports.1
At the end of both wars, the association between the two countries remained so entangled
that no one was quite sure if America retained access to the West Indies, despite the confident
pronouncements of popular pamphleteers to the ‘Alien States of America’.2 At the end of the
War of 1812, Petty Vaughan, a merchant in London, informed his brother William in Maine: “I
cannot yet learn whether the late treaty admits American vessels to the WI, let me know if you
can.”3 Even when Petty learned that all shipments to the British West Indies were once again
confined to British ships, this did not necessarily clear up the confusion. Americans simply
purchased shares in British vessels and indirect shipments of American supplies continued to
flow into the empire via Bermuda.4
In the state’s own pursuit of continuity, the period from 1783 to 1815 was also defined by
experimentation in the empire. Forced to confront former British subjects, who no longer owed
allegiance to the crown, the British government proved equally adaptable. The Board of Trade
pressured governors to avoid opening the ports to American merchants at all costs, making every
breach of the Navigation Act an uncomfortable balance between famine and loyalty. Privateers
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deconstructed Americanness on the high seas by using suspicious conduct to unmask secret
identities. The direction of a ship at sea became a marker of identity, as the crew of the Osiris
discovered when their ship was seized based on the route they had chosen and the allegedly
superior maritime judgment of the British privateer. Meanwhile, the British admiralty courts
determined nationality by relying on temporary residence and intention rather than merely birth.
In fact, admiralty court cases revealed a much more nuanced understanding of international
commerce than is traditionally assumed. The courts were forced to negotiate through
complicated international partnerships with often overlapping identities and businesses
seemingly at once working for and against the British war effort.5 Even with the arrival of peace
with the Treaty of Ghent, national identity remained malleable for both the state and individuals
willing to cross borders.
Though scholars have identified the latter-half of the eighteenth-century as a particularly
extreme tropical storm cycle, those living in the Greater Caribbean in the nineteenth century
experienced drastic temperature fluctuations, earthquakes, and hurricanes all of which created
new opportunities for disaster relief. The 1831 hurricane which struck the British West Indies
threatened St. Vincent and Barbados with starvation. However, while the destruction remained a
constant facet of Caribbean life, the official response had changed. The massive windfalls
experienced by American merchants in the 1780s were largely diminished by increased
government aid and the liberalization of foreign trade with European colonies. The continued
danger of slave revolt or colonial revolution added greater urgency for governments to provide
support for endangered colonies in order to guarantee their loyalty and stave off rebellion.6
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The conclusion of the war destabilized the Caribbean, leading American and British shipowners to compete in a trade war for the right to provision the British colonies and access
Spanish American markets. The independence movements in Latin America served as a capstone
to a nearly fifty-year effort on the part of the British to openly trade with the Spanish Empire.
Britain’s free ports in the Caribbean, which encouraged smuggling efforts into rival imperial
systems, now faced unwanted competition by enterprising American merchants once the war had
ended.7 Tensions between the two countries remained so high that when James Buckley of New
York wrote to his British contacts in March 1815 with news of peace, he warned that peace
might be short lived: “The success that the Americans have most with at sea seems to have
inspired them with the idea that the day is not far distant when they shall be able to humble the
pride of the British navy.”8 While competition was primarily about access to restricted markets,
the ultimate goal was never the absolute collapse of all commercial barriers, but the pursuit of
exclusive privileges.
The march toward free trade in the nineteenth century was not smooth or even universally
supported by the mercantile community. Rather, merchants continued to take advantage of the
licit and illicit opportunities created by the state’s regulation of the economy. Scholars used to
assume that British faith in mercantilism had waned by 1783, but increasingly peace in 1815 is
seen as the marker for a change in economic philosophy.9 However, the years after the war saw a
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doubling down on traditional commercial policies within the empire. Facing the reinvigoration of
the Corn Laws and the Navigation Act, the United States invested in its own mercantilist
policies.10 Much like the empire’s support of neutral traffic under the licensing system, the
British only willingly supported free trade once Great Britain dominated international commerce.
Support for liberal economic policies occurred in fits and starts. The Corn Laws were
continuously modified between 1828 and repeal in 1846 while the Navigation Acts remained
casually enforced until 1849. The repeal of both of these regulations, essential cornerstones of
early modern political economy, carried more political than economic weight by mid-century.11
If mercantilist policies were a ‘jumble of devices’ designed to meet particular interests, the
transition to free trade did not occur as a wholesale adoption of a new philosophy. Rather, free
trade, like mercantilism, came out of composite interests pushing against the privileges of the
competition.12
Adopting free trade not only entailed a change in British commercial policy, but also a
complete redefinition of British identity. During the eighteenth century, the British based
conceptions of loyalty and belonging around the Navigation Act. These beliefs were made even
more evident in the years after American independence. In the words of Lord Sheffield, the
Navigation Act was “the guardian of the prosperity of Britain,” by guaranteeing protection for
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Britain’s shipping and a nursery of seamen for the empire.13 The Navigation Act was also the
moral compass of the empire as it distinguished Britons from the avaricious character of other
commercial peoples. Gradually, free trade supplanted adherence to the Navigation Act as the
standard for Britishness in the nineteenth century. For Victorians, free trade was the marker
which distinguished the British from Continental protectionism.14 Finally, just as protectionist
policies benefitted from the growth of the state in the eighteenth-century, the philosophical turn
towards free trade encouraged this trend. With free trade came the establishment of national
customs enforcement agencies and further constraints on the easy movement of men and material
across borders and nationalities.
For Americans, the process of ‘unbecoming British’, to use a phrase coined by Kariann
Yokota, was long drawn out.15 As this study has shown, it would be inaccurate to chart a linear
trajectory for the development of American cultural identity. After playing with the ambiguities
of political independence in their commercial pursuits for almost a decade, Americans used their
nationality as a neutral shield during the Napoleonic Wars. However, if American nationality
discourse increasingly became associated with republicanism, free trade, and sailor’s rights at the
beginning of the nineteenth century, it nevertheless failed to check the overwhelming popularity
of the licensing system (with all of its British associations) among the commercial classes in the

13

Sheffield, Observations on the Commerce of the American States, 1–2, 86.
Even when it became a major aspect of British national identity, free trade was often a factional issue, associated
more with the Liberal Party, see, Parry, The Politics of Patriotism: English Liberalism, National Identity and
Europe, 1830-1886; O’Brien and Pigman see this distinction between the British and the Continent even more
distinct with the rise of what the authors term “neo-mercantilism”, see, Patrick K. O’Brien and Geoffrey Allen
Pigman, “Free Trade, British Hegemony and the International Economic Order in the Nineteenth Century,” Review
of International Studies 18, no. 2 (April 1992): 89–113.
15 According to Yokota, this was because political change simply outpaced cultural change, see, Yokota,
Unbecoming British: How Revolutionary America Became a Postcolonial Nation.
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United States.16 Instead, the check on American commercial entanglement with Great Britain
came as a result of market forces after the war. The repeated depredations on American
commerce, despite licensing, thoroughly disenchanted many transatlantic merchants. Merchants
like T.H. Perkins and Nicholas Low increasingly turned toward manufacturing, finance, and land
speculation as the provisioning trade dried up. This is reflected in the personal correspondence of
Perkins who complained at the end of 1815: “The harvest of American Commerce has been
reaped, and a scanty crop will be gathered in future.”17 The decline of early modern merchant
practices did not end the close commercial relationship between the two countries. Just as in the
first decade after independence, Americans in the nineteenth century continued to consume vast
quantities of British manufactures. Yet by this late period American consumers expected goods
to reflect their own cultural tastes rather than to serve as an emulation of British elites.18
Scholars contend that the Atlantic World effectively ended by the middle of the
nineteenth century. After all, the Atlantic World was a distinctively early modern moment, a
period of transition and experimentation. In the Caribbean and South America, the ten years after
the Napoleonic Wars continued to perpetuate the main characteristics of that world. The
destruction of the Spanish Empire renewed transimperial cooperation as new frontiers were
formed and individuals freely crossed imperial borders.19 The revolt of the Latin American
colonies against Spanish imperial control also provided a commercial opportunity and crisis as
16

On the power of this message in Republican and Federalist ideologies, see, Gilje, Free Trade and Sailors’ Rights
in the War of 1812.
17 According to T.H. Perkins, the high duties and glutted market in America had resulted in a gloomy market
prediction, James & T.H. Perkins to W.F. Paine, 8 Dec. 1816, reel 6, James & T.H. Perkins, Thomas Handasyd
Perkins Papers, MHS.
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19
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armed bands of men joined multinational ships and waged war on the high seas. In 1818 the
Boston Daily Advertiser carried a vivid description of one pirate crew: “The crew of the pirate
appeared to consist almost entirely of Irishmen, Englishmen, and Americans; and all those who
came on board of us (the boarding officer in particular) seemed to be most determined
robbers.”20 While many at the time, and since, saw such crews as a throwback to an earlier age of
piracy, it seems more accurate to view these multinational crews through the lens of continuity.
Even after the 1815, mariners on the periphery could still contest the growing rationalization of
citizenship and national identity under the law by taking advantage of the opportunities and
confusion brought on by war.21
The period from 1783 to 1815 was a moment of enormous commercial opportunity. The
instability of the British Empire brought on by American independence, environmental disaster,
and transatlantic revolution allowed foreign merchants to push against the periphery and access
technically forbidden markets. For American merchants operating outside of empire, the
persistence of transatlantic networks of information, from official and commercial sources,
offered a steady supply of news and rumor for navigating around the latest mercantile
restrictions, or tactics for self-fashioning voyages to fool customs authorities. The loopholes
created by the empire’s inconsistent governance allowed merchants to exploit the system’s
weaknesses in order to turn a profit.
The experience of the merchants outlined in this study challenges the traditional
narratives of this period as one of revolutionary rupture and the birth of modern concepts of

20
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For more on the legal definition of citizenship for sailors, see, Raffety, The Republic Afloat: Law, Honor, and
Citizenship in Maritime America; For the British case, one can discern the definition of mariner identity through the
exemptions granted to Parliament, see, Brunsman, The Evil Necessity: British Naval Impressment in the EighteenthCentury Atlantic World; For a standard view of nineteenth-century piracy, see, Peter Earle, The Pirate Wars (New
York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2013), chap. 11.
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citizenship and loyalty to the state. Those engaged in overseas trade resisted nationalizing
movements by undermining imperial borders and upending the relationship between center and
periphery. While cosmopolitan practices pushed against nationalization, merchants were not
merely passive witnesses to the era, rather they seized advantage of the opportunities created by
revolution and war. For merchants, the Age of Revolution was the last early modern moment.
The Age of Revolution, however, was also an age of experimentation for the empire. While
initially this experimentation was meant to maintain the continuity of the First British Empire,
something new was created in its stead. Early modern traditions of ineffectual regulations and
malleable national identity soon gave way to the modern forces of nationalism and civic
responsibility to the state. In this new modern world, it was less possible and far less profitable to
purchase Dutch citizenship, a Swedish bottom, or a British license.
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